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ABSTRACT 
Central planners and clt1zens, conservatives and reformers, 19th -century liberal 
statisticians and today's advocates of sustainable development all draw on 
statistics for the elaboration and communication of political visions. Yet, this 
striking phenomenon has so far largely escaped the attention of political 
philosophers in the English-speaking world. As politics has come to be informed 
and shaped by statistics, there is a need to scrutinize omnipresent statistical 
accounts for their political vision. Taking as its political vision the idea of society 
as a fair system of co-operation, this thesis offers a series of essays towards a 
political philosophy of statistics. To this end, the thesis retrieves the statistical 
macro-scopie point of view in the vision of co-operation as spelled out by John 
Rawls and contrasts this uptake of statistics with the one in Martin Heidegger's 
phenomenology of everydayness. The goal is to make explicit the implicit role of 
statistics in the philosophical reflection of these thinkers. This thesis then argues 
for the place of statistics in a system of co-operation in terms of accountability 
institutions. It also engages the contemporary political issue of sus tain able 
development, which has se en the rapid development and use of statistics. Ir 
argues that the Index for Sustainable Development is not a measure of 
sustainable development, but rather a debunking index. As such, it is a stepping 
stone for more systematic accounts, such as the eco-space proposal. For these 
proposals to make a positive contribution to sustainable development, they must 
be situated within a vision of large-scale political society. 
Administrateurs et citoyens, conservateurs et réformateurs, statisticiens libéraux 
du XIXe siècle et défenseurs actuels du développement durable, tous font usages 
de statistiques pour l'élaboration et la communication de leurs visions politiques. 
Cependant, ce phénomène reste jusqu'à maintenant largement ignoré par les 
philosophes politiques du monde anglophone. Comme la politique a été amenée 
à être informée ainsi que structurée par l'outil statistique, il y a un clair besoin 
d'examiner ces comptes-rendus statistiques pour leur vision politique. Prenant 
pour conception politique l'idée de la société comme un système équitable de co-
opération, cette thèse offre une série d'essais vers une philosophie politique de la 
statistique. A cette fm, la thèse récupère le point de vue macroscopique statistique 
dans la vision de co-opération élaborée par John Rawls, et le met en contraste 
avec celui présenté dans la phénoménologie de la vie quotidienne de Martin 
Heidegger. Le but est d'expliciter l'usage implicite de la statistique dans la 
réflexion philosophique de ces penseurs. Cette thèse met en valeur le rôle de la 
statistique dans un système de co-opération en terme d' accountabiliry institutions. 
Elle examine ensuite une thématique en politique contemporaine: le 
développement durable, un domaine ou l'usage de l'outil statistique s'est 
développé récemment. Elle explique que l'Index du Développement Durable 
n'est pas une mesure du développement durable mais plutôt un index de 
déboulonnage. Ainsi, cet index initialise une approche favorisant des comptes-
rendus plus systématiques, par example l'idée d'un espace écologique. Si de telles 
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instruments visent à réellement contribuer de façon positive au développement 
durable, elles doivent être situées au sein d'une vision sociétaire de grande échelle. 
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Die Sonne tô'nt, nach a/ter Weise) 
ln Brudersphiin!n Wettgesang, 
Und ihre vofl!,eschriebne Reise 
Vo//endet sie mit Donnergang. 
from the Prolog im Himmel, 
of Goethe's Faust l 
The ancients recommended the observation of the stars as an exercise with which 
to elevate thinking to the contemplation of the cosmos - and to thereby attain a 
new perspective on concems "down there." "It is a delight to take one's way 
along the starry firmament and, leaving the earth and its dull regions behind, to 
ride on the douds, to take on stout Atlas' shoulders and see far below men 
wandering aimlessly, devoid of reason, anxious and in fear of here-after, thus to 
exhort them and unroll the book of fate" (Ovid, Metamorphosis Book XV). 
Consider the statistical tables and graphs on the preceding pages as three 
exercises. The first exercise is from a work by Johann Süssmilch that, through the 
lenses of an lS th century pastor, discusses basic features of human life: birth and 
death, admission to community and its central institutions. The first fives 
columns of the table - on the number of villages, of married couples, of those 
baptised, of those buried and the number of living - are part of Süssmilch's 
attempt to show that the unexpected early death just as much as the undeserved 
long life, or the many children in one family compared to the lack in another, are 
all familiar events that can be seen from a different perspective - as ordered. The 
distance made possible by statistics reveals a movingly stable regularity once we 
consider the different ratios of the dead to the living, of the dead to the baptized, 
of marriages to the living and of marriages to the baptized (columns 5-10). In 
spite of all apparent arbitrariness, luck and misery, there is a great and perfect 
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order (albeit one that likes to "hide from our eyes''). The statistical tables, 
Süssmilch writes, reveal the divine order, and - as God commands the fallen to 
be fruitful, multiply and replenish the Earth - they also reveal the first laws of the 
science of the state (Süssmilch 1741,50-56). 
The second exercise lists another well-known item: personal income. 
How much do you earn? How much in relation to you friends? Is your income 
secure? These questions are ever present and they fuel discussions and demands 
for change. Just to pick a recent example, in the first months of 2006 a 
movement seemed to gather strength in France, Italy and increasingly also in 
other countries. The "generation précaire" is united in no small part in the 
protest that even the educated can find no decent and stable income, that labor 
benefits from "intemships" are un fair, e.g. too little or simply absent, and that a 
change in the income distribution is required. In response to the demand, 
consider exercise two, a 19th century statistical view from above. As we will see in 
essay two, the income table and distribution curve was worked out by Vilfredo 
Pareto in the late 19th century in the context of socialist demands for a more 
egalitarian society. Consider, Pareto suggests, the income statistics from England 
- x stands for personal income in [" N stands for the number of income holdings 
equal or higher than X, log N for the logarithms of N. If you now make a graph 
with logarithms of x on the horizontal and the logarithms of N on the vertical 
axis, the points so determined can approximately fit on the stretch M-N (see 
graph). Repeat this exercise for many countries and cities, and you will always 
obtain a stretch with the same angle - for example pq on the graph, obtained 
form the income statistics of various Italian cities. Reconsider therefore the 
income debate, Pareto urges, for the distribution of income is the same in spite of 
the differences of their polities, their history and size; no matter how arbitrary the 
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distribution of income initially may seem, it is governed by a natural law. Now, 
Pareto's tables say to the "aimless wanderers," reconsider the nature and aims of 
your struggle. 
Finally, a statistical exercise from the turn to the 21 st century. After the 
end of the cold war, many thought and sorne dared to formulate explicitly that all 
that was now left to do was to bring on board a few more "outliers" and "rogue 
states" and from then on: business as usual, forever, the "end of history." Y et, re-
consider business as usual, the inventors of the table for the third exercise say, 
and consider the myriad of business transactions as a system of production and 
consumption situated on the blue planet; calculate the equivalent land 
requirement that the current mode of economic production and consumption 
requires for extraction of resources and for the absorption of waste; observe the 
development of this requirement over cime (the dark line in the graph); compare 
this "ecological footprint" of business as usual with the planet's biological 
productive capacity for resource regeneration and waste absorption (the dotted 
line in the graph): with the end of the cold war the lines have crossed, resources 
are used up more quickly than they can be re-grown and waste is produced more 
quickly than it can be absorbed. Business as usual is a recipe for the death of 
business as usual, it faces conflict and breakdown - or, this ceaseless wandering 
across the planet in the pursuit of business must change. 
Three statistical accounts - three "statistical views from above"? To be 
sure, statistics is not among the usual suspects for modem variations of ancient 
exercises. And yet, the statistical accounts infuse what Hegel called the morning 
prayer of the modern man, i.e. news reports in newspapers, and now on the 
radio, TV and internet. Perhaps, only rarely as splendid revelations of divine 
order or as proofs of natural law, and maybe only somecimes as bio-spheric 
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premonition - still, statistics of economic growth, unemployment, national 
educational performance along with many other statistics are part of the daily 
morning prayer and account for what there is and needs to be done. 
S tatistik, a 17th and 18th century term for the science of the state, is now 
generally used as a term for a quantitative method in the natural and social 
sciences, as weil as many other domains.1 Consequently, there seems to be no 
longer any specifie link between statistics and political philosophy, or at any rate 
statistics is hardly a major theme of current research in political philosophy, let 
alone an umbreIla term for the study of political societies (Nor is statistics a part 
of professional training in political philosophy). The historian of statistics 
Theodore Porter puts it bluntly: "Quantification has not yet become a topic in 
political philosophy" (porter 1995, 73).2 
However, the importance of statistics for an informed citizenry was 
immediately recognized following the American and French revolutions. 
Statistical bureaus were set up; and although in France the republican spirit of the 
bureau quickly was stifled by Napoleon, they have developed in and with large-
scale political societies to such an extent that today statistics offers a source 
informing political perception and action that it seems too trivial to even 
1 The term is commonly attributed to the 18th century Gôttingen Professor Gottfried Achenwall 
(1719-1772), and covers information that belongs to the study of the state and that need not 
necessarily be quantitative. Lazarsfeld points to an even earlier tradition of su ch "statist" inquiries, 
especially the work of Herman Conring (1606-1682). The quantitative root of modem statistics is 
to be found in the work of the political arithmeticians, notably William Petty (1623-1687) and 
John Graunt (1620-1674). Lazarsfeld conjectures that the difference in outlook between Conring 
and Petty may in part be explained by political scale. "The Englishman, citizen of an empire, 
looked for causal relations between quantitative variables. The German, subject of one of 300 
small principalities and involved in the petty policies of many of them, tried to derive 
systematically the best set of categories by which astate could be characterized" (Lazarsfeld 1961, 
155). 
2 Porter uses "quantification" to refer to the political uses of statistics (as also studied in this 
thesis), and especially to refer to the use of numbers in communities such as French State 
Engineers or the US Army Engineers. In an earlier book he off ers a preliminary fixation of 
"statistics" that is, l think, a useful starting point given the variegated history of statistics: 
"'Statistics' as a plural means to us simply numbers, or more particularly, numbers of things ... " 
(porter 1986, 11). 
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mention. Statistics informs our understanding of society: what goals are 
considered pertinent, communicable and justifiable. Reformers from the 19th 
century moral statisticians to today's sustainability advocates have sought to 
support their positions with statistics - to present "the facts" to the "aimless 
wanderers." And even if there is no "political philosophy of quantification," 
political philosophers also draw on statistics in support of, and as preludes to 
their arguments: records for the hard-headed of the sighs of the oppressed 
(consider the uses of poverty statistics in discussions of global justice). There has 
also been a counter-point to the efforts of these reformers and critics in the form 
of an often aristocratie choir united in the refusal to be "summed" and the 
rejection of the meaningfulness and interest of social statistics and their 
interpretations. Nietzsche writes: "The masses seem to me worthy of notice in 
only three respects: first as blurred copies of great men, produced on bad paper 
with worn plates, further as resistance to the great, and fmally as the tools of the 
great; beyond that, may the devil and statistics take them! What, can statistics 
prove that there are laws in rustory? Laws? They can certainly prove how vulgar 
and nauseatingly uniform the masses are: but are the effects of inertia, stupidity, 
mimi cry, love and hunger to be called laws? WeIl, let us supposes they are: that, 
however, only goes to confirm the proposition that so far as there are laws in 
rustory, the laws are worthless and the history is also worthless" (Nietzsche 1874, 
113). In short, already these few observations suggest that statistics offers 
political philosophers ample possibilities to "think what we are doing" (as 
Hannah Arendt once formulated). 
To be sure, Porter's daim that quantification has not yet become a topic 
in political philosophy should not lead to a disregard of rus and other rustorians' 
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contribution to such a political philosophy.l Neither ought the respective works 
of, and inspired by Michel Foucault be forgotten, which even if thematically of a 
much wider scope also contribute to such a task.2 Nonetheless, Porter's daim is 
pertinent with respect to the political philosophers investigating the ideas of co-
operation, justice, equality, community and liberty and their pertinence for our 
societies. 3 For these political philosophers, and those initiated into political 
philosophy with their works, statistics is hardly a topie that has received much 
discussion (nor one, presumably, that is thought worthy of much attention). 
One reason for these differences in focus is suggested by the respective 
formulation of goals. A comparison of Foucault's and Rawls' respective 
statement of goals is instructive. Foucault writes " l'impératif, par conséquent, qui 
sous-tend l'analyse théorique qu'on est en train d'essayer de faire - puisqu'il faut 
bien qu'il y ait un -, je voudrais qu'il soit simplement un impératif conditionnel 
du genre de celui-ci: si vous voulez lutter, voici quelques points dés, voici 
quelques lignes de force, voici quelques verrous et quelques blocages. Autrement 
dit, je voudrais que ces impératifs ne soient rien d'autre que des indicateurs 
tactiques. À moi de savoir, bien sûr, et à ceux qui travaillent dans le même sens, à 
nous par conséquent de savoir sur quels champs de forces réelles on se repère 
pour faire une analyse qui serait efficace en termes tactiques" (Foucault 1977, 5). 
Due to the importance of statistics for the administration of the state and the 
1 This is an occasion to acknowledge that this thesis is much indebted especially to the work of 
Porter (porter 1986 and Porter 1995), but also to the rapidly growing literature on the history of 
statistics. Some notable examples of this literature are Desrosières 1993, Hacking 1990, Klein and 
Morgan 2001, Kruger et al. 1987, and from a more sociologiCal perspective the volume edited by 
Alonso and Starr 1987. 
2 See especially the recently published lectures on "Sécurité, Territoire, et Population: Cours au 
Collège de France 1977-78." For a work inspired by Foucault see Ewald 1986. 
3 Consider as prominent examples John Rawls' work on justice (Rawls 1971), Ronald Dworkin's 
work on equality (Dworkin 1981), the respectively communitarian and liberal analysis of 
community offered by Michael Sandel and Will Kymlicka (Sandel 1982, Kymlicka 1989) and 
frnally Robert Nozick's work on liberty (Nozick 1974). For an excellent overview of this 
"contemporary politiCal philosophy" see Kymlicka 1990. 
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"normalisation" of citizen s, it is not difficult to see why Foucault would pay 
attention to statistics as a form of power. In contrast, Rawls specifies the goal of 
political philosophy in terms of the question what a just democratic society wou/d be 
like (Rawls 2001, 4). He explores in relation to this task how disputed questions 
can be overcome, what aims and purposes should orient our political self-
understanding and how answers to these questions might offer reconciliation 
with the political world. As a result of this focus on the elaboration of a just 
democratic society, i.e. on the elaboration of a political vision in the sense of a 
specification of the basic arrangement of a polity, a topic like statistics seems to 
attain a secondary status. At best, perhaps, statistics seems to raise questions of 
"implementation" or "application" given the formulation of the political vision. 
So is a political philosophy of statistics at all something that can be developed on 
this approach? 
And yet, a political philosophy of statistics requires sorne political vision in 
order to eam the adjective "political." In the subsequent essays, l have chosen 
the idea of society as a fair system of co-operation as this political vision. l t is an 
idea that is both complex and normatively demanding, i.e. it is a vision with 
which to reflect on and engage in large-scale societies and their extended 
divisions of labor. Still, it is in the nature of the present task that the justification 
of this approach to a political philosophy of statistics rests on the subsequent 
essays: first, because the comparison of political visions and defence of one is 
itself a proper thesis topic (and practically one of many books); second, because 
for reasons that will become apparent at the latest with essay two, the vision of 
co-operation stands in an intimate relation to statistical accounts1 that motivates 
1 l explain below, in es say four/section one, the reason for the expression "statistical account." 
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the present choice (and that indicates the possibility to thereby also contribute to 
our understanding of the vision of co-operation). 
The ide a of co-operation has been systematically elaborated by John 
Rawls, who makes it the basic idea of rus theory of justice. The idea requires 
action guided by publicly recognized mIes and procedures (where this recognition 
involves acceptance of these rules including their regulation of individual actions), 
a system of mIes that is fair in the sense that all participants could reasonably 
accept them and finally involves participants that have a sense of their goals, 
individually and as members of groups and associations. Still, it might seem that 
once this political vision is spelled out, all we need to do is "apply" this vision to 
statistics, i.e. ask what, if any, use it might have for statistics. Arguably, the 
opposite extreme to this application idea is the suggestion to somehow study 
statistics in isolation and then derive implications for political philosophy. l 
submit that neither of these two approaches is plausible once we look more 
closely at political visions and statistics respectively. On the one hand, the idea of 
a prior, independent study of statistics clearly runs the risk of taking as facts and 
as inevitable what is the result of political decisions and choices. But as noted 
above, the history of statistics 1S an intensely political one from the beginning. On 
the other hand, for the political vision studied in this thesis, the idea of an 
application or implementation of the political vision to statistics is practically 
misleading, or so l aim to show. 
Rawls' philosophy has recently given rise to a debate over the demand 
that justice must not only be seen, but seen to be done. The idea of co-operation 
offers reasons to defend this demand, but as l will argue, surprisingly, Rawls' own 
theory of justice does not live up to it. The reason is that Rawls presupposes but 
does not make explicit - statistics. As a result there is a "black-box" in this vision 
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that stands as an obstacle to the vision of co-operation. The idea of an 
"application" of the vision to statistics is therefore misleading: it overlooks the 
role that statistics already plays for this political vision and which must be 
developed with it. While the ftrst essay - "Must we see what we do?" - prepares 
the grounds for this approach towards a political philosophical of statistics in that 
it introduces the vision of co-operation in relation to the current topic, it is the 
task of the subsequent two essays to properly bring to the fore the presence of 
statistics. 
Due to the relative lack of explicit concem with statistics in the political 
philosophy 1 draw on - an absence that indicates in the light of the above 
observations the topic that needs to be explored -, a fair amount of retrieval is 
needed. lndeed, precisely because statistics has become so much part of our way 
of life, extra work is needed to retrieve sorne of the pertinent aspects of the 
history of statistics so as to bring the role of statistics to our minds. To this end, 
the second essay - "Pareto's Limestick" - tells a story from Kant (via Pareto) to 
Rawls that differs from the better known story of the unfolding of Kantianism in 
political philosophy from the roots of Kant's moral philosophy. Starting instead 
with a remarkable passage in one of Kant's essays on history, l sketch the 
contours of the statistical macroscopic point of view in Kant, Pareto and Rawls. 
Drawing on the story of the macro-scopic point ofview, the essay then seeks to 
draw sorne diagnostic lessons. Due to the obstacle encountered by Rawls, and 
more generally the gap between politiCal philosophy and empirical research 
discussed in essay two, there emerges the task to specify the place of the 
production of statistics as part of the political vision of society as a system of co-
operation. 
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However, before l turn to this task the third essay - "Political Perception 
in a World with Statistical StuEr' - continues the work of rettieval. Drawing on 
Heidegger's phenomenology of everydayness, the essay develops a conttast to the 
approach guiding the vision of co-operation. As l show, central passages of Being 
an Time offer testimony of our coming to understand ourselves in statistical tenus 
and an original way to think about the public use of statistics. While l do not 
endorse interpretations that draw sttong anti-modemist conclusions from 
Heidegger's philosophy, largue that the phenomenology of everydayness 
sensitizes to dangers of the uses of statistics; indeed, to dangers that are easily 
overlooked on the Rawlsian approach to co-operation. As an awareness of such 
dangers is part of a political philosophy of statistics - it is not convincing, if the 
driver of a large vehicle, having killed a pedestrian on the road, laments that he 
only drives for the sake of his job and not in order to harm others - the essay 
further conttibutes to the thesis topic and prepares the task of essay four. 
The relation between accountability and the statistical accounts 1S not 
only a contingency of the English language, but also points to a hybrid 
phenomenon of power in large-scale societies: citizens hold govemment 
accountable with the help of accounts, and govemments implement and monitor 
policies with the help of statistical accounts. However, in practice the 
govemmental, technocratie focus on the uses of statistics prevails. In conttast, 
essay four - "Accountability for Accounts" - argues the case for the democratic 
uses of statistics and to this ends specifies the place of the production of statistics 
in political society as a key part of a political philosophy of statistics. 
The steps towards a political philosophy of statistics are as noted also an 
exploration of the vision of co-operation and the challenges it faces. Recall the 
bio-spheric premonition of exercise three. What about the relation between the 
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vision of co-operation and the natural environment? It is the latter question that 
initially led me to the thesis topie. In 2003 l could for the first cime participate in 
a meeting of a network of biologists, economists, political scientists and 
anthropologists on the "governance of sustainable development." Attending this 
interdisciplinary meeting proved to be a new experience. It struck me just how 
much cime was spent on the discussion of - statistics. Various indicators for 
different dimensions of sustainable development were discussed at length, and l 
felt that my prior studies in political philosophy had prepared me for this debate 
in mainly one way: l was surprised. Why this concern with statistics? Why this 
"trust in numbers"? What if any could be the role of statistics for demands of 
justice, equality or community? 
Statistical accounts are important for many of the participants ln the 
network, and the development of even one indicator is enough work for more 
than one PhD-thesis. (Incidentally, the indicator of exercise three, the ecological 
footprint, i.e. the probably most widely known sustainability indicator, originated 
from a Canadian PhD-thesis written by Mathis Wackernagel1). The last years have 
seen an enormous increase in indicator initiatives and with them a veritable 
explosion of sustainability indicators (in 2003, the Compendium of the 
International Institute for Sustainable Development listed around 600 
sustainability indicator initiatives on all levels of governance). These questions 
and observations suggested that l could employ my resources most fruitfully not 
by seeking to develop a further indicator, but rather by investigating the reasons 
for the concern with statistics that at the cime seemed so strange to me. This 
thesis is the result of this effort. Given the omnipresent role of statistics in 
sustainability politics, can the present effort towards a political philosophy of 
1 See Wackernagel and Rees 1996. 
21 
statistics contribute something to the current debate of sustainable development 
and the goal of more sus tain able societies? 
The vision of co-operation has frequently been criticised for its apparent 
dis regard for the natural environment. Moreover, this disregard is hard to justify 
when a vision of development in terms of an economic account of production 
and consumption tends to powerfully and problematically shape political 
perception and action at high costs to the natural environment and well-being. 
The fifth essay - "Political Perception and the Ensemble of Macro Objectives 
and Measures - the Paradox of the Index for Sustainable Economic Welfare 
(ISEW)" - examines one famous attempt to critically engage with this economic 
account. It argues that the ISEW plays a role for democratic accountability as a 
debunking index, but that it falls short on its own grounds as a sustainability 
index. Therefore the sixth essay - "Ec(c)o-Spazio! On the Operationalisation of 
Sustainable Development" - turns to an alternative attempt to develop 
sustainability indicators in a way that systematically takes the relation of human 
society with the natural environment into account. The concept "eco-space" has 
been proposed as one way to operationalise sustainable development in the 
beginning of the 90ies and has since then been developed further in various 
national reports. The essay seeks to offer a qualified defence of the proposal. On 
the topic of the thesis, the examination of what exactly happens when 
"operationalisation" is being proposed offers a case study of a key relation 
between visions and accounts. 
If, in the practice of reformers, from the early 19th -century liberal statisticians to 
today's advocates of sustainable development, statistical accounts have played a 
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basic role for the elaboration and communication of political visions, then 
(paraphrasing Ernst Bloch) Vtsl0ns need accounts. And as political perception lS 
informed and shaped by statistical accounts, there is an ongoing need to 
scrutÎllÏze the accounts for their political vision. Towards trus end, this the sis 
explores the idea of co-operation as one approach towards a political philosophy 
of statistics. 
The essays draw on philosophical, rustorical and contemporary sources in 
order to offer six variations on "our statistical way of life" in large political 
societies, and the "trust" in, and "suspicion" of numbers it involves. My initial 
surprise was followed in the frrst place by synthetic work - featuring a Prussian 
pastor and an American philosopher, telescopes and kaleidoscopes, the social 
bases of respect and trees & thalers - so as to attain the position and requisite 
sensibility to "think what we are doing." Let me therefore end with two notes: 1) 
No prior knowledge of statistics is required for any of the essays. And while the 
thesis as a whole aims to work towards a political philosophy of statistics, l have 
tried to make each essay self-contaÏned so that they can be read on their own 
according to interests. 2) The attempt to grasp something that is as fickle and 
difficult as statistics has led me to a great variety of actors. l am weIl aware that 
these essays might seern not philosoprucal enough for sorne, and certainly not up 
to the standards of rustorians for others; indeed, it has been a special experience 
of working on this thesis to discuss the sarne essay with respectively philosophers 
and historians of science - an experience of almost two texts that has practically 
shown me the challenges of communication in a specialised world, has led to 
rnany rewritings, and rny continued awareness of rnany shortcornings. l can only 
hope that one or the other of these shortcornings will be interesting enough for 
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somebody else to take over and do a better job. The everyday statistical infusion 
of what there is, and of what ought to be done calls for more attention. 
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Essay 1 
Must we see what we do? 
1. INTRODUCTION 
That justice must not only be done, but also seen to be done is a demand heard 
frequently when sorne body has been judged without open court procedures, 
when sensitive information has been misplaced and when rulings are suspected to 
follow expediency. There is a call for justice seen to be done so as to uphold the 
public trust in courts and their legitimacy. 
This example suggests that the call for justice se en to be done - or what I 
will simply call the demand for visible justice - is not an odd additional demand 
for not-just-justice-but- "also" -the-seeing-of-justice. Rather, there is a suspicion 
that justice is only daimed to be done, perhaps due to concealed interests - as 
made manifest on stage by Heinrich von Kleist in rus Broken Jug, where a judge, 
appropriately named Adam, presides over a court case involving rus own 
shortcomings. As the daimant does not know this, Adam shrewedly covers rus 
own involvement.1 The play of power and disguise suggests that the demand 
resonates with wider political themes of competing interests and consequent 
manipulation and lying: will those who daim to bring democracy to the dictator's 
palace, not install torture chambers in the basement; do those who publidy argue 
for peace, not secretly sell weapons and collaborate; do those who talk about 
freedom at public occasions, not privately exp loit others? 
1 A major inspiration for Kleist's play is, next to an 18th century depiction of a court case, 
Sophocles' Oedipus. 
Yet, pertinent as such concems might be, do they not rest on a 
problematic assumption: namely that where justice is done, it can also be seen; 
and that where it is not seen, it could be seen, if only sorne body would not 
deceptively "hide" it? Is the demand for visible justice an unquestioned visible-
justice dogma; perhaps, a product of the Enlightenment that finds its paradoxical 
expression in the blindfolded justitia: we do not dare to think that justitia may be 
blind? The clump-foot ways of judge Adam (and king Oedipus) testify to the 
difficulty and complexity of questions regarding our "seeing" of justice and the 
"blindness" of justice that this essay seeks to examine: many false traces and no 
simple answers. 
In this essay l will explore the demand for justice seen to be done with 
the help of John Rawls' theory of justice. Understanding the demand requires 
sorne grasp of the "seeing" of justice or what l will call the perception of justice. 
Accordingly, l will frrst develop an account of the perception of justice from the 
central idea of Rawls' theory: society as a system of fair co-operation. The focus 
on co-operation and the account of the perception of justice it involves will 
indicate one important reason for the demand for visible justice: the political 
separation of operations, i.e. broadly speaking the distinction between local 
interactions on the one hand and on the other hand actions aiming to correct for 
and scrutinize the many (unintended) consequences and (unknown) dimensions 
these actions have in large political societies with their advanced divisions of 
labor. 
Now, with the demand for visible justice and the political separation of 
operations the role of statistics for a system of fair co-operation emerges. This 
essay only leads up to this role - its exploration will be left to the subsequent 
essays. On the thesis topic, the focus on the perception of justice provides an 
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entry for the role of the statistical accounts for this political vision, and a way to 
introduce sorne basic features of the vision of co-operation. On the topic of the 
essay more specifically, the demand for visible justice has recently given rise to a 
debate between Rawlsians and their critics. The focus on the perception of justice 
offers a novel perspective to illuminate this debate, and indeed a basic reason for 
the pertinence of the demand. It therefore will allow me to deal with sorne of the 
objections raised by the critics. Moreover, the focus on the perception of justice 
also raises a troubling question regarding Rawls' articulation of the vision of co-
operation. If for society as a fair system of co-operation justice must not only be 
done but seen to be done, then does Rawls' elaboration of this political vision live 
up to the demand? Surprisingly, largue, Rawls does not meet the demand where 
it might be most important: in the domain of social and economic inequality. 
2. THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE 
l will begin with the "the fundamental organizing idea of justice as fairness": 
society as afair [Ystem if co-operation (Rawls 1993, 151). It is for Rawls an idea implicit 
in the public culture of democratic societies (Rawls 1993, 8 and 13f), and the task 
is to spell it out, consider its implications and its relation to other ideas.2 
Rawls describes the idea in terms of three basic elements: 1) co-operation 
as action guided by publicly recognized rules and procedures, where this 
1 Throughout the essay 1 will draw on Rawls' Theory rif Justice (1971), Politieal Liberalism (1993) and 
Justice as Faimess - a Restatement (2001). Where Rav.rls' viev.rs have changed over tUne, 1 indicate this 
and discuss whether or not this change is pertinent for the current topie. The idea of society as a 
system of fair co-operation is already there in Rawls' Theory rif Justice (§1). But here 1 refer to the 
later Politieal Liberalism where the idea is more fully inttoduced (See also Rawls 2001, §2). 
2 This is not meant to say that an opinion poil would establish that everyone holds this idea nor 
that the reference to a ftxed "intuition" is introduced. Rawls aims to capture basic practices of 
democracies, which he then exposes to scrotiny, resulting in endorsement and revision. The use 
of opinion poils is at best preliminary, because we might want to revise our judgment, not least 
because our initial self-understanding might be distorted. For an in depth discussion of this point 
see Kaufmann 2006. 
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recognition involves acceptance of these rules including their regulation of 
individual actions; 2) a system of mIes that is fair in the sense that ail participants 
could reasonably accept them; and 3) participants that have an idea of the good, 
i.e. of what they want to achieve and what they see as valuable as individuals, 
members of groups, classes etc. 1 Rawls' thinks of this system of rules as 
ultimately calling for basic principles, which are to regulate and help with the 
design of the major institutions of society or what Rawls cails the "basic 
structure." These basic elements of co-operation, which we will return to 
throughout this es say, make it possible to draw the contours of the account of 
the perception of justice accompanied by this theory: 
1) It is a presupposition of the idea of fair co-operation involving acceptance of 
and acting in accordance with public rules that in sorne (now stillIargely obscure) 
sense ail participating members of this system of co-operation are perceivers of 
justice. In contrast for example to Government House Utilitarianism, where an 
elite only knows the basic objective of society (i.e. sorne version of the 
maximisation of utility) while the "people" might weIl follow other conceptions 
provided that these conceptions foster the basic objective, in contrast then to 
such an account the idea of fair co-operation is plainly more inclusive and 
thereby also quite demanding. It is on this account not sufficient that a group of 
philosopher kings or elite politicians devises and applies aIl mIes and decisions 
according to a rational Ideal of society or a utility calcul us. This would allow that 
1 Readers of Rawls may ask how tbis idea is connected to bis idea of the well-ordered society. The 
latter idea specifies the former (Rawls 2001, 8); more precisely, it specifies the public character of 
co-operation, i.e. the first point above. Rawls' primary motivation for working out the "well-
ordered society" as a separate idea is his daim that conceptions of justice that do not have this 
public character are "seriously defective" (Rawls 2001, 9). While the focus on publicity may 
suggest that for elaborating the "perception of justice" the idea of the well-ordered society is the 
more straightforward starting point, 1 nonetheless elaborate from the idea of co-operation. As we 
will see below, my reason is that the idea of co-operation off ers a better explanatory grasp. 
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sorne members of society or even "the people" remain quite ignorant regarding 
basic issues of justice.1 To the contrary, all members must be familiar with the 
conception of justice, and be able to act in accordance with an understanding of 
them. 
2) If all participating members must in sorne sense be perceivers of justice, what 
is the focus or what are the foei of this perception? The primary focus of this 
perception is on the basic structure of society, i.e. as mentioned the main social and 
economic institutions. The pervasive influence of these institutions on the 
opportunities of their members is a basic reason for this focus. 'When we talk 
about the basic structure of a society, we are concerned with the way in which 
institutions work systematically so as to advantage sorne and disadvantage others. 
Rawls' incorporation of this notion of a social structure into rus theory represents 
the coming of age of liberal political philosophy. For the first cime, a major figure 
in the broadly individualist tradition has taken account of the legacy of Marx and 
Weber" (Barry 1995,214).2 
3) The idea of a fair system of social co-operation understood as co-operation 
according to publicly known and accepted rules evidently calls for sorne account 
of these rules. They are the measure with which the justice or injustice of the 
basic structure can be evaluated and help spell out "a publicly recognlzed point of 
1 On this point see also Williams 1998, 234. 
2 Note that this reason for the focus on the basic structure is cornplernented by a second reason 
that 1 will tum to in section 3. 1 would also like to mention AJ. Julius' recent innovative 
discussion of the basic structure Oulius 2003). While he discusses the basic structure in tenns of 
"framings" and "pro mes" rus discussion is clearly resonant of the theme of co-operation. Julius 
aims at an independent way of accounting for a focus on the basic structure Oulius 2003, 227), 
one different from the one introduced in section 3. However, 1 would like to note that his 
account introduces a strong demand on the knowledge of actors, which he notes raises at least a 
question mark Oulius 2003, 335). The discussion in section 3 might help retme this knowledge 
demand, and help understand whether Julius' account is independent or really in tension with the 
reasoning discussed below. 
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view from which ail citizens can examine before one another whether their 
political and social institutions are just" (Rawls 1993, 9). Ta this end, Rawls 
famously develops two principles, wruch l will now only state, but retum ta 
below in more detai!. According ta the first principle, "each persan has an equal 
daim ta a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, wruch scheme 
is compatible with the same scheme ta ail; and in this scheme the equal political 
liberties, and only those liberties, are ta be guaranteed their fair value;"! according 
ta the second principle "social and economic inequalities are ta satisfy two 
conditions: first, they are ta be attached ta positions and offices open ta ail under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are ta be ta the 
greatest bene fit of the least advantaged members of society"z (Rawls 1993, 5f). 
These principles are ta guide institutional design and the evaluation of the justice 
of institutions. 
4) Pinaily, l would like ta point out one last feature of trus account of the 
perception of justice. Justice demands ta "act from the public conception of 
justice ... [with] willingness, if not desire" (Rawls 1993, 19). Such actions range 
from the paying of taxes, via ways of public debate ta civil disobedience, i.e. the 
defence of justice when the basic structure no longer meets the demands of 
justice - when the "machine of government" is not just seen ta exrubit friction, 
but the "friction cornes to have its machine" (Thoreau 1854). But as especiaily 
the last ex ample indicates, such actions depend on one's perception of the 
workings of government and the justice of its policies. Accordingly, for a system 
of co-operation the perception of justice is action-orienting. 
1 This is a revised version of rus principle in response to criticism by H. L. Hart (Hart 1975). For 
the earlier version see Rawls (1997, 266). This principle is often referred to as the "liberty 
principle." 
2 The second part of the second principle is usually referred to as the "difference principle." 
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With this preliminary exposition, let me now tum to sorne reasons for the 
concern with the perception of justice as they emerge from Rawls' theory. 
3.MYOPIA 
Recall that aIl participants of co-operation are to be perceivers of justice. To be 
sure, in large democracies the political perception of citizens informs their casting 
of votes. Newspapers, TV and other media play a politically sensitive role in 
informing and structuring political perception. And yet, these media might 
manipulate or fail to cover demands of justice, and thereby help governments 
that pursue unjust policies to remain in office and to face little or no opposition. 
As a result, the basic structure might have increasingly unjust effects without 
"anyone noticing" - no doing of justice, and no one seeing that justice is not 
done. The danger of uncritical publics in the developing large-scale democracies 
of the 19th and 20th century is one of the core concems of Habermas' classic 
account of the "transformation of the public sphere" (Habermas 1962). 
Before l turn to a basic reason for this concern, let me point out that the 
expression "perception of justice" can be conducive to think of the perception of 
a "whole," of an object "in full view," of the "basic structure," perhaps in analogy 
to the table that l can sit on, lean on, retum to and so on. Accordingly, there may 
be a tendency to think of justice as a somehow extemal object and thereby 
implicitly exclude forms of perception as belonging to justice. Yet, consider the 
diversity of religious and philosophical views. If l see others as thinking and 
believing as l do, and if l thereby assume that what l accept as justification will 
automatically do as justifications for others, then those others are not recognized 
as holding possibly reasonable, but nonetheless different religious or 
31 
philosophical views. l see them as objects whose standing on an issue l can 
assume, rather than as participants in discussion. Consequently, my perception of 
others is neither a trivial matter nor consequentially irrelevant. Misperception and 
the objectification and lack of recognition it implies raise matters of justice.! 
However, for Rawls the arguably most important reason for concem with 
the perception of justice is a specifically mediated form of relation to others. 
Recall that for him the primary focus of the perception of justice is to be on the 
basic structure. But why focus on the basic structure? Why is it not sufficient, if 
individuals recognize and respect each other in their daily interactions? Could 
justice not arise from some sort of invisible hand mechanism, where everyone 
just focuses on respectful and fair co-operation with others? 
In reply, Rawls points out that even if the co-operation between two 
individuals or groups is fair, it still does not follow that the effects of this co-
operation on third parties do not raise additional demands of justice. 'We cannot 
tell by looking at individuals and associations in the immediate (or local) 
circumstances whether, from a social point 0/ view, agreements reached are just or 
fair" (Rawls 1993, 266, italics added2). Individual and perhaps seemingly unrelated 
actions can have extended and cumulative effects that are hard to notice. "The 
invisible hand guides things in the wrong direction and favours an oligopolistic 
configuration of accumulations that succeeds in maintaining unjustified 
inequalities and restrictions on fair opportunity" (Rawls 1993,267). 
But does this claim not come suspiciously close to the kind of deception 
mentioned at the beginning of this essay? Is there any reason for a tendency 
towards oligopolistic configurations other than people only claiming to co-
1 On the relation between recognition and objectification see Honneth 2005) and for an analysis 
of various way of "seeing and treating a person as an object" see Nussbaum 1995, 215ff. 
2 See also Rawls 2001, §15. 
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operate but really attempting to increase their power? "When our social world is 
pervaded by duplicity and deceit we are tempted to think that law and 
government are necessary only because of the propensity of individuals to act 
unfairly. But, to the conttary, the tendency is rather for background justice to be 
eroded even when individuals act fairly ... " (Rawls 1993,267). Rawls daims that 
no rules of co-operation are possible, wruch individuals could foIlow in their 
interaction and in so doing still keep in view the larger consequences of their 
actions (Rawls 1993, 267). A first reason is the high co st of assessing all the 
consequences of action. But second, in our complex societies with their extended 
divisions of labor the limits to our understanding of the implications of our 
actions make it not only costly, but also very difficult to assess these 
consequences. Consequently, the belief to have acted fairly and to perceive to 
have done so is likely to be hubristic. It overlooks our inability to see clearly 
distant consequences and relations of actions; in short: our myopia. 
Acknowledging it is a challenge to our frequent, intuitive belief in the unlimited 
power of our perception of the social world. 1 
Realizing trus condition, we can consider a specific separation of 
operations, e.g. to distinguish between local interactions on the one hand, and a 
"social point of view,,2 on the other hand, where the task of the latter is the 
evaluation and preservation of the fairness of those interactions (Rawls 1993, 
1 As this takes us beyond the foeus of this essay, l wouId only like to mention here that in my 
view this belief is the flip-side of the "banality of evil," i.e. instead of the unquestioned following 
of orders the dogrnatic belief in the justice of individual actions. (Regarding the former, Hannah 
Arendt famously commented the last words of the "medium-sized, slender, middle-aged, with 
receding hair, ill-fitting teeth, and nearsighted eyes" Nazi bureaucrat Adolf Eichmann: "It was as 
though in those last minutes he was summing up the lesson that his long course in human 
wickedness had taught us - the lesson of the fearsome, word-and-thought-defying banality rif evi/ 
(Arendt 1963, 5, 252 italics in the original). 
2 See italics in the quote above from page 266. 
3 This idea is of course not Rawls' invention. See essay four for more discussion. 
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The discussion has taken us to a basic reason for the demand for visible 
justice: the political separation of operations.! The separation calls for operations 
on the basic structure so as to avoid the problem mentioned ab ove. Yet, this is to 
say that it catis for a specific doing of justice, and therefore also members of 
society in charge of these operations. And it implies that there will be people 
affected by these operations. Let me examine this political separation of 
operations more dosely. 
Justice must be seen to be done. Those who undertake the operations 
regulating the basic structure take a "social point of view" - a specific perception 
of justice informs their doing. Consider co-operatives. They are unions for the 
production (and 1 or distribution) of goods, in which the profits are shared by all 
the contributing members. Thus an agricultural co-operative will mm to produce 
agricultural goods, and distribute profits to all co-operating members. This goal, 
we might say, informs the "co-operative point of view" of those in charge of 
distributing profits, and thereby their distinctive doing. Now, these matters 
become much more demanding with the move from co-operatives to the large-
scale level of states and federations. As Rawls' language of the social point of 
view makes explicit, those in charge of this task must have sorne perception of 
the basic structure and its effects on society that informs their doing. Or else, 
they could only daim that "justice has been done," but would add little more than 
rhetorical ornament to the basic structure. So here is a twist to the demand for 
Il speak of a "political separation of operations" so as to highlight two differences: 1) the 
concern with political structure that is absent or at least in the background of the economic 
discussion of the division of labor, which has historically focused more on the "market" and less 
on the "vertical division of labor" and; 2) the foeus of the present discussion differs but is not 
opposed to the "moral division oflabor" as discussed by Nagel and others (Nagel 1991, Chapter 
6). Nagel focuses on the different standpoints "within the self" and thinks that "to design 
institutions which serve an ideal of egalitarian impartiality without demanding a too extensive 
impartiality of the individuals who occupy instrumental roles in those institutions is the great 
unresolved problem of egalitarian political theory, social demoeracy, and the anti-authoritarian left 
in general" (Nagel 1991, 61). 
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justice seen to be done - the discussion of co-operation illuminates a new 
dimension of the demand. To be sure, so far the "social point of view" is still 
quite abstract; l will turn to the doing of justice it informs more concretely below. 
For now l would only like to note that the discussion so far suggests that, in the 
sense just specified, the perception of justice is a condition of justice to be done. 
Yet, there are also those affected by the operations on the basic structure. 
They, i.e. individuals in their daily interactions (as professionals in a domain, as 
members of an association etc.), need not have the same perception of justice as 
those operating on the basic structure. But they must have reasons to believe that 
those in charge of trus operation further and secure a fair system of co-
operation.1 Or else, there would be no reason for them to think of themselves as 
members of this political co-operation; the fragile "we" of co-operation would be 
tom apart with rulers on the one side, and the ruled on the other side. This 
consideration suggests that the demand for justice seen to be done results from 
co-operation and the separation of operations it requires. 
Let me conclude with one complication that follows once the separation 
of operations has been pointed out. ''Justice, it is said, must not only be done, but 
be seen to be done. Yet, what should occur when what can be dependably seen 
and recognized is less complex than (fully) adequate justice requires? The 
interpersonal function of assuring others that justice is being done or that 
principles are being followed might necessitate following principles that are less 
subtle and nuanced but whose application (and misapplication) can sometimes be 
1 This makes it clear that the demand for visible justice is not only a matter of courts as is 
sometimes assumed. Bernard Manin writes that representative govemment has since the 18th 
century "been accompanied by the freedom of the governed to at aIl times form and express 
political opinions outside the control of government ... in order that the governed may form 
their own opinions on political matters, it is necessary that they have access to political 
information, and this requires that governmental decisions are made public. If those in 
government make decisions in secret the governed have only inadequate means of forming 
opinions on political matters." (Manin 1997, 167). 
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checked by others" (Nozick 1993, 11). Nozick points out a problem of assurance, 
which may pertain in the domain of justice just as in any other area of action. 
Whether assurance tums out to be a problem depends on the respective issues or 
actions. It only "might" necessitate such consequences for it is also a possibility 
that l follow a principle that others could not so apply (perhaps because they lack 
the expertise and skill) but that those others are assured that l do follow that 
principle due to some communicative mecharusm. The assurance problem 
provides one reason for the fragility of fair co-operation; its pertinence depends 
in each case on particular doings and the assurance challenge they pose. 
With this complication in mind, the idea of a well-ordered society, which 
specifies the ide a of co-operation,! can itself be further specified. A society is 
well-ordered, if "it is a society in which everyone accepts, and knows that 
everyone else accepts, the very same principles of justice; and second (implied by 
the idea of the effective regulation of such a conception), its basic structure - that 
is, its main political and social institutions and how they fit together as one 
system of co-operation - is publicly known, or with good reason believed, to 
satisfy these principles. And third, its citizens have a normally effective sense of 
justice and so they generally comply with society's basic institutions, which they 
regard as just" (Rawls 1993, 35). Now, regarding the shared knowledge in the 
second point, some members of society will have a much more thoroughgoing 
practical knowledge of the separation of operations. And this practical knowledge 
is of enormous importance in the actual working of fair co-operation in large-
scale democracies. Consequently, shared agreement on a system of fair co-
operation must not be read to require that all share this public knowledge equally. 
What it does require is that those in charge of operating on the basic structure 
! See footnote 1 on page 28. 
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commurucate their labor to those affected by it. Arguably, Rawls' second point 
indicates such a distinction when he adds to public knowledge "good reason to 
believe." 
4. CHECKS AND BEING 
Andrew Mason has objected that the demand for visible justice draws on sources 
external to justice, and thereby risks constraining the demands of justice (Mas on 
2004, 262ft). The demand for visible justice so to speak unduly reduces our 
vision of justice. More specifically, Mason argues that reflection on the sources of 
the demand and recognition of their independence from justice, provides reason 
to think that the demand ought not "constrain" the conception of justice. 
First, Mason argues, the demand derives its appeal from the promotion of 
justice by publicly checkable rules (Mas on 2004, 264): Citizens may only be 
willing to accept the demands of justice, if they have the assurance that others 
accept them too; and they might only have that assurance if they can check if 
others comply with the demands of justice. If the demands of justice are not 
publicly checkable, then there is a free-rider problem - sorne citizens may bene fit 
from "acts of deception" without the others noticing. Second, according to 
Mason, the attractiveness of the demand is due to its promotion of stability 
(Mason 2004, 264). If principles of justice are publicly checkable, then one 
potential source of conflict and mistrust is removed and institutions are thereby 
made more effective and stable. 
Let me first turn to publicly checkable rules. "It is not incoherent to argue 
that principles apply to the distribution of domestic responsibilities, whilst at the 
same cime conceding that there is no reliable, publicly checkable way of 
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detennining whether these principles have been observed" (Mason 2004, 264). If 
we don't see this, Mason worries, the demand for visible justice will reduce what 
we take to be the demands of justice. 
Now, recalling the discussion in the last section, we need to ask what 
principles or demands of justice Mason has in mind when he daims that it is "not 
incoherent" to conceive of not publidy checkable principles of justice. Does he 
mean demands of justice developed for large-scale democracies (such as Rawls' 
two principles)? Given his reference to domestic responsibilities, does he assume 
that such principles hold on all levels of political society and irrespective of the 
kind of co-operation1? Finally, who is checking? Does Mason mean checkable 
rules on the national level that might for example be "checked" by the state 
administration and the electorate or checkable rules on the local level that might 
be checked by the members of the respective household or family? 
As Mason points to domestic responsibilities, one way to explore his 
concern is, in the light of the discussion in the last section, to think of these 
domestic responsibilities as a matter of local co-operation. No doubt, the sharing 
of domestic responsibilities is a kind of co-operation. However, thinking about it 
in these terms also makes it clear that the se responsibilities are in many ways 
restricted to the members of the household or family. Consequently the 
assumption is problematic that large-scale demands of justice, which have been 
developed with respect to a regional, national or globallevel of co-operation, can 
simply be "applied" to domestic responsibilities. 2 Yet, if we fail to see these 
1 Note that Rawls explicitly specifies that his discussion pertains to the national level (and in so 
doing also acknowledges that there are specifie issues of local justice) 1971, §2. 
2 Note that the daim about local co-operation is not meant to exdude the evident relations 
between such local co-operation and other levels. If for example families and households ensure 
the reproduction of society, they contribute in so doing to co-operation on the societallevel. And 
the sociallevel imposes constraints on the local co-operation, not least where this undermines fair 
co-operation in society - consider for example the educational opportunities of children or the 
equal opportunities of women and men (Rawls 1999, §5). 
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different kinds and levels of co-operation, we might take such large-scale 
demands of justice; note that there are enormous difficulties to publicly check 
them as far as domestic responsibilities are concerned; and then conclude, 
because justice must be seen to be done, that justice does not pertain to domestic 
responsibilities. As a result, the demand for visible justice then seems to lead to a 
reduced vision of justice. And as this is unacceptable, we might therefore want to 
reject the demand for visible justice and insist that even where there is no 
"publicly checkable way," responsibilities can still "be assessed from the 
standpoint of justice" (Mason 264).1 However, closer examination of the 
example of domestic responsibilities given by Mason to support bis case suggests 
that this conclusion is due to a lack of specification. Principles or demands of 
justice developed for the nationallevel might not be "checkable" on the domestic 
level- not only because that presumably requires an enormous bureaucracy, but 
also more substantively because the se principles are not meant to apply to 
domestic responsibilities.2 
Yet even if tbis is correct, what about checkable mIes on the local level? 
Does the problem not arise here too? Now, as far as domestic responsibilities are 
concerned failure to co-operate seems on the whole pretty obvious to all others 
involved (e.g. the members of the household, not "the nation"). It is not difficult 
for others to tell whether 1 have done the shopping, cleaning, cooking etc. 
Responsibilities are not only done, but generally se en to be done by the other 
members of the household. In this case, co-operation generally is "public," or -
to the extent that the word "public" is not used to refer to local co-operation -
1 However, Mason presumably will admit that this notion of "assessment" is a philosophical one, 
i.e. it has nothing to do with the policing and checking of demands commonly associated with 
"quality assessments" etc. 
2 With the qualification made in footnote 2 on page 38. 
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infused with "familiarity."l In short, one challenge of fair co-operation on a large 
scale does not seem to be there on the locallevel (or obtains in only a much more 
mode st form). Consequently the worry about a reduced vision of justice (i.e. fair 
local sharing of responsibilities) is likewise diminished. 
According to Mason's second objection, the appeal of the demand for 
visible justice is due to the instrumental mIe that publicly checkable mIes have for 
stability. But, Mason argues, stability and justice are different values. We can 
consider the salience of Mason's distinction with respect to the discussion of co-
operation so far elaborated. If stability is independent of co-operation, must we 
not consider the possibility of instant co-operation? Stability is deeply woven into 
our understanding of justice as a fair system of co-operation, or so at least the 
discussion of intergenerational justice suggests. The latter tums for example 
around questions of just savings. Consequently an idea of continuity, and with it 
stability of the right kind, is built into the discussion. As Mason gives us no 
reason to exclude intergenerational justice from justice, the distinction between 
"stability" and "justice" does not seem to be a salient one. Rawls' full formulation 
of the idea of co-operation is to the point: "the fundamental organizing idea of 
justice as fairness ... is that of society as a fair system of co-operation over lime, 
from one genera/ion /0 the nexf' (Rawls 1993, 15).2 
Let me tum to a third challenge: Is the demand for visible justice a 
dogma of visible justice, and - as dogmas go - simply false? Does the demand for 
visible justice rest on a false presupposition? It posits that justice could not be 
1 No doubt, there remain problems. Might 1 not fake - "headache!" - and thereby shirk my 
responsibilities? Yet, fakers are generally known as fakers. The harder case is if 1 am myself not 
sure whether 1 really do have a terrible headache or simply do not want to do the work. So there 
are evidently border cases that ultimately pertain to the question whether justice is "done." 1 will 
further discuss the "doing" of justice below. 
2 Incidentally, the promotion of stability by publicly checkable rules is itself a matter debate. 
Empirical research seems to suggest that universal rules (health care for aIl, unconditionally) 
promote trust, whereas differential rules (for example housing or income benefits conditional on 
need) are conducive to distrust (See Rothstein und Stolle, forthcoming). 
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done without it being seen to be done. But justice could obtain without anyone 
seeing it - there might be justice (the right man convicted) aIthough no one 
knows. Is therefore the daim that justice must not only be done but seen to be 
done faIse? 
In this formulation l have followed G.A. Cohen, who takes the demand 
to imply that there is justice (and injustice), which is not seen to be done.1 What 
sort of implication is tbis? It leads to the being or obtaining of justice. Cohen gives 
the following example: "The right man might have been convicted, even if 
nobody really knows that." So here we tum to a possibility - but notably not one 
that requires any doing of justice. The police not able to de te ct the right man 
might simply arrest somebody (perhaps only so as to lower pressure from the 
public or politicians), and the police might, unknowingly, arrest the right man. 
Hence, from our imagined thought-experiment perspective, we might say "justice 
obtains, but nobody sees it to so obtain." Yet, it would be odd to say that justice 
has been done. What the police did is to arrest somebody arbitrarily. In this case 
it is possible for there to be justice, which is not seen by anyone - for justice has 
not been done. 
As a result, l would question whether the possibility of justice 
obtaining/being can serve as an objection to the demand for justice seen to be 
done. TotaI "blindness" - justice is seen to be done by no one - would indeed 
make the doing of justice impossible. Arguably, tbis distinction is paradoxically 
captured by the bJinc!folded justitia: impartiality requires a doing, not to take certain 
considerations into account; and because we know tbis, the protest against 
wrong-doings can be so direct and powerful when somebody has acted partially. 
1 G.A. Cohen makes this point in bis Rescuing Justice from Constmctivism, Chapter 7, section 7. 
However, note that he does not intend this point as an objection to activists for more 
transparency in courts. Rather, he objects to the dogma if "taken literally" and the presupposition 
it rests on. 
41 
Consequently, the demand for visible justice, at least for the reasons discussed 
here, is not simplya dogma resting on a false presupposition.1 This view does not 
rule out the "obtaining of justice" not "seen by anyone to be done"; it only 
argues that this possibility is not the one of the visible justice demand, not least 
presumably, because nothing can be done about it.2 
5. CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE AND VISIBILI1Y 
A social point of view emerged as a result of the discussion in section three, but 
on a very absttact level and there scill remained the task of a more concrete 
examination of the social point of view. How are principles of justice seen to be 
done? Rawls' constitutional contractarianÏsm suggests an answer. 3 If 
constitutionalism is the idea that political authority has to be subject to the limits 
and requirements in the form and force of law, then Rawls seems to offer a 
contractarian version of constitutionalism in the sense that he seeks to develop a 
1 However, the doing in question cannot be narrowly-deflned. Consider a "broken-jug-objection" 
to what 1 have just said: "1 did it" as meaning 1 broke the jug, but meant to wash it. Is there not a 
sense in which 1 have done something even without any intention to so do? But to discuss the 
moral signiflcance of the "1 did it" - which 1 assume to be at issue in the "doing of justice" Ce.g. 
we are not talking about justice by serendipity or divine intervention) -, it makes a difference 
whether lforesaw that 1 was very likely to break the jar, if 1 perhaps was forced for urgent others 
reasons to wash it even though 1 foresaw it breaking etc. While this rais es enormously 
complicated questions, 1 do think that they are in the domain of actions. 
2 Here 1 would like to note that G.A. Cohen's famous discussion of the difference principle 
focuses on "doings." He singles out intention-relative inequalities that he argues cannot he 
justified. Cohen defends an egalitarian ethos, pertaining for example to actions in the market, 
against notably Andrew Williams, who thinks that market-maximizing behaviour is justified 
provided it takes place within a public institutional order (Williams 1998, 234). From the 
perspective of the present essay, the possihility of an egalitarian ethos is limited in the sense that 
the consequences and effects of individual actions are in many ways beyond the grasp of actors in 
the market. It is this limitation of individual action that provides a major reason for a separation 
of operations. Does the present perspective therefore justify market-maximizing hehaviour? No, 
the implication is only scepticism with respect to the idea that for example the difference principle 
could guide actors. This idea seems to ignore the very motivation for its introduction as a device 
regulating the basic structure. But note that this view prima facie does not preclude social and! or 
economic ethi. (lncidentally, Williams' evidence that Rawls thinks market maximizing behaviour 
legitimate seems to be a mi sprint in Williams' article. His footnote 3 on page 226 is a reference to 
Rawls' discussion of the majority vote.). 
3 1 take this term from Frank I. MicheIman's illuminating article to which much of the discussion 
in this section is indebted (Michelman 2003). 
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theory of justice that 1) can be approved by ail competently reasoning citizens; 2) 
which, because not ail issues can be codified, gives rise to a basic set of laws - the 
constitutional essentials - that can organize and orient ail day to day law-making; 
and 3) these constitutional essentials will be endorsed by the citizens (Michelman 
2003,394-397).1 
Rawls lists as examples of constitutional essentials "the fundamental 
principles that specify the general structure of government and the political 
process; the powers of the legislature, executive and judiciary; the limits of 
majority rule," and also "the equal basic rights and liberties of citizenship that 
legislative majorities must respect, such as the right to vote and to participate in 
politics, freedom of thought and of association, liberty of conscience, as weil as 
the protection of the rule of law" (Rawls 1993, 228). The salient point concerning 
the current focus on the perception of justice is that, qua constitutional essential, 
matters of justice become "more or less visible on the face of constitution al 
arrangements and how these can be seen to work in practice" (Rawls 1993, 229) -
as far as these essentials are concemed, justice can be se en to be done. To be 
sure, the constitutional practice is idealized - recail judge Adam -, but there is 
nonetheless a general understanding of what securing and claiming the right 
demands and what would be a way of dealing with difficult cases. So are the 
principles of justice "seen to be done"? 
Granted the account of constitutional essentials, Rawls' answer is still 
incomplete. Rawls deals with the first principle in tenns of constitutional 
essentials, but not with fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle. 
lndeed, he explicitly states that these demands are not so covered (Rawls 1993, 
1 Michelman's focus on the basic structure is narrow in comparison to the interpretation 
advocated by G.A. Cohen, which also includes issues beyond the constitutions and laws (Cohen 
2000). However, for the discussion in this section, 1 can bracket this discussion. 
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228-229). Why are the se demands not likewise constitutional essentials? And in 
terms of what other arrangement are the se remaining principles seen to work in 
practice? Let me first tum to the former question. 
Rawls offers four reasons for the partial inclusion of the principles of 
justice in the constitutional essentials: 
1) that there are simply two different co-ordinating roles with respect to the basic 
structure: "principles covering the basic freedoms specifying the first role, the 
principles covering the social and economic inequalities specifying the second" 
(Rawls 1993, 229). Rawls thinks that to this difference in role a difference in the 
stage of application corresponds: basic freedoms con cern constitution al 
questions, while social and economic inequalities concem legislative ones (Rawls 
2001,49; see also Rawls 1971, §31); 
2) that meeting basic freedoms is more urgent than meeting social and economic 
questions of equality (Rawls 1993,228,230; Rawls 2001, 48f); 
3) that there are epistemic difficulties in including the remamtng demands of 
justice: ''Whether the constitutional essentials covering the basic freedoms are 
satisfied is more or less visible on the face of constitutional arrangements and 
how these can be seen to work in practice. But whether the aims of the principles 
covering social and economic inequalities are realized is far more difficult to 
ascertain. These matters are nearly always open to wide differences of reasonable 
opinion; they rest on complicated inferences and intuitive judgments that require 
us to assess complex social and economic information about topics poorly 
understood" (Rawls 1993, 229; Rawls 1971, 174). Frank Michelman therefore 
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speaks of Rawls' concern with the "transparency of application" (Michelman 
2003,405); 
4) that not just epistemically, but also morally the fust principle and basic needs 
are less difficult to agree on than questions of equality (Rawls 1993, 230; 2001, 
49). 
Having provided his reasons, Rawls does not move on to a 
complementary proposal that would give the excluded demands of justice the 
standing and high symbolic value and memory associated with constitutional 
essentials. It is as if there has been an invention for questions of basic rights and 
liberties - constitutional democracy and constitutional practice -, while a similar 
invention for social and economic practice has not been forthcoming. 
Consequently, the demands of social and economic equality and fair opportunity 
seem to attain a secondary, elusive status. "There is no denying the uneasiness of 
Rawls' insistence on the category of matters of basic justice that are not 
constitutional essentials - his insistence, that is, on the idea that there are 
dimensions of basic political justice upon which reasonable citizens would 
rationally insist but which they would omit from the legal constitution" 
(Michelman 2003. 407). And of course this "uneasiness" is just evidence for the 
sceptic: so much talk and sophistication about equal freedom, but when it cornes 
to the practice of social and economic equality issues become elusive, the 
perception of justice blurred, perhaps even one-eyed. Is the difference principle 
in the end no more than a rhetorical ornament to the basic structure, an 
ideological eye-catcher where not much gets done? Let me look at Rawls' 
arguments in more detail. 
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6. RIGHTS AND RIGID DESIGNATORS 
The second argument, i.e. the appeal to the greater urgency of basic freedom and 
basic needs, no doubt derives intuitive appeal in the context of global justice and 
sustainable development discussions, wruch often focus on basic needs and how 
even these are not met for a very larg number of people. Yet, it hardly establishes 
that issues of social and economic equality do not have a place as constitutional 
essentials. It makes a case to prioritize one issue over the other. 
Likewise the Hrst argument concerning the different co-ordinating roles is 
on its own hardly persuasive. If there are different co-ordinating roIes, why would 
only basic freedoms receive constitutional recognition? Note that constitutional 
essentials do not just include basic liberties, but also fundamental principles that 
specify the general structure of govemment and the political process. In short, 
the constitutional essentials stand for very different functions, and it is therefore 
not evident why difference in function is a difference that makes a difference. 
Unlike basic freedoms, which can be dealt with "visibly" in constitution al 
practice, Rawls daims, questions of social and economic equality raise complex 
issues that we understand only "poody" (Rawls 1993,229). Yet, even if there are 
unresolved questions of understanding, why do the se diŒculties matter? Recall 
Rawls' speciHcation of co-operation in terms of a well-ordered society. It 
requires, Michelman writes, a "conjunction of perceptions": that "1 can at aIl 
cimes see what the regime actually is that my fellow citizens are abiding by so that 
l can check whether that regime, the one actually in force, does in fact meet the 
test of universal reasonable and rational acceptability" (Michelman 2003, 405). 
The perception of justice is a condition of justice, and making demands of social 
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and economic equality a constitutional essential seems to create the demand for a 
perception that cannot be met in practice. As a result, citizens might withdraw 
their acceptance or indeed never accept the relevant regulations, for it will not be 
clear to them wh ether the regulation in fact furthers fair co-operation. 
What to make of this argument? The argument threatens to undermine 
the difference principle in general. Suppose the difference principle is not a 
constitutional essential, but still a demand of justice that needs to be 
implemented. Then it is just quite unclear, given the argument presented by 
Rawls, why controversy should not arise again at "the other place" in society 
where the principle will be implemented, e.g. in Rawls' proposal at the legislative 
stage.! If conversely the implementation is after all not so challenging (or if we 
give no weight to the challenge), then we are back to the question: why not make 
the difference princip le a constitutional essential?2 The latter move would give 
visibility and constancy to the difference principle in everyday legislative efforts, 
and it would avoid the false impression that the already accepted constitutional 
essentials are in practice uncontroversial.3 Freedom of speech is just one example 
for the controversies that arise from implementing and defending basic liberties; 
and obtaining a scheme of basic liberties calls for difficult questions in the 
balance of liberties. 
So is there sorne other, epistemic-practical issue? One that makes the 
demands for social and economic equality not "more complex" or less 
"transparent" but rather somehow different in kind? When speaking of 
individuals and their standing in the distribution of such goods as income and 
wealth, Rawls points out that he does not "rigidly designate" these individuals 
1 This problem also applies to Rawls' fourth argument. 
2 Granted that this may require a priority rule. 
3 This point also applies to Rawls' fourth argwnent. 
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(Rawls 1993, 7 ft.5; 2001, 59 ft. 26). He uses Kripke's term1 to make the point 
that as far as these socio-economic demands are concerned, individuals are not 
identified apart from their holdings of salient goods. In the comparison of 
different distributions the point is not ta say how each individual cornes out in 
the respective distribution - whether you are rich in one distribution and poor in 
another distribution. Rather, the least-advantaged in each distribution are simply 
the least-advantaged in that particular distribution. The perception of justice is 
depersonalized in favour of a relational scheme that abstracts from individuals 
with names and a biography.2 
Non-rigid designation calls to mind what Michel Foucault described as 
the emergence of a form of power concerned with the management of the 
population and its various properties. 3 The management of the population 
involved and involves statistics for the calculation of the population, 
demographic trends and so forth. With statistics, relational schema concerning 
various features of a population become available and with them a specific point 
of view and way of acting based on numerical information that is detached from 
rigid1y designated individuals. In fact, on this view the actions of individuals are 
frequently regarded as governed by societal trends or laws with implications for 
the possibility and form of government. 
Now, to explore this possible peculiarity of the socio-economic demands, 
l need to draw on sorne historical background to be introduced in the next essay. 
For now, l would only like to note that even if at bottom the problem raised by 
the difference principle concerns problems related to "non-rigid designation" and 
its practical implementation, i.e. not greater complexity but in the first place a 
1 Kripke (1972) 
2 Consider by contrast that each individual is to have the same rights, for example to free speech, 
in an social structures considered. 
3 See Foucault (2004). Especially the third lecture. 
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different approach that abstracts, at least to sorne extent, from persons and 
introduces a different practice and knowledge, then it would still not 
automatically follow that the difference principle could not be made a 
constitutional essential. As noted, Rawls' constitutional essentials do not focus 
on individual rights only. They also include principles specifying the general 
structure of government and the political process. 1 Provided that no further 
reasons emerge in the discussion in the next es say, l therefore think that Rawls' 
banning of the difference principle form the constitutional essential does indeed 
go against the spirit of the demand for visible justice. And l will explore in the 
next essay to what extent the further elucidation of the social point of view might 
offer a better understanding of this move. 
7. CONCLUSION 
Must we see what we do? For questions of justice, the question has led me to the 
complexity and fragility of the "we" behind the call for visible justice. More 
specifically, the central idea of society as a fair system of co-operation, and the 
account of the perception of justice it implies, has led me to the political 
separation of operations as a basic reason for the demand for visible justice. 
As is well known from the economic domain, the division of labor 
unleashes enormous energies and sparks the rÎse of the faceless god of efficiency 
that is always claimed to be to everyone's benefit. But the absence of an invisible 
hand and benefits for all necessitates, Rawls argues, a political separation of 
operations as a measure against the myopia of individual actors in large-scale 
societies with their extended divisions of labor. 
1 See section 5 
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And yet, those operating on the basic structure can themselves always tear 
apart the "we" of co-operation: so that there will be only rulers and ruled, co-
optation of power rather than co-operation. The vision of society as a fair system 
of co-operation and the demand for visible justice it implies is an attempt to fmd 
a path between a myopic individualism and the likewise limited "seeing of the 
state" that l will aim to unfold in the next essays.l 
Even though l argued that the focus on co-operation and the perception 
of justice in this essay makes it possible to respond to critics of the visible justice 
demand, l also found that precisely where the perception of justice might be 
expected to be of most importance in large-scale societies with their extended 
divisions of labor, i.e. in the economic and social domain, Rawls introduces a 
distinction between constitutional essentials and rus version of the demand for 
social and economic equality - the difference principle - that goes against the 
spirit of visible justice. The reasons for trus move, as l have only indicated in trus 
essay, have to do with the social point of view and its relation to the statistical 
accounts. In the next essay, l will therefore tum to the social point of view in 
more detail. 
1 The latter expression is a slightly modified form of Scott's 1998 title. Also see essay 6. 
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Essay 2 
Pareto's Lime-stick? 
1. INTRODUCTION 
We started with the vision of society as a fair system of co-operation - that is, not 
something that has actually been achieved, yet still something attractive that can 
be worked towards. 
We are farniliar with the economic account of society in tenus of incorne. 
National income is the combined income of the residents of an economy in a 
given period. It can be calculated from the factors of production: the payments 
made to labor (wages), to capital (profits) and further factors (rent, income from 
abroad). "Incorne" is therefore also used to refer to distributive shares. 
The national accounts make possible the observation of production. 
Corresponding to the aggregate and distributive perspective on incorne, there are 
macro-policy goals such as the increase of total production, and distributive goals 
concerning the benefits to contributors - sober tenus for matters concerning 
basic political struggles, terms that refer to basic ways in which power is exercised 
and legitimated. 
These brief rernarks indicate the interplay of statistical accounts and 
political goals: Should the growth of total incorne be a policy goal? If so, how 
should the total incorne be measured? What, if any, distributive shares should be 
aimed for? And how are these shares measured? 
Yet, in spite of this interplay, there does not seern to be a close 
collaboration of political philosophers and ernpirical researchers, or so Hilde 
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Bojer's writes in her recent discussion of the theory and the measurement of 
distributive justice. She notes that there is "a gap between what the philosophers 
write, and what is studied in empirical analyses of incorne distribution ... " (Bojer 
2003, 1). According to Bojer, the gap results from the philosophers' disinterest in 
empirical analysis and the generally utilitarian oudook of much empirical work. 
Bojer sets out to build bridges between the work of philosophers and 
economists. However, her conclusion with respect to her own attempts is 
negative: "1 have not succeeded; the bridge is still unbuilt" (Bojer 2003, 2). 
This essay also focuses on the theory and rneasurement of distributive 
justice. However, due to the problems encountered by Bojer, it explores a 
different road. Drawing on historical sources, it first seeks to excavate shared 
assumptions and expectations in the work of philosophers and economists. l will 
approach the "social point of view" that emerged in essay one in terms of what l 
will call a statistical macroscopic point of view. l thereby place the work of both 
philosophers and econornists in a development that usually rernains hidden in the 
discussion of the theory and measurement of distributive justice. Statistical 
bureaus, agencies and societies are not a universal feature of polities since times 
immemorial, but rather a relatively recent feature of large-scale political societies 
that we tend to forget about. Notoriously, "the society" and "the social," which 
these bureaus and societies helped rnake visible in the wake of the era of 
statistical enthusiasm in the first half of the 19th century, coincide with the rise of 
a way of thinking that is at the very least often in tension with classical political 
thought: "When the nineteenth century is being spoken of, 'political theory' often 
gives way to 'social thought' ... it was only really from the second half of the 
eighteenth century that something conceptualized as 'society' came to be taken 
for granted as the dimension of existence the theorizing of which was necessarily 
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prior to the formulation of a political philosophy. lndeed, to such an extent was 
this taken to undercut the traditional preoccupation with the political, that one 
fmds several otherwise very different writers of the early- and mid-nineteenth 
century sharing the conviction that the need for political activity at all was a 
transient phase of historical developments, and that with the arrival of the truly 
'social state', whether as understood by Saint Simon, Marx or Spencer, the need 
for the arbitration between conflicting interests and the legislation and 
enforcement of common rules, as opposed to the mere 'administration of things', 
would altogether disappear" (Collini 1980, 203f). 1 
The next section introduces the statistical macroscopic point of view with 
the help of a famous exemplar. The subsequent two sections turn to the work of 
two economists who made classic contributions on the personal distribution of 
income and thereby allow me to develop the macroscopic point of view with 
respect to income, which has been especially important for the discussion of the 
theory and measurement of distributive justice. l then turn to the macroscopic 
point of view in John Rawls' theory that features prominently in Bojer's 
discussion. On the topic of the thesis l aim to diagnose an important aspect of 
the vision of society as a system of co-operation, e.g. the macroscopic point of 
view as part of that vision. Based on this work, l then aim to get a better grip on 
the epistemic problem that emerged towards the end of the last essay. While the 
Hrst part of the diagnosis seeks to locate the source of the epistemic problem 
with the help of the macro-scopie point of view, the second part explores 
implications for the debate on the theory and measurement of justice. It is here 
that Rawls' epistemic problem and Bojer's problem of the gap come together, or 
so l aim to show. 
1 See also Wagner 1998; and Arendt 1958 on the "the social." 
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As is apparent, the story of the statistical macroscopic point of view 
brings together what are often taken to be very different contributions. My hope 
is that this alternative exploration will at least produce a spark to illuminate the 
gap diagnosed by Bojer. 
2. A MACRO-SCOPIC POINT OF VIEW 
In ldea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point tif View Kant observes that 
what appears to be the chaos of individual action is seen to be determÏned by 
laws, if attended to "in the large."1 He directly goes on to give evidence for this 
daim: "Since the free will of man has obvious influence upon marriages, births, 
and deaths, they seem to be subject to no rule by which the number of them 
could be reckoned in advance. Yet the annual tables of them in the major 
countries prove that they occur according to laws as stable as [those of] the 
unstable weather, which we likewise cannot determine in advance, but which, in 
the large, maintain the growths of plants, the flow of rivers, and other natural 
events in an unbroken, uniform course" (italics added). 2 
What are the "tables" allowing Kant to take off from the unruly muddle 
of individual actions and reach to the heights of a point of view "in the large" in 
just two sentences? Kant was familiar with the work of Johann Süssmilch.3 A 
1 Kant writes: "lm GroBen betrachtet". 1 use Lewis White Beck's translation (Kant 1989). Hans 
Reiss translates the expression as "on the large scale" (Kant 1970). 
2 In the original: "So scheinen die Ehen, die daher kommenden Geburten, und das Sterben, da 
der freie Wille der Menschen auf sie so groBen EinfluB hat, keiner Regel unterworfen zu sein, 
nach welcher man die Zah! derselben zum voraus durch Rechnung bestÎInrnen konne; und doch 
beweisen die jahrlichen Tafeln derselben in groBen Uindern, daB sie eben so wohl nach 
bestandigen Naturgesetzen geschehen, aIs die so unbestiindigen Wirrungen, deren Eraugnis man 
nicht vorher bestimmen kann" (Kant 1784, A 385). 
3 Kant's readings can be accessed at http://web.uni-marburg.de/kant//webseitn/kalektu.htm 
(last retrieved May 16,2006). 
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Prussian theologian influenced by the English policical arithmeticians,1 Süssmilch 
had laboured to compile numbers on births, deaths, and sex ratios for his main 
work: the Divine Order (and source of the first exercise in the introduction to this 
thesis (Süssmilch 1741). The work offered a mn of politics and religion. Taking 
God's ftrst commandment to be "fruitful, multiply and replenish the earth," it 
followed for Süssmilch that the state was best evaluated by population surveys.2 
This interest joined the daim argued for by Leibniz and others that the best 
measure of the power of the state is its population.3 
Let me speak of the emergence of a statistical macro-scopie point of view. 
Numerical records make possible aggregates such as the number ofbirths, deaths 
and marriages mentioned by Kant that license the language of perceiving "in the 
large." It requires us to consider society in terms of various measurable features 
so as to enable comparison and aggregation. Aggregates, ratios and distributions 
- a view of society in terms of the quantifiable propercies as in the case of the 
"tables" above - are the primary objects of the macroscopic point of view. 
Second, Kant juxtaposes unruly individual actions with large-scale order. He takes 
statistical tables to indicate rules governing individual actions and even writes that 
they "prove" their occurrence according to natural laws. (ln contrast to Kant's 
conjecture of a possible teleology towards a cosmopolitan federation of societies, 
Süssmilch takes the regularities revealed by statistics as proofs of a divine order -
t On the political arithmeticians see Buck 1977 and Buck 1982. 
2 Süssmilch's enthusiasm for population growth is not without insight in the limits of population 
growth. He has a clear sense of "limits to growth," which he thinks of in terrns of limited food 
supply and he even has a sense of limitations due to waste (Süssmilch 1741, 20, 34). He discusses 
measures to adapt to these limits in terms of fewer and later marriages, lower birth rates as weil as, 
in cheerful biblical spirit, reduced life expectancy. However, it would take another pastor and 
reader of Süssrnilch, Thomas Malthus, to fully explore the implications of demographic 
limitations. 
3 Foucault places these surveys in relation to the emergence of an equilibrium of (national) forces 
that with the Westphelian Treaty tends to replace the conceptualisation of politics in terms of the 
one Empire or the one Church in favour of a plural and dynamic world of states held together by 
the balance of their forces (Foucault 1977, Lecture 11). 
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statistical tables and the point of view they afford are an exercise in 
"demographic theology"l). Third, dosely related to the notion of an order is the 
scale of this point of view. Kant writes of the marriages, birth and death rates, i.e. 
he focuses on societal features rather than individual or interpersonal ones. 
Fourth, the macro-scopic point of view invites questions concerning the causes 
of the observed order.2 Indeed, statistics has played a role in moving political 
discussion from a focus on individual responsibility toward societal causes of 
actions and outcomes. "It is the social state, in sorne measure, which prepares 
these crimes, and the criminal is merely the instrument to execute them," wrote 
the famous 19th century statistician Adolphe Quetelet (Quetelet 1834, 6).3 There 
are objectives set in terms of statistics in so far as these are perceived to be 
influenced by forces that can be changed. But knowledge of a statistic does of 
course not automatically imply knowledge of these forces and/or of what can be 
done to change them.4 
3. INCOME TABLES 
Süssmilch is one of the better-known early producers of statistics. Yet, statistical 
efforts were increasingly made in the growing industrial nation states of the 19th 
century; an avalanche of numbers (Hacking) drove through the century, and 
1 On the latter see Hacking 1990, 21. 
2 l write regularities and laws, because the se terms and the difference between them gave rise to 
considerable debate between 19th century statisticians (See Hacking 1990, Chapter 15). 
3 On Quetelet also see essay three, section five. Also note that following the observations "in the 
large," Kant moves on to his famous discussion of "social antagonism" - of the "ungesellige 
Geselligkeit" - as a mechanism of development. 
4 Nor does it imply knowledge of the particularly difficult question what kind of effects statistics 
themselves have on us. 
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national statistical bureaus were set up, alongside with national and international 
statistical societies.1 
Near the end of the 19th century, the "Italians became increasingly 
interested in rnathernatical social statistics" (porter 1986, 192). In 1896, Vilfredo 
Pareto published his famous claim that a law governed the distribution of 
incorne. His article on the "Courbe de la repartition de la richesse" (pareto 1896a) 
rnusters incorne statistics frorn England, France, Gerrnany and Italy in search for 
an answer to the question whether incorne is distributed randornly2 - presurnably 
the "free will of man has an obvious influence upon" incorne - or whether the 
distribution of incorne is governed by a law.3 His answer: with respect to personal 
incorne distribution we are in the presence of a naturallaw;4 the available incorne 
statistics reveal an unequal distribution of incorne across each society that can be 
approxirnated by a linear, logarithmic relationsrup. 
According to Joseph Persky, "rnost 19th century econornists paid lip 
service to the notion of verifying their theories with ernpirical research. A few 
had even atternpted to collect relevant data. But it was Vilfredo Pareto with his 
research on the distribution of incorne, who first showed what a seriously 
inductive econornics rnight look like" (persky 1992, 1825). Pareto's work Falls 
squarely into the "age of econornic rneasurernent," wruch witnessed frorn 1850 to 
1950 the developrnent of ever new rnethods to analyze and represent statistical 
data (Morgan 2001, 235). At "the turn of the century econornic and social 
developrnent had transformed the conditions for econOmlC data-gathering. For 
1 On the development of national statistical bureaus in the 19th century in England, France, 
Germany and the Unites States see Desrosières 1993. For the development of statistics at that 
rime more generally see Porter 1986 and Gigerenzer et al. 1989. 
2 "Au hasard" (Pareto 1896a, 1). 
3 "Groupent suivant quelque loi" (Pareto 1896a, 1). 
4 "Loi naturelle" (pareto 1896a, 3). 
5 See also Bresciani-Turroni 1939, who acknowledges the originality of Pareto's empirical work, 
and the further research it made possible, even though he is generally quite critical of Pareto's 
work (Bresciani-Turroni 1939,132). 
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generations, statisticians and economists had dreamed of imposing an orderly 
scheme of measurement on the world. What distinguished early twentieth century 
planners and social engineers from their predecessors was that they could actually 
do it!" (Tooze 2001, 18). 
In this period of the development of statistical methods, Pareto's research 
on income distribution is not novel, if that is understood to include work on life 
expenditures such as Frédéric Le Play's typological studies in 19 th century France 
or Ernst Engel's studies on the cost of living required for subsistence in 
Germany.l Rather, rus originality seems to come to the fore in contrast to the 
classical and Marxist economists - "seems," for there is a twist that l will turn to 
below. 
Adam Smith's and David Ricardo's work on income and its distribution 
focuses on income primarily in terms of production and its factors. What is the 
contribution of land (and its rent), of labor (and its wage) and of capital (and its 
profit)? Marx focuses on the conflict between labor and capital for the 
production of income. In contrast, Pareto's discussion of the income and rus "loi 
naturelle" abstracts from these categories of production, and focuses on the 
personal incorne distribution clustered in terms of rnathernatically neat incarne 
groups: the nurnber of people earning 150[ and more per year, the number of 
people earning 200[ and more per year and so on. 
Why did Pareto focus on the personal income distribution? As his editor 
remarks, it was Pareto's hatred of socialism that provided him with energy to sift 
through the statistical material (Busino in Pareto 1896a, X).2 The socialist 
movement had given the concem with equality and the belief in the possibility (or 
1 On these works, compare Hacking 1990, Chapter 16. 
2 Note that Pareto used the term "socialist" extensively: "Pareto cailed socialists ail those who 
wanted 'the intervention of the state to change the distribution of wealth'. 'Popular socialists' 
wished to favour the poor. 'bourgeois socialists' the wealthy" (Beilamy 1990, 259). 
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even inevitability) of egalitarian societies an influential place in the political 
controversies of the late 19th century. Pareto uses his law to argue that the 
distribution cannot be explained in terms of institutions - after aIl he had shown 
it to obtain in societies with different institutions, of different size and mode of 
production - and depends ultimately on human nature. "L'inégalité de la 
répartition des revenues parait donc dépendre beaucoup plus de la nature même 
des hommes que de l'organisation économique de la société. De profondes 
modifications de cette organisation pourraient bien n'avoir que peu d'influence 
pour modifier la loi de la répartition des revenues" (pareto 1896b, 363). His work 
on the income distribution therefore provided him with what he saw as a 
"scientific argument against the possibility of egalitarian transformation" 
(Brandolini 2002, 3). His work on the distribution of personal income aims to 
debunk: the income distribution is stable across different societies; attempts to 
modify it futile; and it is better to focus on the total income of the economy, on 
production: increased production may at least raise the well-being of those at the 
bottom. 
Pareto's loi naturelle was subjected to much criticism and testing. It was 
argued that bis curve did not fit the distribution as well as he daimed it did, that 
there are similar inheritance institutions in the societies he looks at, and that it is 
difficult to see what licenses the inference from past observation to daims about 
the future.1 However, for the present purpose, l would like to point out that 
Pareto relies on quantified information, that his research seeks to establish 
whether the available information indicates that society is ordered, that the scale is 
large (indeed the law is meant to hold universal1y), and that bis statistical efforts 
lead him to a discussion of causes, i.e. bis controversial daim that "human 
1 See for exarnple the discussion in Arthur Pigou's Economis of We!fare (Pigou 1920). Sorne of the 
reactions to Pareto are cornpiled in Cunningham Wood and McLure 1999. 
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nature" is at the root of inequality. In short, these are the features of the macro-
scopie point of view introduced above.1 
4. TELESCOPES 
Against the background of a history of economic growth in the United States, the 
United Kingdom and Germany from around 1780 up to the Second World War, 
Simon Kuznets asked in his 1954 presidential address to the American Economie 
Association whether the income distribution during this period of economic 
growth exhibited any trends (Kuznets 1955). Based on the available income 
information, he famously (and cautiously~ suggested the inverted U-relationship 
that has become known as the Kuznet's curve: income inequality first rises at the 
initial stages of industrialisation, but then achieves a maximum after which "the 
relative distribution of income, as measured by annual income incidence in rather 
broad classes, has been moving towards equality - with these trends particularly 
noticeable since the 1920's but beginning perhaps in the period before the first 
world war" (Kuznets 1955,4).3 
In deliberate contrast to Pareto, Kuznets takes great care to specify the 
income he seeks to measure (Kuznets 1955, 3). Income measurement ought to be 
"free of cyclical and other transient disturbances" and distinguish between "full-
1 Historically, Pareto's essay on the income distribution can arguably be situated in the history of 
19th century liberal statisticians: "Nineteenth century liberals were irnpressed by the power and 
dynamism of that complex entity, society, and were pleased to fmd evidence that it exhibited a 
stability which seemed not to be dependent on the intermittent wisdom of governing authorities" 
(porter 1986, 5, see also chapter 2). Concerning the influence of English liberals on Pareto see 
Bellamy (1990). 
2 See Kuznets 1955, 26. 
3 More specifically, "income inequality might have been widening, from about 1780 to 1850 in 
England; from about 1840 to 1890, and particularly from 1870 on in the United States; and, from 
1840's to the 1890'5 in Germany. 1 would put the phase of narrowing income inequality 
somewhat later in the United States and Germany than in England - perhaps beginning with the 
First World War in the former and in the last quarter of the 19th century in the latter" (Kuznets 
1955,19). 
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time, full-fledged participation in economic activity" as compared to the young 
and the old (who might have other incomes), e.g. those retired and those yet in 
education are to be excluded; measurements should draw on all segments of the 
working society; capital gains are to be excluded and the unit of measurement 1S 
to be family expenditure adjusted by the number of persons in each (Kuznets 
1955, 1). lndeed, he acknowledges that this specification risks producing a 
"statistical economist's pipe dream" (Kuznets 1955, 2): there may simply not be 
sufficient information to calculate the development of the income distribution as 
specified. Yet, these obstacles did not prevent Kuznet from claiming that the 
available statistics can be made to exhibit an order, i.e. order on the Iarge-scale of 
country comparison, and to move from there to a discussion of causes. 
To capture the macro-scopic point of view somewhat differently, we 
could say that statistics provide us with telescopes that make it possible to 
observe, albeit "dimIy" (Kuznets 1955, 4), the structure of the social milky way. 
The metaphor of the telescope is meant to indicate 1) the role of methods of 
measurement and representation as instruments of observation. Drawing on 
prior work by Marcel Boumans, Mary Morgan writes that "we can interpret the 
mathematical formulae, statistical formulae, and accounting rules of data 
elicitation and manipulation . . . in terms of measuring instruments" (Morgan 
2001, 237); 2) to underline the distance produced by the macro-scopie 
perspective, if it is compared to the point of view of inter-personal relations1; 3) 
as resonant of the tradition of 19th century social scientists and their attempts to 
discover Iarge-scale laws of society - indeed, one protagonist, Adolphe Quetelet, 
was a trained astronomer and hoped for a "social physics" (and Pareto's 
"presence of a natural law" will be recalled); 4) to indicate the social science 
1 See the discussion in section six below. 
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strategy and temptation to think about measurement in terms of the example of 
the natural sciences (porter 2001). 
5. A SOCIAL POINT OF VIEW 
Rawls developed the first version of this theory of justice from roughly 1950-
1970 (Rawls 1957, 58, 63, 67, 68, 71). His theory offers a procedural 
interpretation of Kant's moral philosophy for political philosophy (Rawls 1971, 
§40). But as we have seen, rus vision of co-operation also involves an argument 
for a separation of operations.! ''We cannot tell by looking at the conduct of 
individuals and associations in the immediate (or local) circumstances whether, 
from a social point of view, agreements reached are just or fair" (Rawls 1993, 
266). What does trus social point of view practically amount to? 
Another question may lead us to an answer: who are the least-advantaged 
in a system of co-operation? The Rawlsian answer turns to primary goods, i.e. 
those "social conditions and all-purpose means that are generally necessary to 
enable citizens adequately to develop and fully exercise their two moral powers 
[the capacity for a sense of justice as weIl as for a conception of the good] and to 
pur sue their determinate conceptions of the good" (Rawls, 2001, 57'1. For the 
difference principle these goods are the rights and prerogatives of authority, 
income and wealth, and indirectly the social bases of self-respece (Rawls 1971, 
80). 
1 See essay one, section three. 
2 This fonnulation of primary goods in tenns of citizens' needs and the two basic capacities of 
citizens is a revision of the earlier defrnition of primary goods as "things, which a rational man 
wants whatever else he wants" (Rawls 1971, 15). While the changing perspective of primary goods 
is important, it does not change the list of goods Rawls actually proposes and that 1 will deal with 
presently. See Rawls 1981 for discussion of this change. 
3 The social bases of self-respect are "those aspects of basic institutions nonnally essential if 
citizens are to have a lively sense of their worth as persons and to be able to advance their ends 
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With the help of this prirnary good approach, Rawls proposes two ways 
of identifying the least-advantaged: 1) In terrns of relative incorne and wealth: 
"for exarnple, all persons with less than half of the rnedian income rnay be 
regarded as the least advantaged segment" (Rawls 1971, 84). 2) In terrns of social 
position, "say that of the unskilled worker, and then to count as the least 
favoured all those with approximately the incorne and wealth of those in trus 
position" (Rawls 1971,84). Regarding both options he concludes that "either of 
these criteria would appear to coyer those most disfavoured by the various 
contingencies and provide a basis . . . from wruch, in conjunction with other 
measures, society could proceed to fulfIl the difference principle" (Rawls 1971, 
In short, in Rawls we find, among other goods, a focus on income for the 
identification of inequality in large societies. Indeed he demands that income (and 
to a lesser extent wealth) play the major role among the primary goods as far as 
the difference principle is concerned. Income is to be an "objective measure" 
(Rawls 2001, §53). However, rus specification of income differs from Pareto and 
Kuznets in that Rawls aims to single out the life prospects of normally co-
operating members of society. Second, he discusses this objective measure in 
terms of an overall ordering of society: income is to be distributed to the bene fit 
of the least-advantaged. The complement to this discussion of societal order is a 
with self-confidence" (Rawls 2001, 59). Rawls has in mind not just basic rights, but also the public 
recognition of these rights and that "everyone endorses the difference principle" (Rawls 2001, 
60). The social bases of self-respect are therefore intimately related to the perception of justice. 
The other primary goods are covered by the first principle, which is to be met by 
everyone equally, and the principle of appropriate fair equality of opportunity. For a Iist of 
primary goods see Rawls 1971, §15 and 2001, 57. 
1 Both proposals assume that the powers and prerogatives of office and the social basis of self-
respect correlate with income and wealth. While trus may be reasonable in one regime, the 
correlation across regimes is much more controversial. A regime with worker-owned scheme of 
production might do very weil in terms of powers and prerogatives of office; while a capitalist 
regime might perform poorly in this respect, yet better in terms of income and wealth (Krouse 
and McPherson 1988). 
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threatening arbitrariness on the individuallevel. As Rawls emphasizes throughout 
his work - arguably this is his major moral concern - the individual socio-
economic position is influenced by a host of contingencies: the variety of talents 
we are born with and their social esteem, the familles we are or are not born into, 
luck in the market - in short: a chaos that threatens to undermine a fair system of 
co-operation. Third, this order is large-scale; it is meant to govern a people. 
Finally, this point of view inevitably leads to questions about the determinants of 
this order. As already noted, Rawls is concerned with a threatening arbitrariness 
of social factors on individual prospects. He thinks that these social factors -
ultimately the basic structure - have not only a pervasive influence on individual 
lives, but that they can also be designed in a way that mitigates arbitrariness 
towards a fairer system. 
Yet, recalling Pareto's work on the in come distribution, does Rawls 
thereby not use the telescope as if it was a kaleidoscope - rotate until you see a 
pleasing distribution? As noted, the macro-scopie point of view does not 
automatically offer a rigorous understanding of the determinants of the observed 
distribution; it only invites the investigation of and action on the (presumed) 
determinations. And the observation of the distribution is dependent on the 
available information. Rawls and Pareto uses the macro-scopie point of view 
differently. Pareto, we might say, ultimately engineers a devout perception; he 
seeks to make visible an already existing order that nothing can be done about. 
Who could defy a naturallaw? Who would want to change it without looking like 
a fool, a "wanderer, devoid of reason?" For Rawls, we might say by contrast, the 
macro-scopie point of view is to make possible a kind of summoning perception 
for the members of society as a system of co-operation; it is to gather their 
attention towards action that ensures that the vision of co-operation is worked 
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towards and maintained. This difference in role relates to a different use of the 
macro-scopic point of view. Whereas the devout perception draws on available 
facts, we will see that the summoning perception ultimately calls for the 
production of the macro-scopic point of view situated in society as a system of 
co-operation. For otherwise already available facts and the standards of 
objectivity associated with them can only be adopted, but not modified for the 
political vision. As not noting this difference in use is likely to advantage the 
engineers of devout perception, we could in view of Pareto's political intentions 
say that he laid out a limestick - a trap for birds that fixes on one view from 
above, i.e. on the given personal income distribution, and thereby prevents others 
from taking measures for not only the adoption but also the modification of the 
macro-scopic point of view as required by their political vision. The visionary of 
co-operation stands on, or rather sticks to the shoulder of giants - with a 
kaleidoscope. l will offer further reasons for the choice of the limestick metaphor 
in the subsequent sections. 
Let me conclude this section with a clarification regarding the first feature 
of the macroscopic point of view identified above. Readers of Philippe Van 
Parijs' essay on Rawls' difference principle might ask whether the specification in 
terms of social position and the prospects associated with it does not depart from 
measurement. Van Parijs distinguishes the focus on scores (as the outcomes 
people obtain in terms of income etc.) from that on expectations (as the life 
prospect of a social position). He correctly points out that Rawls' focuses on life 
prospects, but in so doing van Parijs tends to associate the misleading focus on 
scores with measurement (Van Parijs 2003, 212-213). However, there is no 
opposition between measurement and expectations (and l am not sure whether 
van Parijs wishes to draw one). Note that with respect to life prospects van Parijs 
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writes: "Under actual or feasible schemes, it is possible to determine the level of 
income and of the other social and economic advantages to be expected by 
people in this position accessible even to the least fortunate, that is, the level its 
incumbents will achieve on average" (Van Parijs 2003, 218). How are we to 
determine what people in a social position acrueve on average? And moreover, 
how are we to do so in such a way that it will be a publicly available standard (or 
as Rawls' says an "objective measure'')? Presumably this requires taking into 
account the government spending available to those in the respective social 
position: wage subsidies, guaranteed income support, health care spending, 
housing support and so on. This will provide a sense of what people in this 
expectation can expect on average (actual income will be different due to 
differences in health, one's communal place in a household, or family etc.). 
Clearly it is a difficult exercise to determine average expectations; yet, rather than 
standing in contrast to measurement it is an especially demanding form of it. The 
literature on lifetime income provides an entry to the considerations in this 
domain.1 
6. THE AMPHIBOLY OF INCOME 
The last sections traced the macroscopic point of view in the work of economists 
and philosophers. In the last two sections, l have focused on income, wruch 
exrubits what Hilary Putnam calls the entanglement of fact and value (putnam 
2003,396). Pareto draws on statistics so as to reveal a law of income distribution 
and demonstrate the futility of egalitarian attempts. To do so, Pareto must 
assume that an equal incorne distribution is something that egalitarians support. 
1 See the discussion in Bojer 2003, 74f. 
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But suppose a socialist position according to which equalised income holdings 
are in the first place simply irrelevant - what is of primary importance is that each 
income meets the respective personal needs; in contras t, counting and comparing 
one's dollars is nothing but an expression of money fetisrusm. There is nothing 
unequal if a person with a disease that requires coscly treatment has much more 
income than a healthy person; to the contrary, sameness would imply inequality: 
not providing to each according to the respective needs. It foIlows that for his 
scientific argument against egalitarian transformation, Pareto (as weIl as socialists) 
must make at least sorne assumptions with respect to equality as a value. Simply 
pointing to one of numerous regularities in the world is insufficient. 
Rawls develops principles of justice, but in so doing he wants to put forward 
an objective measure. RecalI the identification of the least-advantaged discussed 
above. There is no distinction between income as a "primary good" in rus theory, 
and X as an indicator for this primary good. Rather, the primary goods are meant 
to be objective measures. 
Having sketched the features of the macro-scopic point of view in the 
preceding sections, l would like to explore in the subsequent sections what light 
trus point of view sheds on the "social point of view" and controversies it has 
given rise to. Debate has in particular tumed on the "question of the choice of 
espace' in which different persons are to be compared" (Sen 1992, 2). Notably, 
capability theorists have argued that resourcists1 conceptualize the demands of 
social justice in terms of a misleading unit of consideration; and resourcists have 
replied that the more important concems advanced by their critics are in part 
1 The primary goods approach is often labelled as (one variant of) a "resourcist" approach. While 
this label is not ideal it is for example plainly much more general than "primary goods" and 
seems to connote an instrumentalist outlook - l shall nonetheless follow the convention and 
speak of "resourcists" when discussing the work of Rawls, Dworkin and others. Also, resources 
and capabilities are only two possible options, which however feature prominently in the debate 
(see Cohen 1989). 
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"captured" in the space of resources and in part illegitimate (perhaps belonging to 
personal ethics, dependent on untenable assumptions and so on). The advocacy 
of capability and the focus on functioning it entails is in part a comeback for the 
"vital statistics" of Süssmilch and 19th century moral statisticians. Can the macro-
scopie point of view shed sorne light on this "space-debate'? Does it, implicitly 
or explicitly, inform it? 
In the next three sections, l will tum respectively to considerations of 
scale, of order and fmally to considerations regarding the making of measurement 
so as to arrive at a better understanding of the epistemic problem encountered in 
the first essay. 
7. SPACE, VARIATIONS AND SCALE 
In their discussion of democracy, political theorists often draw on a distinction 
between democracy in small dties and the large-scale democracy of nation states. 
This distinction highlights differences in population seize as weil as in the 
possibilities of action assodated with it (consider the political economy slogan 
that the division of labor depends on the size of the market). l Can the 
consideration of scale illuminate the debate between resourcists and capability 
theorists? Let me start with Sen's influential statement of the capability 
perspective. 
A major and - in terms of political influence in the 20th century - perhaps 
the most important variation of the macro-scopie point of view belongs to a 
conception of development that views economic growth as the single most 
important driver of development, measures this development in terms of national 
1 See especially the work of Robert Dahl, who stresses the importance of scale for democracy and 
its institutions (Dahl 2005, 192 and Dahl 1998, 85ft). 
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accounts (both growth rates and GDP per capita) and sets policy goals with 
respect to this measure. Sen's capability critique - and his own view of development 
as freedom - is in no small part directed against a view of development in the 
above economic terms. His Development as Freedom opens with the following 
contrast: "Development can be seen, it is argued here, as a process of expanding 
the real freedoms that people enjoy. Focusing on human freedoms conttasts with 
narrower views of development, such as identifying development with the growth 
of gross national product ... (Sen 1999, 3). 
1 start with this critical focus of the work, because there is a tendency in 
the "space-debate" to bracket critical engagement with actual policies and 
measurements of governments and international organisations. For example, 
capability theorists are criticised as engaging only with a vulgar and unrefined 
resourcist perspective (e.g. that often used by development agencies) as opposed 
to more sophisticated, philosophical resourcist theories. Thomas Pogge writes 
"unfortunately, both Sen and Nussbaum occasionally suggest this invalid 
argument: They compare an implausible resourcist view - typically one that 
assesses alternative feasible institutional schemes by the average income (or GNP 
per capita) each would engender - to a more plausible capability view and then 
suggest that the capability approach is therefore more plausible than the 
resourcist approach" (pogge 2002, 178). As evidence he cites a passage from Sen 
(Sen 1999, 187). But in the passage Sen criticises what he calls the "standard 
income-based poverty assessment" (italics added). There evidently is the 
possibility, and 1 think importance, of engaging with actual policies and 
measurements. The actual policies and measurements can bring to the fore 
aspects that escape the philosophical debate. 1 will return to this point below. 
However, before 1 retum to Sen's criticism of the large-scale economic 
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view of development, let me consider two of Sen's objections to the resourcists, 
who - most prominently Rawls - seek a conception of justice for the large-scale. 
Let me consider two of Sen's objections to the resourcist approach and the reply 
of a prominent resourcist, Thomas Pogge, keeping in mind the specification of 
scale. 
" ... Being relatively poor in a rich community can prevent a person from 
acrueving sorne elementary "functionings" (such as taking part in the life of the 
community) even though her income, in absolute terms, may be much rugher 
than the level of income at wruch members of poorer communities can function 
with great ease and success" (Sen 1999, 71). One single standard of in come can 
have very different possibilities of action and recognition. In defence of the 
resourcist view, Thomas Pogge argues that even a "simple income resourcist can 
accept Sen's point: by recognizing that the value of any level of income depends 
in part on what incomes other participants enjoy and that, partly for this reason, 
an institutional order may be unjust because the incomes it makes available to 
sorne are too low relative to the incomes it makes available to others. A plausible 
resource me tric must include all and only the resources human beings need to 
function adequately and must weight these resources according to their 
importance in fulfilling the standard human needs" (pogge 2002, 180). Yet, 
consider that even Rawls - a simple income resourcist? - cannot meet trus 
criticism as easily as Pogge implies. Even if the position of the least-advantaged is 
maximised (recall the two proposals introduced above), it may weIl be true that 
within the group of the least-advantaged sorne live in richer and others in poorer 
communities. Arguably, the problem is somewhat diminished due to the freedom 
of movement. Nonetheless, Sen makes the basic point that there is societal 
variety of communities that does not fit easily with the large-scale evaluation in 
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terms of income. 
A second criticism with respect to one standard of income across the 
nation points out that "variations in environmental conditions, such as climatic 
circumstances (temperature ranges, rainfall, flooding and so on), can influence 
what a person gets out of a given level of income" (Sen 1999, 70). Pogge words 
his reply to this criticism more cautiously: " ... resourcists have every reason to 
take [environmental diversity] into account. Thus, if we count a place where one 
can live and work among the personal goods or resources, then it makes sense to 
count such a place as more valuable when it offers a temperate climate and 
healthy environment, just as one would count such a place as more valuable when 
it off ers an abundance of freely available nutritious fruits and vegetables" (pogge 
2002, 181). Yet, Rawls and other resourcists do not discuss a resource of place -
not least, presumably, because we do not know how to construct an objective 
measure of place. Even taking into account the freedom of movement, there 1S 
again diversity, now of environmental conditions, that does not fit easily with the 
large-scale. 
But what about these objections, if we make explicit the scale of the 
investigation? The source of Sen's objections appears to be in no small part the 
large-scale focus of his opponents rather than any particular difference between 
the space of resources and capabilities. To see this, let me ask whether Sen's 
objections also apply to the capability approach on the large scale? Consider the 
Buman Development Index (BD!), which is calculated from life expectancy (as 
an indicator of health), literacy and school enrolment (as an indicator of 
education) and GDP per capita (as an indicator for a decent standard ofliving).l 
Environmental diversity, Sen points out, might imply that more income 
1 For introduction to and review of the HDI see Fukuda-Parr and Kumar 2005. 
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will have to be spent on such necessities as heating and clothing in cold areas. 
Yet, consider that people in cold areas might spend much of their income so as 
to go to school (enrolment and literacy) and work (GDP) in a way that reduces 
the effects of the cold, and that because they spend much of their income on 
clothing and heating they achieve the same life expectancy as people in warm 
areas. As a result they do weIl in all four dimensions. And yet, their differential 
effort does not show in the HDI. Iikewise recall Sen's criticism that resourcists 
ignore relational aspects: the income that may be just fIne in one community 
might not be sufflcient to be seen without shame in public in a community that 
has a very expensive, and always changing habit for being fashionably dressed. 
Now, because the HDI calculates a decent standard of living in terms of GDP 
per capita - a rise in the HDI, indeed an increase in all four dimensions of the 
HDI, is fully consistent with the relational requirement not being met. To put it 
polemically, the HDI rises, educated people live longer lives, and yet lives that 
they all along experience as shameful. 
Now, the discussion in the last paragraph assumes the HDI to be 
something like a guideline for policy-makers and people concemed with human 
development. This makes it tempting to think of the HDI as an index for the 
setting of policy goals. But recall the observation made at the beginning of this 
section. Sen at least also views his work as a critical engagement with the widely-
endorsed large-scale economic view of development. Noting this engagement, we 
can take the HDI as a critique of a prevailing paradigm of development. On this 
view, the HDI is intended to question and debunk this dominant paradigm.l The 
1 Indeed, "challenging GDP as a measure and target of development" is at the top of the list of 
uses that Kate Raworth and David Stewart consider in their review of critiques of the HDI 
(Rateworth and Stewart 2005, 165). Their review is written from a point of view sympathetic to 
the HDI and how it can be developed further. Even though the authors stress the critical role of 
the HDI, ultimately their main emphasis is on the HDI as an ideological alternative to GDP, a 
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HDI shows in statistical language that economic growth and important 
functionings are not automatically correlated, and thereby questions the use of 
measures of economic growth as indicators of welfare. This gives the HDI a 
critieal raIe - it puts into doubt a deeply engrained perception of society and its 
development. But it does not automatically follow that policy ought instead to be 
detennined by the HDI as the one overarehing prioritised number. Indeed, the 
fme-grained capability view puts into doubt the very possibility and therefore 
plausibility of sueh one-number prajeets.1 
Granted this critical raIe of the HDI, it is noteworthy that even the 
specifie functionings of the HDI taken in isolation can be subjeeted ta criticism 
in the spirit of Sen's objection to resourcism. Consider "health" as a functioning 
that appears in the Human Development Index in tenns of life expectancy. As health 
does not reduee to life expectancy, the indicator as "the" indicator of health 
implies that "other" health issues remain invisible for public perception and 
discussion, and therefore also the considerable variation of health in a society. 
Now, to be sure, it is possible to add further functionings under the "health"-
category so as to achieve a fuller picture. Yet, to do so is to engage in the kind of 
ad hoc addition that we have seen resourcists resort to (recall the example of 
"place of living" as a resource). Likewise, consider literacy as an indicator for 
education. More effort is required for learning how to read and write Mandarine 
than is required for learning Italian. So how can we accurately compare the 
achievements of different eountries given these differences in effort? Pinally, 
consider most obviously GDP per capita as an indicator for a decent standard of 
living. It is consistent with environmental diversity being destroyed. The indicator 
measure for the stock of human development, a tool for focusing planning objectives and a 
monitoring device. Also see the contribution of the principal architect of the index, Mahbub ul 
Haq, in the same volume. 
1 l will turn to "debunking" at greater length in essay five. 
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not only fails to recogrllze the value and diversity of environments for a decent 
standard of living, but is arguably in its unmodified form even partially 
responsible for the reduction of the standard of living (due to policies aiming at 
GDP increase). 
ln conclusion, what lessons can be drawn concerning the debate over the 
"space" of equality once the scale of this debate is made explicit? In this section, 1 
have argued first that participants in this debate must not lose out of sight the 
critical engagement with political large-scale conceptions of development, and 
how engaging with these conceptions practically shapes even philosophically 
informed work on equality. In this respect, the HDI arguably plays a role in 
debunking economic growth as an indicator of welfare in that it questions this 
very influential view in the statistical language of the still prevailing growth 
paradigm. 1 will further discuss the topie of indeces and debunking in essay five. 
Second, 1 have argued that the enYÏronmental and communal variation objections 
are, at least in part, orthogonal to the space debate. Sen's objections against the 
resourcists can also be targeted against the HDI and against the constituent 
functionings of the Index. If environmental variation and communal diversity 
increase with scale, then large-scale accounts of resources and functionings are 
likely to stand at a distance from the locallevel and be thereby always potentially 
exposed to the kind of criticism made by Sen. 
To be sure, both approaches can continuously expand their list of 
resources and capabilities in response to such criticisrn. However, here it seerns 
important to draw a lesson from the prevailing large-scale economic view of 
developrnent, which reduces political perception to very few variables. Not only 
the longer the list of considerations bec ornes, the more alternative critical 
measures are likely to decrease in critical force, but as there are also limits to our 
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cognitive capacities even in capability / resource utopia a limited number of 
capabilities/resources is required - and with the limitation difficult choices. 
Political experience suggests that further to the "law of large numbers," there is 
also one of relatively "few numbers." lt is arguably this insight that motivated 
the construction of the HDI. 
8.0RDER 
The macroscopic point of view involves perceptions and expectations of large-
scale order: Süssmilch takes statistics as evidence that the biblical imperative to be 
fruitful, multiply and replenish the Earth is met; Quetelet sees the ever further 
development of average man. There is an element of wonder and relief in such 
works: seen in the large, the individual chaos does after all exrubit order; in spite 
of political interruptions and revolutions the number of marriages and suicides is 
stable. The macro-scopic point of view offers relief in the objective language of 
statistics, the perception of "divine order" - and it thereby invites devout 
perception. The devout perception of order is made possible by statistics, and 
often fed with graphs. It takes for granted that the world is ordered, and only 
calls for scrutiny and questioning regarding the making of statistics to the end of 
making that order visible. The world is assumed to be ordered, and disappointing 
this expectation of the devout perception can therefore lead to total scepticism 
regarding the social world: only the "arbitrary chaos" of individual action is 1eft, 
and no alternative political ways of structuring the social world. 
Interestingly, the absence of a proposed large-scale order has been made 
an objection to the capability approach. In rus detailed contribution to the 
"space" of equality discussion, Pogge urges that the debate must not be led in 
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isolation: " ... we should ask which approach can deliver the most plausible public criterion 
of social justice" (pogge 2002, 167, italics in the original). Complementary to the 
specification of the "space" of consideration there is, Pogge argues, a need for a 
criterion so as to order resources and capabilities (pogge 2002, 197). With the 
help of the criterion we are able to evaluate the justice or injustice of an 
institutional scheme, because the "public criterion of social justice ... tells us how 
an institutional order ought to be designed, and also how existing llstitutional 
schemes fall short and how they should be reformed ... as an institutional order 
is ful{y specifie, so is the public criterion of justice underlying it" (pogge 2002, 211, 
italics added). 
Now, in this section l would like to further explore the statistical macro-
scopie point of view, its possibilities and influence. l will argue that the way 
Pogge calls for a public criterion and the way he argues against the capability 
approach risks inheriting an expectation of devout perception and with it a 
misleading understanding of the political VlSlon made possible by the macro-
scopie point of view that ultimately strengthens scepticism with regard to the 
possibility of political vision on the large-scale. 
Let me begin with Pogge's characterization of the public criterion. It is to tell 
us how an institution al order ought to be designed and to do so fully specifically. 
Pogge does not advance a public criterion of rus own in trus article, but he does 
endorse a resourcist perspective. l will therefore consider the criterion of a 
philosopher that Pogge calls the "paradigmatic resourcist": Rawls (pogge 2002, 
181). The first point to note is, strikingly, that is is questionable whether Rawls 
even meets the precondition for a fully specifie institutional order. Notoriously, 
he discusses both versions of socialism and capitalism as possible institutional 
sets of rus approach to justice (Rawls 1971, §§ 42-43). Second, regarding the 
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relation of the public criterion with regards to the space of equality, three 
observations are pertinent: A) Rawls does not offer one criterion of justice, but 
two principles, which on doser inspection turn out to contain three criteria: a 
liberty principle conceming basic liberties and rights, the principle of fair equality 
of opportunity, and the difference principle. Now, pedantically, we could say that 
social justice concems distribution issues and not basic rights and liberties, so 
that the liberty principle is irrelevant here. But this is problernatic, for the 
discussion of what counts as social justice for whorn is in practice linked to the 
capacity to voice one's view and thus to basic rights; and there would anyway still 
rernain two criteria (And l have not even yet rnentioned intemational criteria, nor 
those oflocal justice). B) Consider the resources to which the difference principle 
applies in practice, i.e. according to Rawls' own proposals especially wealth and 
incorne: ''The prirnary goods of incorne and wealth are not to be identified only 
with personal incorne and private wealth. For we have control, or partial control, 
over incorne and wealth not only as individuals but also as rnernbers of 
associations and groups. Mernbers of a religious sect have sorne control over 
church property; rnernbers of a faculty have sorne control over a university's 
wealth viewed as a rneans for carrying out their aims of scholarship and research. 
As citizens we are also the beneficiaries of the governrnent's providing various 
personal goods and services to which we are entitled, as in the case of health care, 
or of its providing public goods (in the econornist's sense), as in the case of 
rneasures ensuring public health (dean air and unpolluted water, and the like)" 
(Rawls 2001, 172). Not only is incorne defmed in tenns of life prospects -
dernanding as this already is for evaluative purposes - it also indudes incorne "in 
kind," i.e. for exarnple health care services. Consequently, the task to develop an 
"objective rneasure" of incorne is raised to a new level. Whether and how the 
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criterion is met depends on decisions over in kind and in cash provision, and the 
extent to which public measures (such as Rawls' public health example) reaIly 
have universal rather than differential impact. As the environmental justice 
movement has long argued with respect to public health measures, conceiving of 
environmental goods in terms of a nature-society relation often conceals the 
differential access and exposure of societai groups to environmental goods and 
bads. q Granted the extended understanding of incorne and wealth, it is still not 
correct that we can sim ply apply the difference principle. It may for example be 
thought that provisions can be made for medical needs up to the point where 
further provision would lower the expectation of the least-advantaged. Yet, the 
possibility of the se provisions depends itself on decisions that do not depend in 
any straightforward sense on the difference principle, nor in any "fully specific" 
way on the other criteria: ''What sets an upper bound to the fraction of the social 
production spent on medical and health needs are the other essentiai 
expenditures society must make, whether these are paid for by private or public 
funds. For example, an active workforce must be sustained, children must be 
raised and properly educated, part of the annUal product must be invested in real 
capital and another part counted as depreciations, and provision must be made 
for those who are retired, not to mention the requirements of national defence 
and a (just) foreign policy in a world of nation-states. The representatives of 
citizens who view these daims from the point of view of the legisiative must 
strike a balance between them in aIlocating society's resources" (Rawls 2001, 
173). The three observations suggest that the relation between public criteria and 
the space of equality they are meant to order is cornplex and involves a good 
measure of judgment. As a result, Pogge's caIl for a fully specific public order is 
hardly met by the "paradigmatic resourcist." Rawls neither specifies institutions 
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fully, nor does he ensure even on the highly absttact level of the specification of 
the criterion that space for judgment is minimised. 1ndeed, Rawls writes with 
respect to the principles and their use that "regarding citizens in this way does 
not single out a precise answer. As always we have at best guidelines for 
deliberation" (Rawls 2001, 174). Consequently, either resourcists do not offer 
public criteria (Rawls does not live up to the standards, and Pogge does not offer 
one), or Pogge's characterization of the criterion is misleading. Now, Pogge 
clearly does think that resourcists have such criteria, and 1 agree. Therefore, the 
problem must be the characterization of the criterion, or more generally the way 
Pogge invites us to think about them. The political vision of society is not fully 
specific in the way that devout perception and its expectation of an already given 
order might tempt one to think. 
The suspicion, just mentioned, that Pogge might have inherited a peculiar 
way of using and thinking about the macro-scopic point of view is strengthened 
by the observation of the total scepticism that Pogge is given to in the absence of 
a public criteria and a fully specifie order. An overall ordering of resources or 
capabilities is required so as to assess the plausibility of a specification of space as 
part of a theory of justice, Pogge writes, because "without such an account of all 
the capabilities and their relative weights, we cannot say of anyone whether she is 
naturally favoured or disfavoured, let alone how much she should owe or be 
owed" (pogge 2002, 211). Yet, even if we cannot fully specify whether sorne 
individual or group is disfavoured tout court, we may still have a grasp of 
disadvantage, because such questions also arise in comparative cases. 1s this 
group disfavoured at work in comparison to that group? Pogge's push for a total 
account of order leads him to a radical scepticism with respect to pressing 
questions of injustice. Recalling the above observations, this scepticism should be 
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particularly worrisome to Pogge himself as the resourcists might not have any 
criteria of justice on his account either. There remains only the arbitrary chaos of 
individual actions that emerges out of the various contingencies that make 
possible the lives of the members of the species. 
Finally, as a last part to this examination of Pogge's call for a public 
criterion, let me tum ta two points that are in my view orthogonal to the debate 
over equality. First, Pogge argues that a criterion is needed, because the justice of 
a scheme depends not only on the benefits received but also on the required 
contributions (pogge 2002, 208). But questions concerning the legitimacy of 
demands for contributions can be addressed in terms of different spaces, i.e. how 
they affect functionings, resources or utility. Second, Pogge writes "it is obvious 
that it would be extremely difficult in the contemporary world to reach agreement 
on the four key points: on this list of valuable capabilities, on how to measure 
achievements with respect to each listed capability, on the relative weight of 
achievements in regard to different listed capabilities, and on the relative value of 
diverse overall endowments in respect to overall capability achievement" (pogge 
2002, 209, italics added). No doubt, as far as measurement is concerned Pogge 
highlights senous challenges, but again it is difficult to see how this kind of 
challenge is not orthogonal to the space debate. Consider the following 
paraphrase: "Tt is obvious, as already the observation b) ab ove suggests, that it 
would be extremely difficult in the contemporary world to reach agreement on 
the measure of income as the life prospects of individuals taking into account 
also the various benefits they receive from government and associations"; and 
further, "it is obvious that the relative weight of primary goods is extremely 
difficult to assess and the assumption of their correlation only a poor fix." 1 
point out the "orthogonal" nature of the se arguments, because their effect is 
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ultimately to add to the case against any normatively demanding political vision 
on the large-scale. 
According to Pogge's characterization of public criteria, even the 
"paradigmatic resourcist" does not live up to the demands of the public criterion. 
His characterization is accompanied by radical scepticism in the absence of such 
a principle. Now we can add that in addition, the sceptical arguments concerning 
the possibility of measurement (he it of resources or capabilities) are not 
accompanied by any discussion of the making of these measurements. Inevitably 
therefore, our judgments concerning the possibility of measurement is strongly 
influenced by measurements alreat/y available - those inforrning already available 
perceptions of order. This influence, to be sure, serves weIl the kind of project 
pursued by Pareto - no change of the relative income distribution is possible! But 
not considering the making of measurements is a limestick for the political 
visionary - she is left with no account of the possibility of making measurements 
and no discussion of the reasons for the present absence of some. In this 
situation, must the philosophical discussion of the space of equality not remain 
"academic," and the large-scale account of the development of society in terms of 
given measures prevail? Let me therefore tum to the making of statistics. 
9. THE MAKING OF STATlSTlCS 
The discussion in the last section brings us back to Bojer's thesis concerning a 
gap between the work of poli tic al philosophers and the empirical research of 
economists. Süssmilch and Pareto draw on available information (which is not ta 
say that it does not require work to collect this information). Süssmilch draws on 
the records of the church (as weIl as earlier work done by political arithmeticians); 
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Pareto draws heavily on statistics made available by statistical bureaus and 
published in works on taxation and legislation. 
With respect to these available records, differences can of course emerge 
in the sense that sorne will be interested in questions of production, sorne in 
questions of distribution, and the more ambitious in the confirmation of divine 
order. Perhaps, such differences in outlook will even fail neatly into or turn into 
disciplinary categories. If such differences develop far and hecome part of the 
everyday work of various schools, one could even say that a «gap" hetween the 
work of these schools has emerged. They have difficulties to find common 
interests, and their methods might he very different. 
And yet, concerning Bojer's gap (as weil as conceming the problems of 
measurement encountered in the last section) it would be strange to forget that 
the available information is by and large made available by the state and 
international organisations. After ail, there can be a gap between the information 
coilected by the se institutions and that demanded by philosophers and 
economists - between political will and interest and "statistical pipe-dreams." 
The interests of philosophers and/or economists on the one side and 
governments and international organisations on the other side need not coincide; 
and even where interests coincide statistics might not be produced due to a lack 
of resources, political obstacles and so on. 
The first half of the 19th century shows many beginnings of statistical 
efforts in large-scale societies. For example, the post-revolutionary administrators 
in France attempted to introduce a classification based on socio-economic rather 
than hierarchical categories of estate and status, but ran into trouble enforcing 
these categories and obtaining information. Entrepreneurs remained suspicious 
regarding the central administration's use of this information, and local préfets 
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sometimes sim ply used alternative categories based on cultural criteria or refused 
to disclose information about the local elites (Bourguet 1987, 310f). Not much 
later, Napoleon Bonaparte would be little interested in the education al goals of 
post-revolutionary statisticians. "He wanted specifie, focused information for 
purposes of conscription, requisition, taxes, and wartime management of the 
economy" (porter 1995, 36). As Bourguet writes: " ... the social history of the 
survey and the content of the analysis of the reports disclose the interdependence 
of knowledge about society and that society proper" (Bourguet 1987, 309). 
Napoleon's imperialist interests are a useful reminder that in the historical 
perspective statistics are in the first place not a slowly emerging set of 
mathematical tools of purely scientific interest, but a form of power for the 
management of populations and their environment. In James Scott's memorable 
phrase, statistics offers a way of "seeing like a state" and to thereby organize the 
vision of society around a few, military, political or economic, goals; attempts are 
made to literally reorganise populations and the environment in terms of these 
goals, and even if the attempts ultimately fail, the costs for people and the 
environment can be enormous (Scott 1998\ 
If we are interested in the "gap" between philosophical VISIon and 
empirical research, we can therefore in any particular case expect explanatory 
material via a study of the actual production of statistics in the respective society 
or societies and the interests informing this production. It is such an approach, 
which in particular cases can help illuminate the gap diagnosed by Bojer. Yet, as 
long as statistics are only considered as available information, a source of 
explanation for gaps between the kind of information demanded by work on 
justice and the available information is left untapped. The moral outlook of 
1 For an example see the discussion in es say six, section one. 
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economists is not the only, and perhaps not even the primary reason for gaps 
between visions of justice and the available statistical accounts and empirical 
research. 
Now, for any particular diagnosis of a "gap" this suggested avenue calls 
for a detailed historical investigation. But there is also another Iesson to be 
drawn. If the production of statistics is important for the philosophical vision of 
society - and l have argued above that the idea of society as a system of fair co-
operation gives us reason to think so -, then developing the philosophical vision 
prima facie also ought to include a discussion of the place of the production of 
statistics in this vision. Failure tG do so may well mean to remain trapped on 
"Pareto's lime stick": with a macro-scopic perspective making possible devout 
political perception, but with insufficient resources to fully develop a 
philosophical vision of society. l do not daim to have proven this point, but l 
hope that the story told in this essay makes the diagnosis one that it is plausible 
and worthwhile to think about further. Let me now turn to sorne concluding 
remarks regarding the vision of society as a system of co-operation. 
10. CONCLUSION 
In the preceding essay, l noted that Rawls' discussion of the idea of society as a 
system of co-operation provides reasons for a concem with the perception of 
justice, that it makes the demand for visible justice a condition of justice, but that 
Rawls does not live up to this demand in the social and economic domain. The 
difference principle is not made a constitutional essential and, given RawIs' 
general outlook, it therefore effectively risks being an ideological eye-catcher 
where not much gets "done." The reason for this problem turned out to be 
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epistemic questions regarding the demands of social and economic justice, which 
Rawls notes yet does not explore further. And in view of Bojer's diagnosis of a 
gap between political philosophy and empirical research, we can now add that 
epistemic obstacles do not seem to be confmed to Rawls' analysis. 
In this essay, l have sketched a story that situates the vision of society as a 
system of co-operation with respect ta what l have called the statistical 
macroscopic point of view. Taking Kant's famous discussion as my exemplar, l 
have first outlined the macro-scopic point of view in terms of its focus on 
aggregates and distributions calculated from numerical information, its focus on 
the order thereby made visible (as opposed to the "unruly" actions of 
individuals), the scale of this point of view and finally the investigation of causes 
regarding the determinants of the observed arder this point of view invites. l 
specifically focused on the macro-scopic point of view on income in Pareto's and 
Kuznets' work, and then tumed ta the macro-scopie point of view in Rawls' 
rendering of the vision of co-operation. The first part of the story thereby seeks 
to locate a source of the political perception that informs the vision of society as 
a system of co-operation. 
In a second step, l attempted to explore some implications for the current 
predicament of a "gap" between political vision and empirical research, and the 
epistemic problem encountered by Rawls. Devout political perception expects 
the social world ta be already ordered. Engineering such a perception, especially 
in the language of science, can therefore serve as a tool against political change as 
the example of Pareto indicates. The macro-scopie point of view thereby builds 
up expectations about the role of principles that, perhaps, are best called 
"unconscious" in that they are difficult to retrieve and at least partly in conflict 
with political goals. Political visions are not "there" and "given" fully specifically 
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in society and as l have worked out in the section on «order" misunderstanding 
the role of principles ultimately plays in the hand of the sceptic of political vision. 
One aspect of the ccunconscious" influence of the macro-scopie point of view is a 
striking disregard for the making of statistics. But a focus on the making of the 
statistical accounts is not only an explanatory source for any particular attempt to 
understand the gap between political visions and empirical research, it also 
prevents statistics from serving as a black-box that delivers results we-don't-
know-how, and that delivers results that make change seem impossible. Without 
such a focus, political vision is subject to sceptical arguments concerning the 
possibility and legitimacy of visible justice and the measures it requires that the 
proponents of the vision have little resources to tackle. It is this bracketing of one 
aspect of his political vision that ultimately prevents Rawls from fully exploring 
the demands of co-operation, or so l would argue. Consequently l will tum 
below, in essay four, to the place of the production of statistics in society as a 
system of co-operation. 
Finally, exploring the ccspace-debate" with the help of the macro-scopic 
point of view has brought to the fore two points that l will draw on in the further 
discussion: 1) Sensitivity to orthogonal arguments, which target the scale of the 
macro-scopic point of view rather than a philosophical difference in space; 2) the 
cognitive limits that a political philosophy of statistics needs to take into account. 
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Essay 3 
Po/itica/ Perception in a Wor/d of statistica/ StNf! 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the 19th century, a way of seeing has come about that l have began to 
diseuss in the last essay in terms of the statistical macro-scopie point of view. 
Statistics - for ex ample regarding unemployment, income inequality or education 
- have become a part of our self-understanding as members of political societies. 
As statistics inform and shape our political perception and actions, commentators 
have spoken of a "polities of numbers" (paul Stan et al.) and a "politique des 
grands nombres" (Alain Desrosières) that seems to have beeome inescapable in 
the large democracies developing since the Ameriean and French revolutions. 
Yet, what exactly does it mean to say that statistics have become a part of 
our self-understanding as members of political societies? And what are the 
implications of this self-understanding? To be sure, statistics may play a role for 
justice and equality in large-scale societies. And yet, statistics notoriously are also 
accompanied by unease: Have things not been unduly simplified to the detriment 
of culturallife1; are statistics not used to manipulate citizens and eustomers;2 and 
are statisties not the expression of a dangerous rise of bureaucratie power? 3 
In this essay, the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, and more specifically 
his classic Being and Time, will serve as a philosophieal testimony for the publie 
1 Adorno writes that "culture might be precisely the condition that excludes a mentality capable of 
measuring it" (Adorno 1969, 347) and suggests that at least the statistical research he experienced 
helps to produce, as "administrative research," a standardized culture-industry (Adorno 1969, 
342). 
2 See Darrell Huff's classic "How to lie with statistics" (Huff 1954). 
3 G6tz AIy and Karl-Heinz Roth have for example attributed a key raIe to statisticai technology 
for the deve10pment and execution of Nazi policies (AIyand Roth 1984). 
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self-understanding in terms of statistics. His phenomenology of everydayness 
makes it possible to examine the public self-understanding that has come about, 
and to work out sorne of its inherent dangers. In a way wruch will be specified 
shortly, the phenomenology of everydayness thereby contributes to a political 
philosophy of statistics. 
Heidegger tends to be associated not with a particular unease with 
statistics, but rather with a more general rejection of, and disdain for modem 
societies, including their liberal-democratic political systems. In this spirit, Pierre 
Bourdieu discusses Heidegger as a "conservative revolutionary." 1 Heidegger's 
philosophy therefore promises a rather different perspective than the one 
discussed in the fIrst essay, and for that reason also a useful contrast. Towards the 
end of trus essay, l will argue that rus philosophy sensitizes to dangers, but does 
no t, as has been recently claimed, demonstrate on ontological grounds an 
"ineliminable paternalism" of the modern public. 
Granted the political position associated with Heidegger and the standing 
of Being and Time as a philosoprucal classic, it might still be asked: why choose trus 
philosophy as a testimony for the question stated above? The reason is that the 
phenomenology of everydayness is in crucial passages tangled up in statistical 
language. As this has hardly been noticed so far in the secondary literature, this 
essay, in answering the question stated above, also seeks to explore a surprising 
"gap" in Heidegger scholarsrup. Since investigating this gap will take us to key 
developments concerning the public self-understanding at issue, l speak of 
testimony. 
Let me begin the investigation of this public self-understanding with 
Heidegger's analysis of "perception" and (statistical) "objects" in terms of the 
1 A tenn coined by Hugo von Hoffmansthal in 1927 and said to include figures such as Oswald 
Spengler and ErnstJünger (Bourdieu 1991, 25, footnote 47). 
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"circumspection" of the (statistical) "stuff." As we will see, the analysis will take 
us to an original way of rethinking perception, and to the key notion of the 
"average" and "averageness," which even though it occurs in central passages of 
Being and Time} has received little attention. Here as elsewhere the obvious is 
difficult to ftxate - "our statistical way of life is too much a way of life to catch 
the eye" (Gigerenzer et al. 1989,289). 
2. CIRCUMSPECTION 
Turning to everyday actions and the sight speciftc to them, Heidegger notes that 
what we encounter in these actions we always encounter as something. His 
exemplar is the workplace and the dealing with tools at work. Toois - or what 
Heidegger calis the "stufF' [Zeug1] - are part of a nexus of tools: with the 
keyboard, l can write a text to be stored in a @e, printed out on a sheet of paper, 
or sent off by email; the keyboard becomes available so as to write a text, i.e. via 
its place in text processing. 
The "stufF' becomes available in our dealings, which Heidegger describes 
in terms of the self-understanding at work (the "for-the-sake-of-which"), a set of 
general requirements ("in-order-to's") that cali for particular actions ("towards 
this'') in the respective work place ("in which'').2 Se!funderstanding as a doctor 
brings about certain general requirements, such as diagnosing the health of a patient, 
1 "Zeug" is closely related to "Werkzeug," the German word for too!. However, "Zeug" can be 
used more widely than just with reference to tools at work, and aiso evokes "Zeuge" and 
"bezeugen," i.e. German nouns and verbs for the English "testimony." As Heidegger stresses the 
disclosing function of the "Zeug" - the world it makes available and about which it gives 
testimony (consider as an example archeologists discovering a jug) - l prefer the term "stuff," 
rather than the more common translation of "tooI" and "equipment." 
2 See Heidegger, 1927 §1S; Dreyfus 91 ff. 
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that call for specific actions, such as making X-ray images with a radiograph in a 
hospital. 
So as to highlight the sight of everyday action, Heidegger speaks of 
circumspection rather than perception. The radiograph cornes into view as part of 
the everyday actions of doctors, and the "perception" of this "object" is in this 
sense structured and becomes available in terms of these actions. The importance 
of this point can be particularly weIl appreciated with the help of difficulties in 
everyday action such as the breaking of a tool or alterations of the usual setting.1 
For example in an experimental setting, people asked to identify a series of 
playing cards shown to them on short exposure identified all cards as regular 
cards - even though sorne of the cards had been altered. They identified a black 
of four hearts as either spades or hearts.2 There is sorne subtle irritation, but 
confonnity with prior expectations is quickly re-established (perhaps, even on the 
first reading of this example!). In Heidegger's language, "das Auffallen gibt das 
zuhandene Zeug in einer gewissen Unzuhandenheit ... die pure Unzuhandenheit 
meldet sich am Zeug, um si ch jedoch wieder in die Zuhandenheit des Besorgten, 
zuruckzuziehen" (Heidegger 1927, 73 3 ). In the exp erim ent, it took a long 
exposure to the cards for there to be a real breakdown; at forry times the average 
exposure, one participant exclaimed: "1 can't make the suit out, whatever it is. It 
didn't even look like a card that time. l don't know what colom it is now or 
1 See Heidegger, 1927 § 16. 
2 Quoted in Kuhn 1963, 63. Kuhn discusses gives the example in the context of discovery in 
science - for example the disco very of X-cays. His case studies reveal the slow process of 
discovery. Novel observations are first explained away, and scientists take cime to develop new 
models for fitting the facto Kuhn therefore writes that discoveries can be dated only 
approximately: "We can only say that X-rays emerged in Würzburg between November 8 and 
December 28,1895" (Kuhn 1963, 58). 
3 Due to Heidegger's unique language, 1 have decided to leave citations in the original and to add 
the translation by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson in the footnotes. ''This 
conspicuousness presents the ready-to-hand equipment [stuff] as in a certain un-readiness-to-
hand ... Pure presence-at-hand announces itself in such equipment [stuff], but only to withdraw 
to the readiness-to-hand of something with which one concerns oneself." 
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whether it's a spade or a heart. l'm not even sure what a spade looks like. My 
God!"l The experiment illustrates just how deep1y embedded circumspection is in 
everyday action, and how their breakdown is experienced as a distressing "sleight 
of hands." 
It is therefore Heidegger's close attention to everyday action that 1eads 
him to speak of the circumspection in the encounter with the "stuff' of everyday 
actions. (Having provided his account of circumspection he then sometimes uses 
the term "perception" in this sense.2) But who then "acts" or "perceives" in 
everyday action? Writing a text or making X-rays involves too1s. But such too1s 
presuppose specifie ways of dealing with them. With respect to such everyday 
invo1ved activity, Heidegger therefore writes that the others are "those from 
whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish onese!f - those among whom one 
is too" (Heidegger 1927, 118; italics added), and speaks of "the one" [das Man3] 
as the "ens realissimum" (Heidegger 1927, 128). And with respect to the current 
focus on circumspection/perception, we could speak of one-circumspection or 
one-perception so as to stress Heidegger's claim concerning the "who" of 
everyday circumspection. "One's own view" for the most time is the view of "the 
one." 
1 Quoted in Kuhn 63f (italics added). Kuhn draws on work by J .S. Bruner and Leo Postman 
(1949). 
2 Compare for example the passage: "Wenn aber schon jedes Wahrnehmen von zuhandenem 
Zeug verstehend-auslegend ist, umsichtig etwas aIs etwas begegnen lasst ... " (Heidegger 1927 
150). Ultimately, Heidegger aims to show that aIl perception must be understood as modifications 
of everyday circumspection. The implication of this approach for epistemological debates is a 
matter of ongoing disputes among Heidegger scholars. Thus Cristina Lafont argues that 
Heidegger seeks to "unmask the myth" of neutral perception and with it scientific realism (Lafont 
2005, 274; and in much more detail Lafont 1994), while Hubert Dreyfus reads Heidegger as a 
scientiftc realist, albeit one who rejects the reducibility of reality to one true, e.g. physical, 
description of the world (Dreyfus 1991, 251 ff). 
3 John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson translate "das Man" as "the They". 1 use "the one," the 
translation proposed by Dreyfus. 1 have aiso modified the English translations in this respect. 
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The view of "the one" might, unbeknownst to them, "make practical men 
the slaves of a defunct economist."l ln the current context, John Maynard Keynes' 
famous quip suggests that paying attention to "the one" might bring to the fore 
inconspicuous yet omnipresent phenomena of power (Morchen 1980, 30): the 
more sorne ways of thinking simply become what "one thinks," the more 
effective is the influence of the se ways of thinking on "practical men." The focus 
on the deliberative, independent subject as the perceiver of the true and the good 
is likely to overlook or ignore this "sight" of everyday perception and its 
implications. Political perception appears as the sum of so many individual, 
independent perceivers and the shared structure of political perception and the 
mechanisms and sources sustaining it remain invisible. Below, 1 will therefore 
turn to issues of power and accountability raised by everyday "circumspection" 
and "the one." However, before 1 carry on the exploration, a brief ex cursus 
regarding the difficult relation between the phenomenology of everydayness and 
political philosophy is in order. 
3. THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EVERYDAYNESS 
AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
Consider the set of questions pertaining to the liberal-communitarian debate with 
which political philosophers have recently approached Heidegger's philosophy. 
One central issue in this debate has been the communitarian critique that the 
liberal conception of the self is flawed in that it fails to adequately take into 
account the "embeddedness" or "situatedness" of the self. Community is a 
precondition of individual choice, or 50 communitarians argue. In order to spell 
1 l thank Gregory Mikkelson for suggesting this quo te. 
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out this daim, communitarian political philosophers have turned to Heidegger's 
phenomenology of everydayness (Bell 1993). 
And yet, as with other systematic, metaphysical thinkers - notably Hegel 
- Heidegger's phenomenology has also given rise to an alternative interpretation. 
Jonathan Salem-Wiseman has recently argued that Heidegger offers liberals an 
account of a "thickly constituted, social self," but also one that avoids the 
communitarian excess (and romanticism) of viewing the self as bound by the 
community and its goals and goods (Salem-Wiseman 2003, 534). For this essay, 
these interpretations are instructive for at least two reasons. 
First, there is the difficult relation between Heidegger's philosophy and 
normative views. For example, Salem-Wiseman reads Heidegger's authenticity as 
a phenomenological account of the "capacity for autonomy" (Salem-Wiseman 
2003, 550).1 The posited relation between the autonomous, "liberal self" and 
"authenticity" ultimately requires an interpretation of "authenticity" as valuable, 
after aIl "autonomy" is the "prime primary good" of liberals. Yet, Heidegger 
notoriously refuses to evaluate "authenticity" as "good" or "right," just as he 
does not want rus account of "the one" to be read as a pejorative account of 
modem life. And even if Heidegger affirmed the value of authenticity as 
autonomy, liberal politics (in a wide sense) would not yet follow as that also 
requîres a commitment to the equal consideration of aIl. Even if human beings 
have the capacity to act autonomously, there is still the further question whether 
1 "Heidegger's distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity corresponds remarkably with 
the distinction between autonomy - understood in Dworkin's sense - and heteronomy" 
(Wiseman 2003, 550). A person is autonomous (in Gerald Dworkin's sense), if she identifies with 
her desires, goals and values, and such identification is not influenced in ways which make such a 
process of identification alien to the individual. For liberals this includes the possibility of 
detaching oneself frorn communal goals, i.e. to be able to critically evaluate them and, perhaps, 
adopt revised or even sorne new ones in the process. Salem-Wiseman locates this possibility in 
Heidegger's discussion of authentic repetition as the possibility of rejecting, afftrming or creating 
new possibilities in response to the heritage (i.e. the social word one has grown into). 
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the equal capacity of ail ought to be a goal and what exactly this requires. 1 Pinaily, 
Heidegger's account of authenticity avoids ail specifications of particular content 
such as goals, values, maxims and laws. 2 He is concerned to work out the 
possibility of agency in general, whereas liberal maxims would on bis account 
seem to arise out of a tradition and the situations it gives rise to. Heidegger gives 
no indication - in academic writings and in bis political involvement - that his 
analysis would support a case for liberalism on ontological grounds. 
Consequently, as a matter of interpretation, it is very difficult to argue for a 
specific political interpretation. It is for this reason that 1 have written above that 
bis philosophy can "sensitize" to dangers - to actuaily see dangers rather than 
only possibilities, something more, a political vision or commitment is needed. 
Second, Salem-Wiseman also writes that "politics cannot eliminate the 
everyday forms of patemalism or the mass conformism that is ubiquitous in our 
Kierkegaardian 'present age,' and Heidegger provides an astonishing account of 
why these modes of being are, in fact, ineliminable, but if authenticity demands 
freedom, and if a liberal state can best defend and promote such freedom, then it 
foilows that Dasein, as a liberal self, would best flourish in a liberal state" (Salem-
Wiseman 2003, 552 italics in the original). The daim that Heidegger provides an 
account of the ineliminable paternalism of our present age needs to be 
scrutinized very carefully. The problem is that Heidegger, his goal of a 
phenomenology of everydayness notwithstanding, does not shy away from 
politically charged terms and frequently makes little attempt to state the 
chonnotations thereby implied. As a result, even where the analysis is directed at 
1 No doubt, this is a difficult moral question. 1 only raise it here because - unlike political 
philosophers such as Dworkin and Rawls - Heidegger does not explicitly endorse equal 
consideration, and his affirmation of the Führerprintfp during his rectorate in Freiburg hardly lends 
support to such an interpretation either. 
2 Compare in particular the analysis of the si/en! "cali of consciousness" (Heidegger 1927, §§ 55-
57). 
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questions regarcling the possibility of agency and self-understancling, there remain 
political undertones that can tempt one to draw direct and surprisingly strong 
political implications of the phenomenological analysis. While trus point will be 
further clarified in the next sections, let me give at least one example. Heidegger 
writes that "distantiality, averageness and levelling down" - terms l will turn to 
below - "as ways of Being for the 'one,' constitute what we know as 'publicness' 
[Offentlichkeit]" (Heidegger 1927, 127, italics added). I.e. Heidegger, a 
philosopher with an in depth knowledge of the rustory of philosophy, writes that 
"we" know the public as a "levelled down" one, and sees no need for a comment 
that "we" also know the "public" as characterised by Kant in rus discussion of 
the public use of reason, i.e. in terms of critical reasoning and freedom from 
tutelage rather than "levelling down."! 
Due to the two observations just made, l will proceed in the next sections 
on the assumption that a distinction between the phenomenology of 
everydayness and political philosophy is at least initially fruitful in that an explicit 
account of the latter is required to draw lessons from Heidegger's 
phenomenology, which on its own hardly lends itself straightforwardly to one 
political interpretation or the other. What the phenomenology of everydayness 
can do is sensitize to possibilities and dangers given a political account. But here 
it is important to scrutinize the language employed by Heidegger, so as not to 
inherit unacknowledged choices. But let me now return to circumspection and 
"the one" so as to make this last point more vivid. 
1 Compare Kant's famous essay "Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" (Reprinted in 
Kant 1970). 
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4. A VERAGENESS 
Heidegger's discussion of «the one" has not only been identified as one of the 
most important parts of his work, but has also been called one of its most 
confused parts (Dreyfus 1991, 143). It has been argued that the analysis of «the 
one" runs together the analysis of the structure of everyday action with a critique 
of conformism and «levelling down." Dreyfus therefore suggests separating the 
(<<Diltheyan'') insight into the social conditions of intelligibility in Heidegger's 
analysis - «das Man ist ein Existenzial und gehort als ursprüngliches Phanomen 
zur positiven Verfassung des Daseins" (Heidegger 1927, 129 1 ) - from the 
(<<Kierkegaardian") attack on the modem public and "dictatorship of the one" 
(Heidegger 1927, 127). 
Yet, according to another commentator, Dreyfus' clarification appears as 
a typical and problematic aspect of Heidegger's philosophy. There is afundamental 
ambiguiry at play in Heidegger's work that is not so much «confused," but rather 
one way of stating and empowering a political agenda in «pure," "descriptive" 
and «primordial" philosophical terms (Bourdieu 1991, 3). According to Pierre 
Bourdieu, Heidegger simultaneously addresses political and philosophical 
questions. The fields of the political and the philosophical, Bourdieu argues, have 
their own ways of doing and saying things, which give each field their 
independence and thereby the autonomy that makes it appear impossible for 
example to compare a philosophical treatise - the Abhandlung "Sein und Zeit"-
with a political pamphlet. But it does not follow that ideas could not be imported 
from one field to the other one. Rather, such imports require a specific kind of 
eus tom: a mediation, which Bourdieu calls the imposition of form. According to 
1 "The 'one' is an existentiale; and as a primordial phenomenon, it belongs to Dasein's positive 
constitution." 
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Bourdieu's central interpretative daim, Heidegger is a master of importl export, 
i.e. of attending to both fields at the same cime. 'We must abandon the 
opposition between a political reading and a philosophical reading, and undertake 
a simultaneously poli tic al and philosophical dual reading of writings which are 
defmed by their fundamental ambiguiry) that is, by their reference to two social 
spaces, which correspond to two mental spaces" (Bourdieu 1991, 3). 
Consequently, he inspects the texts for traffic in concepts between the fields. For 
example in his view, when Heidegger introduces solicitude ("Fürsorge") as a term 
for the analysis of different modes of being with others, he talks about social 
welfare and pushes a 'conservative revolutionary' line about the welfare state.1 It 
is a "euphemized discourse, which tends to suggest, by emphasizing what it is 
really supposed to be stating, that it is not really saying what it has constantly 
been saying" (Bourdieu 1991,85).2 
Bourdieu's analysis of Heidegger forcefully addresses the problem of 
language already mentioned in the last section. However, Bourdieu curiously do es 
not consider any pertinent differentiation within the "philosophical field" - e.g. a 
distinction between the phenomenology of everydayness and political 
philosophy.3 But it is this differentÎatÎon that is presupposed in the discussion of 
1 The passage is on page 121ff; the Gennan tenn is "Fürsorge", which can mean social welfare (as 
in the "Fürsorge-Staat") but refers to a fundamental aspect of being in the world ("solicitude'') in 
Heidegger's analysis. 
2 Assuming the pertinence of Bourdieu's approach (at least with respect to sorne aspects of 
Heidegger's work), there is evidently a further questions concerning the effectiveness of such 
"coding." Heidegger's abstract language results for example in the case of Fürsor;ge in a) Bourdieu 
reading the conservative code ("the one" evade their responsibilities, opt out of their liberties, live 
on procured assistance) and b) Salem-Wiseman commenting the same passage as "Heidegger 
suggests, for example, that government-sponsored welfare work is necessary precisely because 
'Dasein maintains itself at first and for the most part in the deficient modes of solicitude'. This 
should not be taken as a morallzing critique of Dasein, a suggestion that we ought to walk down 
the street, buy coffee, or spend our work breaks in fundamentally different ways than we do. We 
can never leave this mode of solicitude behind" (Wiseman 2003, 551). 
3 Perhaps, Vincent Descombes' book on 20th century French philosophy, Le même et l'aulre, 
indirectly suggests one reason for this non-differentiation. Descombes points out that even 
though many French philosophers were politically active, there are very few books on political 
philosophy written by the French post-WWII philosophers (Descombes 1979). 
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the implications of Heidegger's philosophy for political thought.! Second, there 
can be developments that are pertinent to both the "philosophical" and 
"political" fields and that might be overlooked by a focus on the trading between 
these fields. Just such a development is pertinent for understanding the public 
self-understanding that has come about, or so l will argue below and thereby 
offer a possibility to rethink Bourdieu and Dreyfus' critical interventions. 
As tools require ways of handling them, Heidegger's analysis of the 
workshop does not describe individual subjects, but rather dealings and ways of 
concern (Heidegger 1927, 67). Anyone can use the tools, provided they used the 
tools appropriately. lt is this common way of doing, which leads Heidegger to 
characterize everyday comportment in terms of "the one." 
Heidegger lists distantiality ("Abstandigkeit'') as a first characteristic of 
"the one": "lm Besorgen dessen, was man mit, für und gegen die Anderen 
ergriffen hat, ruht standig die Sorge um einen Unterschied gegen die Anderen, sei 
es auch nur, um den Unterschied gegen sie auszugleichen, sei es, daB das eigene 
Dasein - gegen die anderen zurückbleibend - im Verhaltnis zu ihnen aufholen 
will, sei es, daB das Dasein im Vorrang über die Anderen darauf aus ist, sie 
niederzuhalten" (Heidegger 1927, 126).2 Heidegger even speaks of the power 
("Herrschaft'') of "the one" - for "the one" defines the standard either positively 
in the case of the conformist, or indirectly in the case of attempts to improve 
upon and stand out with respect to these standards. 
Distantiality, according to Heidegger, is grounded ln the concern with 
averageness ("Durchschnittlichkeit'') (Heidegger 1927, 126). Why averageness? 
! E.g. compare the liberal-communitarian debate mentioned in the last section. 
2 "In one's concern with what one has taken hold of, whether with, for, or against, the Others, 
there is a constant care as to the way one differs from them, whether that difference is merely one 
that is to be evened out, whether one's own Dasein has lagged behind the Others and wants to 
catch up in relationship to them, or whether one's Dasein aIready has sorne priority over them 
and sets out to keep them suppressed." 
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"Dem Man geht es in seinem Sein wesentlich um sie [die Durchschnittlichkeit]. 
Deshalb haIt es sich faktisch in der Durchschnittlichkeit dessen, was sich geh6rt, 
was man gelten liillt und was nicht, dem man Erfolg zubilligt, dem man ihn 
versagt. Diese Durchschnittlichkeit in der Vorzeichnung dessen, was gewagt 
werden kann und darf, wacht über jede vordrangende Ausnahme. Jeder Vorrang 
wird gerauschlos niedergerhalten. Alles Ursprüngliche ist über Nacht als langst 
bekannt geglattet. Alles Erkampfte wird handlich. Jedes Geheimnis verliert seine 
Kraft. Die Sorge der Durchschnittlichkeit enthüllt wieder eine wesenhafte 
Tendenz des Daseins, die wir die Einebnung aller Seinsm6glichkeiten nennen" 
(Heidegger 1927, 127).1 In terms of Dreyfus' diagnosis, the passage seems to 
exhibit a transition From the analysis of comportment to social criticism: its frrst 
part addresses that which is "appropriate," what counts as "valid" and what does 
not, what is "approved,,2 and "endorsed" and what is "disallowed;" its latter part 
focuses on the "levelling", i.e. the term made familiar by Kierkegaard's critique of 
the modern public. The transition somehow arrives with averageness, which "keeps 
watch over everything exceptional that keeps itself to the fore," "noiselessly 
suppresses priority," and "over night" profanes the primordial. So regarding this 
averagenesss, what kind of "keeping watch" is at issue; what kind of seeing is this? 
The term Durchschnitt (average) derives from durchschneiden (cutting 
through). The influential Wijrterbuch der Deutschen Sprache by Jacob and Wilhelm 
Grimm states as the primary use of Durchschnitt examples such as the cut made 
l "The 'One' essentially makes an issue of this [averageness]. Thus the "one" maintains itself 
factically in the averageness of that wruch belongs to it, of that wruch it regards as valid and that 
which it does not, and of that to which it grants success and that to which it denies it. In this 
averageness with which it prescribes what can and may be ventured, it keeps watch over 
everything exceptional that thrusts itself to the fore. Every kind of priority gets noiselessly 
suppressed. Overnight, everything that is primordial gets glossed over as something that has long 
been weIl known. Everything gained by a struggle becomes just something to be manipulated. 
Every secret loses its force. This care of averageness reveals in tum an essential tendency of 
Dasein which we calI the "levelling down" lEinebnung] of aIl possibilities of Being." 
2 This is my translation. Macquarrie and Robinson translate "belongs to it," which 1 think is easily 
misJeading (Heidegger does not refer to a property state, but a way of doing). 
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through a forest and the sketch of houses, ships or trees, if cut through. But this 
use of "average" hardly elucidates "the one." The dictionary states as a secondary 
use of Durchschnitt the mean yield of a field calculable by taking into account the 
yield of a field across time and the calculation of the mean by addition and 
division. No doubt, the numerical sense of Durchschnitt is today very common. 
And this sense is also indirectly acknowledged by Bourdieu, who notes in 
Heidegger's work "a hatred of statistics (harping on the theme of <average') seen 
as a symbol of all the operations of <levelling down' which threaten the <person'" 
(Bourdieu 1991, 79). However, apart from the attribution of a "code" function 
for conservative revolutionaries, Bourdieu shows no interest in Heidegger's 
characterization of "the one" as "average." Dreyfus senses the nurnerical use of 
the "average," but leaves it at the remark that "averageness is not merefy statistica!' 
(Dreyfus 1991, 153, italics mine). 
Yet, why would "the one" be statistical at all? "Averageness is not merelY 
statistical . . . what Heidegger is getting at is the tendency to conform our 
behavior to a norm, even if that norm is frequently violated. To be told that 90 
percent of the population does X, exerts pressure only on the conformists, while 
norms gently influence everyone" (Dreyfus 1991, 153). Dreyfus' reading leaves 
Heidegger's statisticallanguage mysterious and ultimately inappropriate. It fails to 
consider the possibility of a "normative power" of statistics, i.e. statistics as 
something in terms of which people understand themselves and thereby as 
something that exercises the "gentle influence" Dreyfus speaks of. Yet, it is just 
this possibility that suggests one way for sharing norms in large-scale societies. 
Averageness "keeps watch over everything exceptional": the death of the 
neighbour on the road cornes to be understood as part of the traffic accident 
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statistic; the loss of work as part of the unemployment statistic. So is there a link 
between the "averageness" of "the one" and statistics? 
Before l turn in the next section to three historical observations 
concerning the coming to be of a public self-understanding in terms of statistics 
and its relation to Heidegger, let me conclude this section with two preliminary 
observations. 
First, the numerical sense of "averagness" provides an exemplary case of 
why one might think, as Heidegger does, that "distantiality" is grounded in 
"averagness." The concern with "lagging behind" or winning "priority" requires 
some commensurability. If l could not compare my holdings of X or my 
expectancy of Y with that of others, how could l even be concemed with 
"distantiality"? Regarding the public Heidegger seeks to describe, statistics offer 
an exemplary way to make such distantiality possible. No matter how different 
the efforts, how different the luck - the personal income statistics establishes the 
average income and the respective standings with respect to it, i.e. a standing with 
respect to a large-scale public. 
Second, Heidegger adds a cautionary note shortly after the section on 
"averageness" just cited. "Man darf weder vorschnell dekretieren, diese Man ist 
'eigentlich' nichts, noch der Meinung huldigen, das Phanomen sei ontologisch 
interpretiert, wenn man es etwa als nachtraglich zusammengeschlossenes Resultat 
des Zusammenvorhandenseins mehrer Subjekte 'erkliirt' ... das Man ist auch 
nicht so etwas wie ein 'allgemeines Subjekt' das über mehreren schwebt" 
(Heidegger 1927, 128).1 Heidegger's prohibition - "one [0 may not" - indicates 
1 "One may neither decree prematurely that this 'one' is 'really' nothing, nor profess the opinion 
that one can interpret this phenomenon ontologically by somehow 'explaining' it as what results 
from taking the Being-present-at-hand-together of several subjects and then fitting them 
together." 
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the very power of the numerical use of "average," and the historical observations 
in the next section will help to bring this out. 
5. L' HOMME MOYEN 
First, the numerical use of "durchschnittlich" received an enormous increase in 
(real) possible uses ever since the "era of statistical enthusiasm" in the frrst half of 
the 19th century eStarr 1987, 24). A great number of statistics became available, 
and with them averages for crimes, health, expenditures etc. Statistical averages 
were much discussed in terms of the enormous number of statistics presented to 
governments and public spheres from the beginning of the 19th century. They 
were the subject not only of scientific stuilles and administrative policies, but also 
of newspaper debates, of national shame and pride, and of ridicule and contempt 
from literary writers. They gave the members of the nation states of Europe and 
North America something to talk about: themselves, as a public made visible by 
statistics. 
Consider as an emblematic figure the Belgian astronomer and statistician 
Adolphe Quetelet (1796-1874), who with publications and the promotion of 
statistical societies and institutions played a central role in the production of 
statistical facts. Quetelet was struck by the regularities he saw in statistics. Citing 
the example of crime reports, he wrote that "in everything which relates to 
crimes, the same numbers are reproduced so constantly, that it becomes 
impossible to misapprehend it [the example in the text is the constancy of a 
number of different causes of death - by "gun and pis toI," "sabre, sword, 
stiletto" etc. - revealed by a French criminal justice table for 1826-1831] - even 
in respect to those crimes wruch seem perfectly beyond human foresight, such as 
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murders in general at the close of quarrels, arising without a motive, and under 
other circumstances to all appearance the most fortuitous or accidental: 
nevertheless, experience proves that murders are committed annually, not only 
pretty nearly to the same extent, but even that the instruments employed are in 
the same proportions" (Quetelet 1835, 6). Impressed by the constancy he 
discovered in various statistics, Quetelet conjectured that the greater the number 
of individuals observed, the more accidental features of individuals disappear, and 
notoriously suggested to think of social averages as the properties of l'homme 
mqyen, who is "in a nation what the centre of gravity is in a body; it is by having a 
central point in view that we arrive at the apprehension of all the phenomena of 
equilibrium and motion" (Quetelet 1835, 97). The "average man," Quetelet 
claimed, is a "type of perfection; and everything differing from bis proportions or 
condition, would constitute deformity and disease" (Quetelet 1835, 99).1 The 
description of the "average man" of each nation was to be part of a future social 
physics - once sufficient statistics would be avaiIable. 
Quetelet takes me to a second observation. His work inspired Henry 
Buckle (1821-62) to conceive ofhistory as a science. Statistics was to provide the 
evidence for the existence of social laws, which according to the liberal Buckle 
govemed history quite independently from the only temporal disturbances 
introduced by governments (porter 1986, 62). Buckle's widely read History of 
Civilization in England (1857-61) helped further popularize statistics - and 
1 Quetelet, the great regularity salesman (Hacking), did not hesitate to offer rus statistics as a 
service to artists. In rus Treaties on Man there is a section "of the average man considered with 
reference to Literature and the Fine Arts", where Quetelet suggested that his approach would 
introduce more precision in the artist's search to describe the "characteristic traits of the period" 
(Quetelet 1834, 96). In his 1864 diary, Dostoyewski thundered: " ... there is one very puzzling 
thing: how does it corne about that ail the statisticians and experts and lovers of humanity, when 
they enurnerate the good things of life, always omit one? One's own free will and unfettered 
volition, one'S own caprice, however wild, one's own fancy, inflamed sometirnes to the point of 
madness - that is the best and greatest good, which is never taken into consideration because it 
will not fit any classification, and the omission of which always sends ail systems and theories to 
the devil" (Quoted in Hacking 1990,146). 
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provoked critical replies by unimpressed academic historians. Johan Gustav 
Droysen (1806-1884) criticised the "dilettantism" of the work, and opposed it to 
his own efforts for a science of history (Schnadelbach 1983, 149). His science 
was to be developed following a method of understanding as opposed ta the 
method of explanation in the physical sciences. This model of understanding 
adopts the hermeneutic approach developed by philologists, but seeks to extend 
it to actions and artefacts that are taken as expressions of a shared hum an spirit 
(i.e. shared by both parties to the understanding relation). The human spirit is to 
the particular expressIon as the whole text to the particular passage 
(Schnadelbach 1983, 150-151). To be sure, the influence of the debate over 
historical method on Heidegger is well-known, but it is important to also note the 
intimate relation of this debate ta statistics.1 
Finally, a third observation: as noted, Quetelet and Buckle were 19,h 
century liberals. But the liberal idea of society in terms of individuals was attacked 
by German 'moderate liberals' (Norton Wise's term for the German liberals who 
after the 1848 revolution made their peace with Prussian power2). Against the 
liberal statisticians, they argued that individuals do not "sum" - or at any rate that 
"Germans individuals do not sum,,3 - and advocated instead an organic unity, 
whose unity as a whole grew naturally with the irreducible diversity of its parts. 
The name for that organic unity was "Gemeinschaft": "As German intellectuals 
sought increasingly to differentiate their own national heritage from that of the 
French and British, especially 1870 and after, they opposed Gemeinschcifi 
(community) to Gesel/schcifi (society) as a whole to an aggregate" (Wise 1987, 397). 
1 Interestingly, Appendix B on Heidegger's lectures in Kisiel's Genesis of Hetdegger's Being and Time 
lists for the summer semester 1926, i.e. the year prior to the publication of Sein und Zeit, a seminar 
on "Übungen zur Geschichte und historischen Erkenntnis im Anschlufi an J .B. Droysen, 
GrundriJ3 der Historik" (Kisiel 1993). 
2 See Wise 1987, 396. 
3 See Wise 1987,396. lt is by hindsight tempting to see Wise's apt slogan as the beginning of a 
slippery slope towards "individual don't count." 
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In a move similar to the one noted above with respect ta the "public," Heidegger 
not only invokes community and the "historizing of community" (Geschehen der 
Gemeinschaft), but immediately goes on to wam that he is not describing 
something that "setzt sich ... aus einzelnen SchicksaIen zusammen, sowenig das 
Miteinandersein aIs ein Zusammenvorkommen mehrer Subjekte begriffen 
werden kann" (Heidegger 1927, 384).1 
These three observations do not only underline the numericaI use of 
"average," but aIso retrieve the intimate relation between the development of 
statistics and the debates it involved on the one hand, and Heidegger's situation 
when analysing the "everydayness of Dasein" on the other hand. l would 
therefore tentatively propose that the description of "the one" as "average" 
captures 19th and 20th century large-scaIe societies and the public self-
understanding its members have acquired in terms of statistics. The emblematic 
figure is l'homme mqyen as an important centre of the science and politics of 
numbers that would be followed by many novel and refmed ways of studying 
society and societaI groups and the perception of society resulting from this 
statisticaI work.2 If this is correct, how does the description of "the one" as 
"average" as part of Heidegger's phenomenology of everydayness help illuminate 
this self-understanding? What about statistics as "that which one has to do with 
in one's concemful deaIings" (Heidegger 1927, 68)? 
l " ... not something that puts itself together out of individual fates, any more than Being-with-
one-another can be conceived as the occurring together of several Subjects." 
2 For the 19th century a very interesting brief discussion is offered by Stigler 1987 (see also Stigler 
1986 and 1999). 
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6. PERCEPTION ON HOLIDA YS: 
STATISTICS AND PUBLIC SIGHTSEEING 
The perception of justice in large-scale societies involves the use of statistics so as 
to evaluate to what extent justice obtains, or more likely, to help identify major 
injustices.! The phenomenology of everydayness lets us rethink this perception in 
terms of the everyday use of "stuff' and the "sight" accompanying this use. 
Following Heidegger's analysis, we are likely to turn first to the site of 
"production." There are those who we would identify in terms of their "for-the-
sake-of-which,,2 as statisticians. At work, they are concerned with obtaining data, 
calculating averages, correlations, regressions, and time series, and with checking 
whether the data can be used consistently given the assumptions needed for the 
calculation. They will use graphs, pens, computers, books, telephones and so 
forth - in short, encounter a nexus of tools. This doing has its circumspection -
a statistician is attentive to features of the data as the carpenter to knotholes in 
the wood. 
And yet, there is also quite a different use of statistics. As the public in 
large-scale political societies has come to understand itself in terms of statistics, 
what use of statistics does this self-understanding involve? Consider the "skill" 
and "craft" with which the carpenter uses the "stuff;" and consider the way 
statisticians draw on information and conversations to develop a statistics; and no 
doubt the public uses of statistics will seem to be quite poor. Even if statistics are 
everywhere in newspapers, on TV, the radio and internet, there is hardly 
"statistical literacy" or even a "statistical citizens-craft" as a general requirement 
of self-understanding as a citizen in large-scale political societies. On this 
l Compare the discussion in the last essay. 
2 See section 2. 
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comparative perspective, a certain unease regarcling the public use of statistics is 
therefore hardIy surprising. ''There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and 
statistics" (attributed by Mark Twain to Benjamin Disraeli).! The citation not only 
highlights the way in which statistics might come into the circumspection of 
citizens (e.g. in a manipulated way), but rates statistics below even damned lies. If 
damned lies are those with particularly pernicious effects (perhaps something like 
telling people that they are naturally inferior in such a persuasive way that they 
end up internalizing it and condemned to believing it), then what further step 
could be indicated by the move from lie, to the damned lie to statistics? 
Statistics are read about and reported without there necessarily being any 
training that would enable the users to grasp the choices that went into the 
making of the statistics, and therefore also not into what inferences are supported 
by the statistics.2 Accordingly, the sight associated with the use of statistics can be 
characterised as the circumspection of a public sightseeing: it is "public" in that 
the statistics are typically available to all and moreover concem sorne aspect of 
society (for example life expectancy and unemployment rates both offer 
information about one aspect or other of society), and it is a "sightseeing" in that 
statistics tend to be "accompanied" by a guide pointing out the "sights" (i.e. the 
account of society in terms of statistical objects; in the politician's case for a 
policy, in the journalist's analysis of sorne public affair, and the company's 
attempt to sell a product). What is the implication of this public sightseeing? 
Consider again the "average." It subtly evokes the "golden middle" 
neither lanky, nor stunted; neither filthy rich nor dirt poor - or, as "just" the 
middle, the average evokes mediocrity. In either case, there is a subtle evaluative 
play and one that is exploited with great skill by Heidegger in the passages 
1 See Twain 1924, 246. 
2 See the many examples, in particular with respect to medicine, in Gigerenzer 2002. 
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quoted, where he alludes to conservative tropes regarding the "levelling down" of 
the modern public. Whatever the specifie political philosophy endorsed - be it 
average utilitarian, elitist-perfectionist or egalitarian - this evaluative play and its 
influence on our self-understanding is noteworthy; and it is indicative of 
respective dangers. Especially because statisticians, if asked about the statistical 
justification of the various evaluative understanding of statistics, are likely to say 
that no such reading has been intended or is warranted by statistics alone. Even 
though statistics involve a widely understood evaluative dimension (I will turn to 
the example of economic growth rates in essay five) , this dimension is not in 
general one that statisticians would endorse. Therefore, when tuming to them, 
the evaluative play might sttangely withdraw. Only numerical facts remain, and 
the source and responsibility for the undeniable evaluative dimension remains 
difficult to locate. This phenomenon indicates a problem of displacement that I 
will turn to in more detail in subsequent essays. 
If statistics become available to citizens who may use them without 
generally sharing the statistician's understanding of the making of the respective 
statistics, then the reasoning that citizens can give for actions based on this 
statistical account of society is comparatively reduced. 1 might only be able to 
refer to the numbers in question, but have only a vague or no sense of who might 
be able to account for them and of what was the method used; instead, I might 
just see the statistics in the way "one" sees them: "rise in GDP" meaning 
"improved wellbeing." This public self-understanding is powerful - it informs 
the members' understanding of their society - and raises a problem of 
accountability in the sense that even though citizens are likely to have difficulties 
to provide reasons for the inferences they draw, they still use statistics to hold 
government accountable. And this holding accountable, again depending on the 
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political philosophy, might weIl be opaque with respect to (or upon consideration 
even be in conflict with) core values of this political philosophy. 
Finally, Hannah Arendt has singled out a specifie kind of invisibility 
created by this public self-understanding: Statistics show the up and downs of 
trends; there will be expectations regarding the lowering of unemployment, the 
increase in economic performance, the lowering of inflation and the meeting of 
environmental standards. While this focus provides ample space for political 
discussions, it thereby also serves as a magnet of political perception. ''The laws 
of statistics are valid only where large numbers or long periods are involved, and 
acts or events can statistically appear only as deviations or fluctuations. The 
justification of statistics is that deeds and events are rare occurrences in everyday 
life and in history ... " (Arendt 1958, 43). Society, Hannah Arendt's observation 
suggests, becomes static in the sense that its "development" becomes confined to 
the up and down made possible by statistical categories. For Arendt there is the 
danger that the political action that sustains and protects the political community 
will become invisible to "public sight-seeing" - a devout perception expects a 
social order only to be administered and forgets about the importance of political 
action. 
Thus, the focus on the everyday use of statistics can sensitize to dangers 
of this public self-understanding. In subsequent essays, l will return to 
displacement, accountability and invisibility so as to develop a political 
philosophy of statistics that is sensitive to the dangers of statistics. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
This essay has explored the phenomenology of everydayness as a philosophical 
witness for the arrival of a public self-understanding in terms of statistics. 
Heidegger's philosophy, far from being simply an instance of "anti-modemist" 
thinking with which to dismiss statistics as so much levelling down and loss of 
personality, offers one way with which to think about this self-understanding. 
Rather than having to "apply" Heidegger's philosophy to statistics, doser 
inspection shows statistics to be already tangled up in Heidegger's account of 
everyday action and their sight, or so l have tried to show with respect to the 
public self-understanding of "the one." 
Dreyfus views Heidegger's statistical language as an instance of 
Heidegger's confusion of the analysis of the structure of agency and anti-
modemist social criticism, and therefore suggests separating the analysis of 
"everydayness" from that of the "public" and its "averageness." (IncidentaIly, in 
order to avoid the confusion Dreyfus introduces the word "normal,,1 so as to 
explicate "the one" in a different way. The "normal" is no! one of Heidegger's 
words, but it has an interesting science-policy history of its own that would make 
it interesting to further explore the Dreyfusian Heidegger).2 However, on the 
present reading, statistics are a particularly interesting way in which a public self-
understanding in large-scale societies has become possible. If the numerical sense 
of the average is made explicit, then a reading can be undertaken that is, in a 
t Dreyfus 1991, 151ff. 
2 On the history of the "nonnal" see especially Canguilhem 1966. 
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variation of Bourdieu, phenomenological and poli tic al. Rather than diagnosing a 
"hatred of statistics," l have read Heidegger as capturing a public self-
understanding that has come about, and the dangers of which his 
phenomenology of everydayness can sensitize to, i.e. public sightseeing and the 
dangers of displacement, accountability and invisibility. No doubt, awareness of 
such dangers belongs to a political philosophy of statistics and l will therefore 
elaborate the problems, which l have so far only introduced, in the subsequent 
essays. At any rate, the focus on everyday action and the sight of "the one" brings 
to the fore and sensitizes to what the focus on individual perceivers of justice and 
the objects of their perception easily overlooks: the power of, and unease with 
this public self-understanding. 
This reading finaIly raises the question whether Heidegger has not shown 
after ail, as Salem-Wiseman writes, that paternalism is ineliminable in modern 
publics? Heidegger, as noted, is reluctant to specify and endorse terms such as 
autonomy and paternalism. However, as the present issue is Salem-Wiseman's 
conclusion, we can consider the question with the help of the notions of 
autonomy adopted by Salem-Wiseman. A person is autonomous if she identifies 
with her desires, goals and values, provided the identification is not influenced in 
ways which make such a process of identification alien to the individual; and 
Salem-Wiseman speaks of "paternalism" where there is only a "heteronomous 
imposition of ends, the prevention of individuals making choices about their own 
ends for themselves" (Salem-Wiseman 2003, 549). So what then about the claim 
of an "ineliminable paternalism?" 
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To be sure, the structure of everyday action and its circumspection is on 
Heidegger's account "ineliminable" in that it makes all particular actions possible. 
Yet that daim hardly makes this structure ineliminably paternalist. However, as 
always aIready being-in-the-world we can certainly ask whether any particular type 
of set actions is patemalistic, i.e. whether sorne of the assumptions going into it 
have to be rejected upon examination. Let me illustrate this point with two 
examples pertaining to the topic of this essay. Does public sightseeing 
systematically prevent autonomy? 
Consider the difficulty with accountability: "One" cannot really explain 
how the (statistical) features in terms of which "one" knows different aspects of 
society are calculated, which assumptions that requires, what is therefore left out 
etc.; "one" can only defer to others, and "one" might not even know who has 
expertise for the issue in question. There is dearly a possibility of alienation. Yet, 
the deferral of accountability also disburdens:1 it is after all information that 1 had 
to make little or no effort for - and that 1 might use to hold government 
accountable;2 in short, the deferral also makes action possible. Whether sorne 
goals or values acquired with public sightseeing will tum out to be alienating 
depends on the particular case, the assumptions involved, the work of the 
producers of the statistics and how it stands up to scrutiny. If this it correct, then 
it is misleading ta speak of ineliminable paternalism in this case. Patemalism and 
autonomy are possible features of everyday action. Upon scrutiny, parts of the 
public self-understanding could tum out to be paternalistic. But this possibility 
does not imply that any specifie form of paternalism, once scrutinized, could not 
be eliminated. AlI that Heidegger's analysis suggest is that there is no prior 
1 Heidegger's tenn is "Entlastung" (Heidegger 1927,127). 
2 A topic l will turn to in the next essay. 
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guarantee that a specific public self-understancling is free from patemalism - as 
part of our already being-in-the-world we have to scrutinize everyday action. 
Reconsider in this sense the displacement described ab ove. 1 might find 
myself endorsing values, which upon scrutiny apparently lead, puzzlingly, only to 
a description of society and moreover a description that does not support the 
purported normative interpretation. For example, unlike what "one says," a 
specific statistic is in this case not an indicator for improved well-being and 
raising an associate rate also not a policy goal that stands up to scrutiny. Now 
regarding the potentially alienating effect of coming to see this, a distinction 
between myself (or my group) and the public seems called for. Regarding only 
myself (or my group), it is hard to see why l could not come to reject that 
particular interpretation and thereby "eliminate" a form of patemalism. Yet to the 
extent that l, as a member of society and implicated in the everyday actions of 
what "one says" and "does," am therefore still a member of society that 
continues to hold the reacling that l have come to reject, there does seem to be a 
sense in which l experience alienation and patemalism in that l keep on being 
confronted and implicated in that which l reject. But yet again, it would seem 
misleacling to speak of an "ineliminable" patemalism in this case. Regarcling any 
specific case, as the statistic in the example, the question is clearly rather what can 
be done to change the particular social mechanism sustaining the statistic and its 
interpretation. Simply conclucling "ineliminable paternalism" only reifies the 
respective power relation. 
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As the public self-understanding in terms of statistics is clearly a possible 
source of alienation and paternalism, l will therefore tum in the next essay to the 
place of the production and use of statistics in political societies. 
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Essay 4 
Accountability for Accounts 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This essay turns to the place of the statistics in political society. More specifically, 
it seeks to illuminate this place with the help of the vision of society as a fair 
system of co-operation. This task, as we will see, is intimately related to the 
possibility of accountability in large politiCal societies. How do citizens hold 
government accountable? Or in the language of essay one, how do those affected 
by the operations on the basic structure hold those operating on the basic 
structure accountable? In this essay, l will argue that the relation between 
accountability and the (statistical) accounts is not just a coincidence of the 
English language, but indicative of an important relation in large poli tic al 
societies. This relation therefore needs to be understood, and l propose to do so 
with the help of the vision of society as a fair system of co-operation. 
The importance of statistics for political society is of course not new. It 
was immediately recognised at the beginning of large-scale democracÏes. As the 
American constitution calls for regular statistical information, the French 
statisticÏan Moreau de Jones spoke of Ha people who instituted the statistics of 
the country on the very day when they founded their government."l However, it 
is Sir John Sinclair (1754-1853) who is generally credited for having introduced 
Hstatistics" into the English language. He had learned about Statistik in central 
t Quoted in Bauer xi; see also Article 1, Section 2 of the American Constitution; for post-
revolutionary France and the attempt of the Bureau de Statistique to inform citizens whether 
republican government did in fact improve the situation of the people see Bourguet 1987. 
115 
Europe, and saw its function as "ascertaining the real political state of a country, 
in its minute details" in order to improve the "welfare of a great political 
community" (Sinclair 1826, 223-225).1 To this end, Sir John, aided by sorne nine-
hundred ministers of the Scottish "Kirk," produced the first "statistical accounts 
of Scotland" in the 1790's. Due to the current tendency to think of statistics as 
merely a mathematical method, 1 have found it useful to recover the expression 
"statistical account" as one way to indicate the political dimension of statistics,2 
i.e. the account it seeks to offer of the "real political state." 
Essay one introduced the demand for visible justice in relation to the 
political separation of operations, but noted the difficulty of meeting the demand 
with respect to social and economic issues. While the statistical macro-scopic 
point of view is a part of the vision of co-operation, 1 noted in essay two that 
there is a peculiarly failure to further investigate the "epistemic problems" it 
encounters, and indeed more generally to bridge "the gap" between philosophical 
visions and empirical research. As a result, there is a risk to remain stuck in an 
unjust present - statistical accounts are treated as uncontroversial, given facts, 
rather than as something that is produced and has a place in the system of co-
operation that needs to be specified. Failure to scrutinize this place likely also 
contributes to a pervasive une ase with statistics. That we have come to 
understand ourselves in part in statistical terms is noted, but becomes at most the 
subject of concerns regarding the various dangers for society or even regarding 
the "levelling down" of the public. As we will see presently, one response to 
1 See Chapter 10 of Mitchison 1962 for the historical context of Sinclair's work on the famous 
"statistical accounts of Scotland." 
2 It is indeed a usage still encountered today. For example in April 2006, an article in the 
prestigious medical journal Tbe Lancet critiqued the World Bank policy with respect to Malaria, 
and in particular the Bank's misuse of statistics - its title: "The World Bank: false ["mancial and 
statistical accounts and medical malpractice in malaria treatment." 
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these concems is to seek a better understanding of the relation between 
accountability and the accounts. 
2. THE POUTICAL SEPARATION OF OPERATIONS 
RECONSIDERED 
The Abbé Sieyes, theorist of the French revolution, deputy of the Third Estate of 
Paris and later diplomat, advocated a famous argument for the political 
separation of operations. 1 The argument develops not from the oligarchie 
tendencies of the division of labor (see essay one), but from the benefits of 
specialization. For the Abbé, specialisation is a principle of progress and 
civilization. "Tout est représentation dans l'Etat social. Elle se trouve partout 
dans l'ordre privé comme dans l'ordre public; elle est la mère de l'industrie 
productive et commerciale, comme des progrès libéraux et politiques. Je dis plus, 
elle se confond avec l'essence même de la via sociale."2 In short, Sieyes incIuded 
politics in the division of labor, and saw here, as everywhere, the benefits 
specialisation may have.3 In a peculiar twist - "everything is representation" - the 
politician, just as baker and doctor, is understood to take on a task and thereby 
substitute work that would have to be done by everyone. 
The force of this specialisation argument and its celebration of civilization 
depends not least on the division of labor actually promoting specialisations that 
deepen the understanding (thereby triggering new inventions and skills), that 
enrich life and that are recognized by others. "Activities that display intricate and 
1 1 follow Pasquino 1987. 
2 From his "Discours du 2 thermidor an III"; quoted in Pasquino 1987, 221. 
3 And in our rime Jane Mansbridge writes: "Constituents choose representatives not only to think 
more carefully than they about the ends and means about but also to negotiation more 
perceptively and fight more skilfully than constituents have the rime or inclination to do" 
(Mans bridge 2003, 515). 
117 
subtle talents, and manifest discrimination and refinement, are valued by both the 
person himself and those around him" (Rawls 1971, 387). Notoriously however, 
the division of labor is driven by efficiency considerations - breaking down a 
production process into smaller parts can increase production possibilities, but 
need not promote any division of labor of the kind just mentioned.1 The division 
of labor can simply result in a large number of repetitive tasks. Marx speaks with 
a view on this kind of division of labour of "the life-Iong speciality of serving one 
and the same machine ... transforming the workman, from his very childhood, 
into a part of a detail-machine," a work that "confiscates every atom of freedom, 
both in bodily and intellectual activity."2 
But noting this routinization typically frees the focus for a phenomenon 
that tends to remain marginalized in the celebra tory discussion of the division of 
labor in the market: hierarchy and the imposition of tasks. To the extent that any 
sophisticated division of labor requires specialists for the organisation of this 
division, specialisation also leads to a relation of vertical power. Those in charge 
of the co-ordination of the division of labor can abuse their power - in economic 
organisation and, if we follow the extension proposed by Sieyes, in political 
t See Adam Smith's famous analysis of productivity-enhancing development of "skill, dexterity 
and judgment" as an effect of the division oflabor (Smith 1776, Book 1, Section 1). 
2 Karl Marx 1867, Ch. 14, sect 4. And in this observation Marx could draw on Adam Smith, who 
writes in the Wealth of Nations: "In the progress of the division of labour, the employment of the 
far greater part of those who live by labour, that is, of the great body of the people, cornes to be 
confined to a few very sintple operations, frequently to one or two. But the understandings of the 
greater part of men are necessarily formed by their ordinary employments. The man whose whole 
life is spent in performing a few sintple operations, of which the effects are perhaps always the 
same, or very nearly the same, has no occasion to exert his understanrung or to exercise his 
invention in finding out expedients for removing difficulties which never occur. He naturally 
loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is 
possible for a human creature to become" (Smith 1776, Book V, Section 1). Emile Durkheint, the 
great celebrator of the division of labor - "pourquoi y aurait-il plus de dignité à être complet et 
médiocre, qu'à vivre d'une vie plus spécialisée, mais plus intense? ... Loin d'être entamée par les 
progrès de la spécialisation, la personnalité individuelle se développe avec la division du travail" 
(Durkheim 1893, 398f) -, therefore distingnishes "normal" and "abnormal division of labor." 
The former enables specialisation, the latter he described as an "avilissement de la nature 
humaine" (Durkheint 1893,363). 
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society more generally.l In short, there is a flipside to the argument for a political 
separation of operations introduced in essay one. While the absence of an 
invisible hand and oligarchie tendencies provide the rationale for the political 
separation, the latter cornes with its own dangers and abuses of power. 
A key issue of the separation of operations is therefore the control of 
political power. In terms of large-scale democratic systems, the distinctions 
proposed by Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski and Susan Stokes help clarify the 
issue. They argue that government is responsive, if its policies reflect the 
preferences of the citizen s, and that it is accountable, if citizens are able to evaluate 
governmental performance and sanction incumbents via elections. Consequently, 
a government "may act in a representative fashion because it is responsive or 
because it is accountable" (Manin, Przeworski and Stokes 1999, 10). But, they 
argue, a responsive and/ or accountable government IS not necessarily 
representative. One chief reason for this insufficiency concerns information. 
With limited or distorted information, citizens may form policy expectations that 
do not correspond to their interests, and accordingly a government may promote 
citizen s' interests even if it acts against their policy expectations. Conversely, 
government may be responsive to the electorate, but at the same cime conceal 
that it could do more and better.2 
Importantly, the problem of information is not simply one of 
manipulation and distortion. Rather, it is a genuine challenge for governments in 
ISociologists sometimes speak of an "iron law of oligarchy" according to which organised activity 
in society tends to be executed hierarchically by leaders. One influential modern source of this 
discussion is Michels 1911; see also the study in McConnell 1966, Ch.5. 
2 The investigation of US politics in the 1990ies has led Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro 
to the conclusion that the seemingly "responsive" interest of politicians in public opinion polis 
may not so much serve the function of finding out about the needs and wants of citizens, but 
rather help "craft the talk" with wlùch the public can be better persuaded of the political agenda 
of politicians and political parties (Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro, 2000). 
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large political societies to be infonned, and it is likewise a genuine challenge for 
the governed to accurately perceive the perfonnance of governance. 
Thinking back to the discussion of visible justice in essay one, we can say 
that it is one desideratum of a system of co-operation that those affected by the 
operations on the basic structure are able to hold government accountable, i.e. 
that they can challenge and punish governments that do not live up to the 
demands of co-operation. This is to extend Rawls' concern with the oligarchie 
tendencies of the "invisible hand" of the market to the oligarchic tendencies of 
the "visible hand" - that is to those operating on the basic structure, who may be 
"all fist" (or all "thumbs'') and "no fingers" skilled to sustain a system of co-
operation. 
3. POLITICAL PERCEPTION AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
How is this desideratum met in large political societies? The examination of 
processes of accountability in large political societies indicates that the question 
leads us to something highly pertinent to the topic of this thesis. Electoral 
research in the United States suggests "voters routinely reject incumbents who 
governed during a period marked by deterioration in social and economic 
conditions" (prewitt 1987, 263). The phenomenon, Kenneth Prewitt argues, can 
be explained in tenns of voters either reacting to recent changes in theÏr personal 
cÏrcumstances or to changing circumstances of the state as a whole. "Somewhat 
counter-intuitively, current research supports the second explanation. Voters in 
the United States give more weight to negative or positive trends in national 
economic conditions than to changes in their own economic cÏrcumstances ... 
when economic and social indicators are moving in politically popular directions, 
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political credit is claimed; when they are moving in unpopular directions, political 
blame is assigned" (prewitt 1987,263-264).1 
Thus, the electoral research off ers an indication of the "what" and "in 
terms of what" of accountability in large political societies. Statistics on 
unemployment, economic growth, inflation or the budget deficit - ubiquitous in 
the statements of politicians and the reports of the media - inform citizen s' 
perception of the state of society and societal "trends," their evaluation of the 
performance of government and how they will hold government accountable. 
If we join trus observation with the discussion of vertical power in the last 
section, statistics seems to emerge as a yet to be further examined "trurd," 
somehow between rulers and the ruled: On the one hand, govemments will use 
statistics for the making, communicating and monitoring of policies - a use that 
is evident from early on in the rustory of large political societies (Kelman 1987). 
And no doubt, political parties will also use statistics to embellish their 
acruevements, to paint those of opponents in black, to present political fears and 
hopes as objective, and so forth. On the other hand, citizens use statistics to hold 
govemments accountable in elections, and to make the case for or against laws 
and regulations in between elections with the help of statistics. In short, the 
statistical accounts have a hybrid function - they serve both rulers and the ruled, 
both those operating on the basic structure and those affected by these 
operations. Let me illustrate this point with an example. 
In its 2003 Report on "Environment and Sustainable Development 
Indicators for Canada," the Canadian National Round Table on the Environment 
1 D. Roderick Kiewitt argues that the personal and the national perspective need not be exclusive. 
"That voters value national prosperity, which they clearly do, implies that they would rather live in 
a worId in which economic opportunities are expanding - for themselves and for everybody else. 
Concem over one's personal interest and the national interest thus run in the same direction, 
resulting in what de Tocqueville referred to as an "enlightened" sense of self-interest" (Kiewitt 
1983,132). 
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and the Economy (NRTEE) observed that Canada's environmental information 
is "incomplete and of surprisingly poor quality" (NRTEE 2003, xix). The 
National Round Table argued that existing information needs to he 
complemented and proposed indicators for air quality, freshwater, greenhouse 
gas emission, forest coyer, extent of wetlands and educational attainment. In 
reaction to the report, the federal govemment made a commitment to "start 
incorporating key indicators on clean water, clean air and emissions reductions 
into its decision making" (Speech from the Throne, Pebruary 2004, 19). Now, the 
development of environment and sustainable development indicators is valuable 
as the NRTEE de scribes the available information as of "incomplete and 
surprisingly poor quality." However, the members of the NRTEE are appointed 
by the executive, and it decides which policy recommendations to endorse. As it 
happens, it chose to fund the development of only three out of six proposed 
indicators. But a missing indicator on wetlands and more generally information of 
poor quality diminishes the capacities of citizens to hold govemment accountahle 
for its environmental policy. There is a tension resulting from the hyhrid function 
of the accounts: on the one hand they serve government to monitor policies and 
to communicate them, on the other hand they serve citizens to hold govemment 
accountable. 
The hybrid function of the accounts highlights the need to clarify the 
place of statistics in political society. However, before l tum to this task an 
excursus seems appropriate. The sceptical reader might think that the present 
focus on the political separation of operations, accountability and the accounts 
gives the de facto use of statistics too much importance - to the detriment of 
more democratic ways of politicallife. Let me therefore tum in the next section 
to deliberative democrats whose outlook is not only conducive to a sceptical view 
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of large-scale politics and their modes of accountability, but also might promise 
an alternative. 
4. DELIBERATION AND SCALE1 
Deliberative democrats insist that inclusive communication lS constitutive of 
democracy and the source of legitimate democratic decision-making. Democratie 
poli tic al decision must be legitimated in a public process that gives everyone a 
chance ta contribute to, argue against or in favour of the issue at hand, including 
the very way we think about the respective issue. A democratically saturated point 
of view is to be the outcome of a deliberative process that takes into account the 
various perspectives of interlocutors. "Everyone is required to take the 
perspective of everyone else, and thus project herself into the understanding of 
self and world of ail others . . . from this interlocking of perspectives there 
emerges an ideally extended 'we-perspective' from which all can test in common 
whether they wish to make a controversial norm the basis of their shared 
practice; and this should include mutual criticism of the appropriateness of the 
languages in terms of which situations and needs are interpreted" (Habermas 
1998,58; Kuper 2004,66). The "we-perspective" is meant to authorize policy. As 
Robert Goodin writes, deliberative democrats "suppose that outcomes will be 
democratically legitimate only so far as they emerge through . . . pro cesses of 
deliberation involving free and equal exchange among everyone who will be 
affected by them" (Goodin 2000, 82).2 Such an "ideal seems eminently feasible in 
smail-scale societies where face-to-face interactions are the norm" (Goodin 2000, 
82). Of course, deliberative democrats could call for "a very small state where the 
1 This section is especially indebted to the work of Robert Goodin. 
2 See footnote 5 of Goodin's text for extensive references for this view. 
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people can easily assemble and where each citizen can easily know all the others" 
(Rousseau 1762/1987, Book 3, Chapter 4).1 But this alternative is not one that 
Habermas and other deliberative democrats argue for. How then is deliberation 
to be possible in large-scale democracies? 
In response to the question, deliberative democrats have developed 
mechanisms designed to deal with the challenge of sc ale - and thereby provide us 
with a comparative case for possibly more democratic ways of politicallife. Let 
me first introduce five such proposals, and then turn to their critical discussion. 
The first way to deal with the problem of scale is to introduce "seriality" and 
"disjointed deliberation" (Goodin 2000, 84ff). A version of the approach has 
already served the English juries of the 12th century. It is based on the idea to 
reduce the number of people deliberating by splitting them into groups. Through 
several iterations of this process of disjointed deliberation, first with one group 
and then with the next, it may be possible to arrive at a common view. 
A second, much more familiar way to deal with the problem of scale is 
substitution or what Goodin calls "Ersatz deliberation." The key idea is to 
establish a social microcosm of the society, which via deliberation arrives at views 
that would have been arrived at if deliberation had been possible in society as a 
whole. The idea is familiar from citizens' juries as well as more recently from 
deliberative polling2 (Fishkin 1991; Coote and Lenaghan 1997). 
While the last two proposals reduce the number of deliberators in 
response to the problem of scale, another option is to restrict input. Goodin 
1 Incidentally, Rousseau's own position with respect to democratic institutions is complex. While 
he is often taken to be an opponent of representative government, Rousseau defended 
representation in his constitution al writings. On this and related matters see Joshua Cohen 1986, 
288ff. 
2 Deliberative polis draw on samples from the respective group to find out how opinions would 
change, if there is occasion to deliberate and get informed. The ftrst deliberative polI with 300 
British citizens was organized and broadcast on TV in the UK in 1994. 
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therefore calls it "emaciated deliberation" (Goodin 2000, 89f). The idea is to 
reduce the "deliberative load" that the participants have to digest by reducing the 
length of cime available for each speaker and/or their number of interventions. 
Another possibility is to introduce intermediaries that "filter" the initial 
contributions: synthesizing them, cutting out repetitions, gratuitous insults and 
the like. 
Habermas' account of the transformation of the European public sphere 
draws attention to another well-known intermeruary: the newspaper (Habermas 
1962/1990). "When Addison and Steel published the first issue of the Tattler in 
1709, the coffee-houses were already so numerous and the circles of their 
frequenters already so wide, that contact among these thousand fold circles could 
only be maintained through a journal" (quoted in Goodin 2000, 91). The idea is 
that every member of the deliberative public sphere can post rus view in a 
journal, newspapers and the like for others to read. Goodin calls the resulting 
possibility of (necessarily) selective uptake "blinkered deliberation" (Goodin 
2000,90f). 
Finally, Goodin proposes his own way of dealing with the problem of 
scale via recourse to art. "Rather than merely bemoaning the fact [that there are 
ulcimately strict limits to the extent to which everyone really can be 
communicatively present all at once in large-scale societies], let us instead try 
harder to make everyone el se 'imagïnatively present' in the minds of each of the 
deliberators" (Goodin 2000, 98). His inspiration is the work of arcists, who are 
able to bring others or even a whole social world to life, and in so doing allow the 
reader to experience the perspectives of the various social roles, and characters of 
the work. He calls trus "democratic deliberation within." However, note that this 
proposaI can evidently only be a supplement to "external" democratic 
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mechanisms. lndeed, Goodin writes: "Just as in a small assembly the 
reqtÙrements of deliberative democracy may be met by a free-ranging discussion 
of the issues culminating in a distinctly non-deliberative show of hands, so too in 
large-scale mass societies the reqtÙrements of deliberative democracy may be met 
by expansive internal reflective deliberations culminating in a non-deliberative 
visit to the poil booth" (Goodin 2000, 109). 
Let me now turn to a critically consideration of the way in wruch these 
mecharusms deal with the challenge of scale. With respect to "disjointed 
deliberation," it needs to be recalled that deliberation can "transcend" its initial 
starting point. After deliberation, the initial problem will frequently be looked at 
differently and perhaps no longer be the same. Consequently, the very question 
and problem formulation can change due to deliberation. This implies the 
problem for serial deliberation that "the conclusions reached by each group in 
turn will be answers to different questions" (Kuper 2004, 67). If it is now re-
called that deliberation in the political context must arrive at judgments, the 
question is how deliberations that eventually are likely to respond to different 
problems could possibly be synthesised into a ftnal judgment? The English jury 
tradition mentioned above dealt with the problem via a small group of judges in 
charge of conduding the various deliberations that had taken place in juries 
across the country. But, as Goodin points out, this solution will hardly fmd the 
enthusiasm of deliberative democrats. "From their perspective, whatever direct 
deliberative gains were secured by introducing juries in the ftrst place would be 
largely nullifted by entrusting such a small and closed elite with the task of 
blending the products of all those lower-Ievel deliberations into a single 
nationwide common law" (Goodin 2004,85). 
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Indeed, already setting the agenda will require sorne discretion by an agent 
or group, and as such an exercise of power in democratic politics (Lukes 1974, 
16ff). To be sure, deliberative democrats can point out that trus agenda-setting 
power is diminished by the freedom of deliberation, which can question and re-
situate the initial way of seeing the problem and phrasing the question. But if so, 
there remains the problem how answers to different questions could be 
synthesised in one meta-deliberation. Making judgments for political decisions 
possible in large-societies does in this case not only rely on an extended 
conversation and search for a "we-perspective" among all. There are also 
considerable asymmetries in influence among the deliberators. 
"Ersatz deliberation" makes further challenges manifest. 1) If there 1S no 
way in which the demos as a whole could have deliberated on a topic (the initial 
reason for the "substitute deliberation"), on what grounds can the substitute 
deliberation be said to stand for that which the demos would have decided 
(Kuper 2004, 68)? 2) Even if the required notion of substitution can be made 
sense of, it quickly runs into troubles due to the dynamic character of 
deliberation. If deliberation has the power to radically alter understanding and to 
"transcend" initial ways of seeing the problem, in what sense do the substitutes 
continue to be substitutes in the course of the deliberation? "The question is 
whether people, who started out being representative of the wider community, in 
all the ways we can measure, are also representative of the wider community in 
the ways in wruch they change over the course of deliberation" (Goodin 2000, 88). 
As such changes are likely to happen, the question of democratic accountability 
emerges, i.e. how to check the deliberations of the substitute deliberators and the 
political decisions they will be conducive to. Indeed, are we still dealing with a 
mechanism falling under the rubric of "deliberative democracy," or have we 
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arrived at sorne form of democratic representation? It is worthy of note that 
Jürgen Habermas, a pioneer of current theorizing about deliberative democracy, 
takes representative government in his discussions of deliberative poli tics for 
granted. He locates the deliberative processes in the communicative flows outside 
of formal, representative politics. But this leaves the question in what sense these 
communication flows are deliberative. Evidently, the communication flows 
outside of formaI representative politics frequently exhibit patterns of domination 
and manipulation. And even if this problem could somehow be overcome, there 
would remain a question of scale: how are these communication flows to be 
channelled into formaI politics in an inclusive way? In short, Habermas' approach 
seems to make the design of deliberative mechanisms all the more urgent. 
What about the idea of dealing with the problem of scale by reducing the 
amount of "deliberative upload?" Ir seems to presuppose the thought that every 
citizen "puts in one's 2 cents worth," which in a large society would then amount 
to an enormous amount of information. In reply, there have been frequent 
reductions ad absurdum of deliberative democracy. "If an association were to 
make one decision a day, allow ten ho urs a day for discussion, and permit each 
member just ten minutes - rather extreme assumptions - then the association 
could not have more than sixty members" (Dahl 1970, 67f). The discussion 
assumes that it is meaningfu1 to add up individual perspectives and contributions. 
Yet, consider typical debates - an increase in tax, a new immigration policy - and 
the idea that there as many pertinent perspectives as people can be seen for what 
it is: a mathematical fantasy. No doubt, it is important to get all arguments and 
considerations into the debate. But that is not the same as - tediously and 
boringly - everyone having to listen to everyone else for the same amount of 
cime. The latter procedure even might have the result to cut short those citizens 
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who have sometrung to say - perhaps, because they are directly affected by the 
policies, or because they have in depth knowledge of the required administrative 
procedures etc. Goodin notes that with the proposed mechanism "our cognitive 
capacities, which re1y upon information inputs, are more or less undemourished 
(hence the term 'emaciated deliberation'). In the limiting case of a 'democracy of 
soundbites', we are deliberating on the basis of so little as ta make it hard1y a case 
of deliberation - of serious reflective 'weighing and judging reasons' - at aU" 
(Goodin 2000, 90). 
Fourth, consider the "blinkered deliberation" that has come about with 
the deve10pment of the large-scale societies. The generally negative tone in wruch 
Habermas traces this development is hardly surprising. In what sense can the 
"mediated" deliberation still be compared with discussion? "Contributors to 
broadsheets - as, indeed, those holding forth coffeehouses - are not so much 
'talking to one another' as they are 'posting notices for all to read'. Others might 
(or might not) take note of them, and reply" (Goodin 2000, 91). Moreover, the 
example of the media shows that what is taken up in the media might be 
interesting for all sorts of conversational reasons, but this "blinkered 
deliberation" need not be material for political deliberation and the judgments 
that have to be made (Kuper 2004, 70). They are in the first place simply publicly 
available postings. 
FinaUy, there is Goodin's original appeal to more imaginative, empathetic 
minds. While rus call for a deeper understanding and extended sensibilities is no 
doubt important, rus proposaI tends to put an enormous burden on the 
deliberator. We consider writers who are able to capture sorne individuals, sorne 
types, or even a social world as exceptionalfy gifted. And the example of the arts -
both the 'deliberative' artist and the democratic effect of art - is notoriously 
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ambivalent. "Ir is a commonplace that Hitler was freely elected, in the country of 
Goethe and Mann, by a comparatively well-read populace" (Kuper 2004, 71). 
In conclusion of this brief excursus on deliberation and scale, the 
discussion of the deliberative mechanisms suggests that the deliberative 
approach, at present anyway, does not offer a radically different approach to 
escale' that would somehow obviate the need to scrutinize the possibility of 
accountability in large political societies. To the contrary, doser attention to the 
mechanisms shows them to likewise grapple with accountability issues. However, 
the consideration of these mechanisms also has at least two lessons to offer. First, 
the approaches generally highlight the need to understanding accountability not 
just in terms of the traditional "sanctioning" (via elections), but also in terms of 
the giving and asking for reasons that is so important in particular in between 
elections.1 In the following l am especially interested in one form such reasons 
take in large political societies, and the resources such reasons need to draw on. 
But the problems encountered by the proposed mechanisms - in particular 
agenda-setting and maintenance, the choice of "substitutes" and the ambiguous 
role of intermediaries - will also have to be kept in mind for the further 
discussion. 
5. TaO PROBLEMATIC PROBLEMS 
The joined observation of the hybrid use of statistics by both govemments and 
citizens, the sensitivity of political debates to agenda-setting and maintenance by 
a potentially problematic political grouping, and the technical requirements of 
producing statistics call for a delegation of statistics to science. On this view, the 
1 See for example Bohman 1996, 54 and Gutman and Thomson 2004, 135ff. 
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production of statistical accounts 1S to be the task of the scientific commumty, 
which is envisaged as a politically independent, self-governing association. As 
such it can offer a neutral platform for the various uses of statistics. 
The delegation of the task to scientists 1S attractive, and the proposal even 
seems to resonate with a view of science in Rawls and other political 
philosophers. In the "original position," i.e. Rawls' device of representation for 
thinking through the various aspects of justice, the parties are to draw on theories 
and facts for the design of the constitution. They are to have "an understanding 
of the principles of social theory ... [and] know the relevant general facts about 
their society, its natural circumstances and resources, its level of economic 
advance and political culture . . ." (Rawls 1971, 173). While Rawls thinks it 
important and legitimate to draw on the findings of science, he does not fmd it 
necessary to thematize science as part of rus political philosophy. Scientific 
knowledge appears as "aIready there" and "given," and arguably therefore as the 
ultimately uncontroversial product of scientific commumties. 
However, it is problematic to think of the production of statistics as a 
scientific enterprise independent from political society and responsible only for 
the advancement of knowledge and the making available of facts whatever these 
facts may turn out to be. First, self-governed scientific commumties are no doubt 
an effective way to advance our knowledge of the world. However, this 
knowledge might not only be strongly confmned or corroborated, it might also 
be irrelevant for the present task. In a striking passage on the workings of 
science, Thomas Kuhn argues that the respective disciplinary outlook offers its 
members a criterion for choosing "problems that . . . can be assumed to have 
solutions" and to reject other problems as "metaphysical, as the con cern of 
another discipline or sometimes as just too problematic to be worth the time" 
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(Kuhn 1962, 137). He notes that this outlook might "insulate the community 
from those socially important problems that are not reducible to puzzle form, 
because they cannot be stated in terms of the conceptual and instrumental tools . 
. . Such problems can be a distraction, a lesson brilliantly illustrated by several 
facets of seventeenth-century Baconianism and by sorne of the contemporary 
social sciences. One of the reasons why normal science seems to progress so 
rapidly is that its practitioners concentrate on problems that only their own lack 
of ingenuity should keep them from solving" (Kuhn 1962, 37). Science might 
advance, but trus does not necessarily imply advancement in the understanding of 
social issues - to the contrary, according to Kuhn's bleak assessment, the focus 
on social issues might hinder the advancement of science. In essay one, we 
encountered the epistemic challenge of social and economic problems. Rawls 
notes "whether the aims of the principles covering social and economic 
inequalities are realized is . . . difficult to ascertain. These matters are neady 
always open to wide differences of reasonable opinion; they rest on complicated 
inferences and intuitive judgments that require us to assess complex social and 
economic information about topics poody understood" (Rawls 1996, 229). 
Surprisingly, Rawls shows little interest in the advancement of our understanding 
of topics that are currently understood only poody, and gives no indication that a 
lack of understanding in a certain domain might be related to the social and 
political structure of that society. Do the social and economic issues pose too 
problematic problems for normal science? Indeed, in essay two we encountered a 
more general gap between political philosophy and empirical research. 
Second, there is the intimate relation between statistics and poli tics. Even 
a self-governing and socially interested scientific community must be able to 
gather information, and therefore relies on the co-operation of rulers and the 
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ruled, who might be suspicious of the eventual uses of this information and 
simply not be willing to make it available (quite apart from the issue of who is 
funding the research). Therefore, the notion of an independent scientific 
community is bound to be descriptively inaccurate. Discussing the "right qualities 
of success" of the driving force behind the first statistical accounts, Sinclair's 
biographer notes: "First of all he had money and energy and a seat in Parliament. 
He could draw up circular letters to the nine hundred odd ministers of the Kirk, 
pay for their printing, and then send them out under a parliamentary frank. The 
importance of this last privilege was enormous" (Mitchison 1962, 122). 
Third, the notion of an independent scientific community correctIy 
emphasizes the relative organisational independence of associations in a society. 
Scientific communities have their own ways of organising research; whether it is 
the selection of members or the peer-review of scientific work, scientific 
communities need not mirror the political organisation of society. Nonetheless, 
associations are constrained by the basic commitments of political society - even 
if l have discovered a very efficient new production system, l cannot form an 
economic organisation based on this system as long as it requires slaves for the 
labor input. And even more pertinent for the current context, associations are 
generally part of a larger institutional context with key societal functions. 
Consider the family: no doubt, there are many possible family structures even 
within the constraints of justice, but there is also the family's societal function to 
ensure the "production and reproduction of society and its culture from one 
generation to the next" (Rawls 1999, 157). In short, associational freedom must 
not be confused with a licence to ignore or bracket the understanding and 
specification of key societal functions. 
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In conclusion then, the model of the independent scientific community as 
the producer of the true and as the platform of the right is only partly persuasive. 
On the one hand, the production of statistics is a communal activity that relies on 
much organisational effort, shared standards and practices, and the term 
"community" is in this sense entirely appropriate. On the other hand, scientific 
communities can be neither expected to automatically advance socially pertinent 
knowledge, nor does associational freedom necessarily imply that societal 
function does not exist. To the contrary, the specification of this function is of 
key importance. Recent work in democratic theory suggests a way to meet this 
challenge. Let me therefore turn to it in the next section. 
6. ACCOUNTABILITY INSTITUTIONS 
In his work on representation as responsiveness, Andrew Kuper proposes a 
"system of representative govemment" that is sensitive to the problem of 
information that surfaced earlier on (Kuper 2004, 77).1 Just as individual citizens 
have only limited knowledge and judgment so do elected politicians and other 
decision-makers. It is therefore important how the system of representative 
government as a whole functions "so as to consistently produce outcomes that 
take into account the interests and/or views of the public" (Kuper 2004, 77). 
To this end Kuper demands that '(1) the representative has the discretion 
and capabilities to judge and act - or a representative system is structured so as to 
1 Jane Mansbridge also stresses the need for a more systemic approach (and points out that 
empirical research in this respect is much further than the normative theory of representation). 1 
discuss Kuper's work here because he develops issues especially pertinent to the topic of this 
essay. However, see Mansbridge 2003, 517, and also the aIready mentioned text by Manin, 
Przeworski and Stokes, which anticipates sorne of the points made by Kuper. Kuper's work on 
democratic theory can be critically situated with the help of Daniel Weinstock's article on interest-
based approaches to global democratic reform such as Kuper's, which Weinstock contrasts with 
approaches based on democratic agency (Weinstock 2006). 
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operate - in the best interest of the public; 2) he, she, or it is impelled to do so 
because of institutional empowerment and constraints rather than whim, luck, or 
other caprice; 3) he, she or it does so in a way that elicits and takes into account 
the active exercise of judgment by the public in a way that justifies the attribution 
of systematic control to the public" (Kuper 2004, 79). Concerning the first point, 
Kuper understands the public interest in terms of a) the interest of the majority 
(with significant constitutional consttaints) that b) can be identified in terms of 
the capabilities of the public, where this identification is c) the task of 
professional agents who generally will be best placed to identify the public 
interest so defined (Kuper 2004,83-90). 
So how is the system of representative government to work for the best 
interest of the public? Having noted Manin, Przeworski and Stoke's point about 
information above, it follows that the "prospect of future assessment" need not 
impel govemment to act in the "best interest" due to information constraints and 
possibilities of manipulation. "Asymmetric and incomplete" information, Kuper 
notes, make prospective and rettospective voting a "blunt instrument" (Kuper 
2004, 95). His response is to generalize the separation of power. "A suitable 
dispersal of authority, linked with the prospect of publicity and sanction -
including removal from public office through elections and other mechanisms of 
dismissal - might together reduce the adverse effects of discrepancies of power 
and information" (Kuper 2004, 103). The separation of power requires a system 
of representation, which horizontally leads to checks and balances in a way that 
identifies and acts in the best interest of the public, and which vertically (i.e. with 
respect to citizens) is compelled to "elicit and take into account the active 
judgments of citizens" (Kuper 2004, 103). 
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To this end, Kuper proposes further to the traditional triad of executive, 
legislative and judicative "an additional set of institutions" (Kuper 2004, 104): 1) 
accountabiliry agencies or channels 0/ scrutif!J, and 2) advocary agencies or channels 0/ dissent. 
The main task of the former is to supply citizens with more independent and 
assessable information (Kuper 2004, 108); the latter are designed to take up 
concerns and corn plaints of citizens and to demand response from political 
authorities (Kuper 2004, 106). 
As will be readily apparent, on this approach we can specify the place of 
statistical accounts in terms of a democratic approach to accountability. The 
production of accounts 1S on this view a task of accountability institutions. 
Indeed, citing the prior work by Manin, Przeworksi, and Stokes, Kuper sees the 
provision of independent statistical information as a key task of accountability 
institutions (Kuper 2004, 108). The primary function of these institutions is 1) to 
provide independent and asses sable information to citizens - and thus reverses 
the prevailing governmental-administrative focus on statistics (that we have seen 
for example in the NRTEE example) -, 2) to do so in terms of the best interest 
of the public, and 3) to thereby impel the other parts of the system of 
govemment to act responsively, i.e. as part of a dispersed political separation of 
operations. 
7. THE BEST INTEREST OF THE PUBLIC 
Alert to the relation of information to power, Kuper proposes an extended 
separation of powers. Accountability and advocacy institutions are to improve 
democratic decision-making. He thereby attempts what Jane Mansbridge 
demands: that political philosophy catch up to, and thereby reflect on the 
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development of large-scale democracies. His system of representation situates 
already existing institutions ln an extended separation of powers. Indeed, his 
further development of the system of representation distantly recalls the spirit of 
the Abbé Sieyes' enthusiastic endorsement of political specialisation as a means 
of social progress. 
While l endorse Kuper's (and Mansbridge's) call for a systemic 
understanding of representation and accountability, l need to add one 
clarification and then an objection. Regarding the clarification: What ensures that 
those working for accountability institutions can contribute to the specified 
function? Regarding the objection: How persuasive is Kuper's account of the 
best interest of the public? l will begin with the first question. 
For accountability institutions to offer independent and assessable 
information they require a measure of independence from the other parts of the 
system of government. To the extent that the making of accounts requires some 
specialisation - think for example of the complex system of national economic 
accounts - there is evidently a need for trained staff. Along with this education al 
requirement, there is a need for extended communication to ensure shared 
adherence to rules and practices.1 Yet, as pertinent information is likely to be 
contested, and because there is consequently the possibility of distortions due to 
illegitimate interests and corruption, it is for accountability institutions just as 
important as for other democratic institutions to consider the authorization and 
sanctioning of their members. Here techniques deve10ped for the appointment of 
judges might be helpful such as a "professional code of ethics, long-term 
appointments, measures to prevent sacking by politicians, adequate salaries, clear 
1 For an interesting illustration of trus point from the domain of international statistics see 
Vernon 1987. 
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criteria of selection, independent commissions of appointment, agreement from 
legislators on all sides, review by higher courts" (Kuper 2004, 113). Moreover, for 
the information to be assessable for citizens, processes of extended peer review 
are likely to be required. So as to ensure the quality of the information, citizens 
must have on a regular basis the chance to comment on and demand 
information. lndeed, in a social world were numerous actors constantly struggle 
for everyone's attention - consider the enormous amounts spent on 
advertisement, and the sophistication of advertisement techniques - it is 
particularly important not to leave the statistical accounts arcane and inaccessible 
products of "normal science." 1 
If these measures go sorne way to ensure the proper working of 
accountability institutions, what about Kuper's specification of their work in 
terms of the best interest of the public? On his approach, the interest of the 
public refers to the interest of the majority. "Constitution al constraints on the 
power of the majority [are to prevent] tyranny in any strict sense" (Kuper 2004, 
88). Yet, recall that Kuper argues for a systemic approach that seeks to generalize 
the separation of powers. But the judiciary, wruch is charged with upholding 
constitutional consttaints, is part of this system of representation. Therefore, the 
majoritarian focus on the interest of the public is at odds with the proposed 
systemic outlook. Furthermore, the focus on the majority seems to indicate a 
concern with elections, even though Kuper judges them to be a "blunt 
instrument." What warrants the exclusive majoritarian focus in between elections 
and regarding the manifold possible issues that might arise? It reduces citizens' 
possibility to make their voice heard by reducing the information they can draw 
on to forcefully present their case. 
1 A fact that the makers of the ecological footprint have consistently recognized in the 
development of their indicator. 
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Kuper further defmes the interest of the majority in terms of capabilities 
(Kuper 2004, 89). A focus on capabilities, he points out, makes visible the 
differential conversion of goods - "pregnant women will starve if they obtain 
only the amount of food sufficient to keep most other people nourished" (Kuper 
2004, 90) -, and the capability is sensitive to the different vulnerability of 
different local contexts - "pressing a srurt is necessary for a poor person to avoid 
further social and economic exclusion in sorne contexts, but not in others" 
(Kuper 2004, 90). Trus justification of the capability perspective poorly coheres 
with the proposed majoritarian focus. Since when are pregnant women in the 
majority? Or poor people in sorne contexts, but not in others? Kuper seems to 
overlook that the capability approach has been developed as a specification of 
equality. 
The example of the pressing of srurts also indicates a tension between a 
fine-grained approach and Kuper's focus on the national and global level. The 
information reqwrements of rus approach would be enormous. Even Amartya 
Sen, the champion of capability analysis, notes that "in practice su ch 
discrimination [between actual functioning and choice over functionings] is often 
difficult to do when dealing with aggregate statistics (as opposed to detailed 
micro-studies of individuals), and the practical uses of the capability concept in 
poverty analysis has been mainly with simple functioning information" (Sen 2000, 
75f). 
In the light of these problems with Kuper's internally contradictory 
account of the best interest of the public, let me consider an alternative 
specification in the next section. 
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8. ACCOUNTABILITY AND CO-OPERATION 
Kuper advances bis conception of the best interest of the public only after having 
dismissed an alternative specification of the interest of the public: social co-
operation (Kuper 2004, 88). He dismisses the ide a of social co-operation on the 
grounds that the "Pareto optimality articulated" in it cannot resolve "most of the 
vexed decisions of poli tics," and because "many political decisions are not 
resolved by reference to whether they promo te wider social cooperation" (Kuper 
2004, 88). Now, this rendering of co-operation in terms of Pareto optimality will 
come as a surprise given the discussion of a fair system of co-operation in essay 
one. Is Kuper's dismissal warranted? Let me revisit the vision of co-operation 
with view on the CUITent topic. 
Co-operation, it will be recalled, reqwres action in terms of publicly 
recognized rules. 1 As argued in essay one, a demand for visible justice is built into 
the idea of co-operation. Consequently, the ide a directly motivates the calI for 
accountability institutions as institutions that make visible justice possible in large 
societies. What is more, this motivation is systemic, i.e. it concerns the system of 
co-operation. 
Co-operation, it will be further recalled, is to be fair, i.e. it is to be 
acceptable to alI who are willing to reasonably consider it. As such, the basis of 
co-operation is not majoritarian. Majority poli tics are not ruled out, but situated 
within a scheme of co-operation. For the members of the co-operation to 
understand themselves as members of co-operation, they must in principle be 
able to assess everyday political problems with respect to the overalI fairness of 
the system. It is consequently of the first importance that information regarding 
1 See essay one, section two ff. 
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the fairness of the system as a whole is available to the members of co-operation. 
This is nothing but a recognition of the myopia diagnosed in the first essay. But 
as meeting this requirement is challenging in large political societies, the need for 
an institution mandated to meet this challenge emerges. To be sure, none of this 
prevents majoritarian politics and coalition-building from emerging. However, 
this coalition-building is set against the background of independent and 
assessable information regarding the fairness of the system, and consequently 
helps impel political parties and movements to take a stance with respect to this 
information. 
Finally, co-operation involves recognition of the needs of those 
participating in the co-operation (Rawls 1996, Lecture v, §4). In essay two, l 
introduced one account of the se needs in terms of primary goods, i.e. basic rights 
and liberties, freedom of movement and free choice of occupation, powers and 
prerogatives of offices and positions of authority and responsibility, income and 
wealth and the social bases of self-respect. To be sure, this account fits weIl into 
the vision of co-operation. However, as the "space-debate" in essay two 
indicated, the vision of co-operation can be spelled out with a different 
specification of needs. Put differently, the vision of co-operation can in principle 
be attractive even to those objecting to the primary goods account, i.e. notably 
the capability theorists. 
Still, as we have seen the primary goods approach is deliberately set out 
for large political societies. For the social and economic domains its specification, 
e.g. especially income and wealth, is to oEEer asses sable information in a way that 
the capability approach with its micro-focus on differential conversion has great 
difficulty dealing with.1 Moreover, it will be recalled from the discussion in essay 
1 See Sen's admission in the last section. 
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two that a number of the arguments against the primary goods approach are 
orthogonal in that they also apply to the capability approach once scale is made 
explicit. Finally, it is important to note that important functionings, in particular 
health, can be accommodated by the vision of co-operation. Health for example 
is a precondition of equal opportunity.l 
A key moral recognition of the vision of co-operation is absent from or at 
any rate not inherent to the capability approach. The possibility to co-operate 
depends in many ways on features beyond the control of the individual. To 
mention but three: 1) the economlC value of talents and specific trainings 
depends in part on supply and demand, i.e. a systematic feature of co-operation; 
2) individual working possibilities depend to sorne extent on the family and 
community one is born into, i.e. again a feature of social organisation; 3) finally 
the possibility to participate in co-operation - in a formal sense of having work, 
but also in the substantive sense of having work that is not just non-recognized, 
underpaid routine toil -depends on the overall organisational capacity of the 
scheme of economic production. Notoriously, economists speak of the "natural 
rate of unemployment" - determined by various features of the respective 
economy. The lack of individual control over important features of co-operation, 
and the advantage and disadvantage associated with it offers a strong rationale to 
pay special attention to those least favoured in the scheme of co-operation. In 
short, there is a specific social sensibility built into the vision of co-operation that 
is not inherent to the capability approach. As a result, the vision of co-operation 
further helps specify the production of independent and assessable information 
in a system of co-operation. It must pay special attention to those least-favoured 
1 On health as a prerequisite for equality of opportunity see Daniels 2003. 
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by the system of co-operation, and thereby help impel the system of co-operation 
towards the improvement of the situation of those Ieast advantaged by it. 
In conclusion, l would therefore argue that on balance the vision of co-
operation offers a specification of the best interest of the public that shows 
Kuper's dismissal of the idea to be unwarranted and on closer examination to be 
better suited to the task than rus own specification. It would be quite misleading 
to think that the provision of independent and asses sable information on primary 
goods is a trivial task. Information on income in terms of life-prospects, 
including the choices between work and leisure this involves, is at the moment 
hardly available on the nationallevel (Bojer 2003, 44f), and on the global level 
even simple income information is still in a stage of development.1 In short, there 
is much work to do for accountability institutions as part of a system operating 
on the basic structure for the promotion of co-operation. 
Let me end trus section with one point conceming the function of 
accountability institutions that is applicable to the specification of the public 
interest on either the capability-majoritarian or the co-operative model. A 
recurrent theme of this thesis is the relation between the vision of co-operation 
and already existing modes of political perception and the perception of societal 
structure and development these modes entail. Macro-economic indicators offer 
one example. Justifiable as the interest in one or the other macroeconomic 
indicator may be from the point of view of economic theorizing, the relation of 
the indicator to the public interest might still be quite opaque, and conducive to a 
circumspection that sees what "one sees" but has great difficulty to provide 
reasons for this circumspection. Here innovative work is called for so as to 
provide more assessable information regarding the relation of theses systemic 
1 See Milanovic's important work towards overcoming this challenge (Milanovic 2005). 
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features to fair co-operation in order to promote democratic accountability. In 
the next essay, 1 will turn to an example for such work. 
At the same time, such work helps to tackle the phenomenon of a static 
political perception that emerged in essay three: sratistical accounts can set the 
agenda in an inconspicuous yet powerful way. Yet, a macro-indicator and its 
evaluative interpretation might be salient at only one period in history. Therefore, 
the reigning statistical accounts must be scrutinized periodically regarding their 
continued viability. Accountability institutions must be in a position to take a 
critical historical stance with respect to the history of statistics and the present 
perception of society that history has made possible. 
9. CONCLUSION 
This essay has worked toward a clarification of the place of statistics in political 
society. The goal is to thereby contribute to a poli tic al philosophy of statistics. 
Indeed, in view of the intertwined history of the use of "statistics" as refening 
variously to (possibly secret) information for the ruler, to a (family of) 
mathematical method(s), and to a branch of the administration and its activities, 
such a clarification almost suggests itself. 
To this end, this essay scrutinized the relation between accountability and 
the statistical accounts, which has hard1y received much attention from the 
political philosophers spelling out the vision of co-operation. 1 hope to have 
shown that the relation between accountability and the accounts is more than 
mere1y a linguistic coincidence of the English language. To the contrary, electoral 
research suggests that statistical accounts are used to hold governments 
accountable. And yet, even if the accounts do play thls roIe, everyday 
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understanding of their relation to key concems of political V1Slon are often 
opaque and the suspicion of manipulation and ideology never far - not least 
because the accounts are not just used by citizens, but also by governments. As 
the ex ample of the NRTEE illustrates, there is a tension between these uses that 
calls for a specification of the production of statistics in large democratic 
societies. 
This essay has critically considered proposals that see statistics as the 
product of independent scientific communities and as the product of 
accountability institutions mandated to offer information on the capabilities of 
the majority. While learning from these proposals, l have argued for an approach 
in terms of the vision of society as a system of co-operation. On this view, the 
production of statistics is the task of accountability institutions that are to provide 
independent and assessable information that allow the govemed to hold their 
rulers accountable. The provision of information can be further spelled out in 
terms of the vision of co-operation, and crucially includes the critical assessment 
of existing statistical measures and their relation to the vision of co-operation. 
The goal is to foster the understanding of political society as a system of co-
operation among its members. Regarding the form of the accountability 
institutions, l have accordingly indicated in section seven sorne measures 
intended to specify the form of institutions given the specification of function. 
Notably, this requîres sorne independence from other parts of govemment as 
well as openness to demands and feedback from members of this society in order 
to ensure independent and assessable information. 
The result is an approach to statistics that argues for a shifting of weight 
from the governmentaI-administrative needs - arguably the overwhelming 
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traditional priority - toward the citizens' need to hold their govemment 
accountable. 
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Essay 5 
Political Perception and the Ensemble of 
Macro Objectives and Measures - the Paradox of the 
Index for Sustainable Economic Welfare 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Macroeconomic objectives and measures inform and structure political 
perception in large political systems. The way in wruch they render issues visible 
shapes political questions, the imagination and what decision-makers will be held 
accountable for. This is particularly worthwhile noting in the context of political 
theories and approaches that take the dignity and equal value of persons as basic, 
as trus leads to a presumption of measurement focused on individuals, and 
therefore often does not get macro-measures into view. 
This essay explores one exception to this rule, the critique of the goal and 
measure of economic growth presented by John Cobb and Herman Daly in For 
the Common Good (Daly and Cobb 1990). There is a well-known worry that the 
objective and measure of GDP (Gross Domestic Product) distorts political 
perception in the sense that there is a promise of growth and enhanced well-
being that unduly ignores current costs and long-term consequences for humans, 
animaIs and ecosystems. But if so, how do you critique an existing measure and 
the perception of society and goals it crea tes? 
Daly and Cobb's critique of economic growrh with the help of the Index 
of Sustainable Economie Welfare (ISEW) has found a wide audience; indeed, 
following its initial calculation for the US, the index has since been calculated for 
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many other countries.! However, as this essay will show, Cobb and Daly's work 
on sustaÏnable economic welfare and the reception of their work are paradoxical. 
First of aIl, the authors are proponents of strong sustainability, but as will be seen 
below, with the ISEW they have constructed an index of weak sustaÏnability (I 
will tum to these terms in more detail below). Second, in their extended 
discussion in For the Common Good, Cobb and Daly notably de scribe humans as 
persons-in-community in reaction to what they view as the misguided atomism of 
mainstream economics. But the famous index presented in the appendix of the 
book is constructed on personal consumption. Third, the reception of the book 
is a striking testimony to the importance and politics of numbers. Cobb and 
Daly's critique has had a wide audience, but of the numerous articles that 
appeared in reaction and as further development of their work, to my knowledge, 
aIl focus on the appendix of the work (i.e. the ISEW\ whereas the roughly 500 
pages of the book have received little to no attention. 
Due to this puzzling situation, this essay aims to 1) reconstruct Cobb and 
Daly's criticism of growth as a goal and measure drawing on the book as a whole, 
i.e. on the statistical account as weIl as the political vision. l will present what l 
will caIl the ontological option proposed by the authors, i.e. their person-in-
community approach; 2) to situate the ISEW not only as a scientific tool 
regarding the question of sustainable economic welfare given the problematic 
question of the scale of the economy with respect to the biosphere, but as also 
simultaneously entangled in a different problem of scale: the scale of politics in 
large-scale political systems. Based on this, l will defend the ISEW as a 
debunking indicator that is motivated by the economy-ecology scale problem, and 
that engages in the politics of scale so as to debunk an existing objective and 
1 For information on country studies see Neumayer (2000), and Lawn (2003). 
2 Or on the successor to the ISEW, the Genuine Progress Indicator. 
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measure. Debunking does not imply that the tool used for debunking (the ISEW) 
is independently also a sustainability index. Cri tics, who do not see this and 
expect a sustainability index, are therefore likely to see contradictions, but not the 
critical role the ISEW can play for democratic accountability. Taking into account 
the two problems of sc ale therefore makes it possible to endorse the ISEW and 
related indices in full awareness of their shortcomings as a step in the evolution 
of political perception and action. 
2. LEGITlMACY, ACCOUNTABIUTY AND 
OBJECTIVES/MEASURES 
In its Lisbon strategy, the European Council states the EU's political goal "to 
become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and 
greater social cohesion" (European Council 2000). Progress towards these goals 
is measured by so called structural indicators that allow monitoring the objectives 
stated above. For the objective of sustainable economic growth, we find GDP 
among the structural indicators. 
What kind of objective is sustainable economic growth? In its White Paper 
on Governance, the European Commission identifies the need for "clear policies 
and objectives" (European Commission 2001: 28). For economic objectives the 
White Paper points to the Lisbon strategy (European Commission 2001: 28). But 
in the latter, the adjective "sustainable" in sustainable economic growth remains 
unexplained, whereas "economic growth" is mainly "clarified" by repeatedly 
stacing the objective rather than giving reasons for it. Growth is stated as an 
objective throughout the presidency conclusions of the Lisbon strategy 
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(European Council2000: §§ 3, 5, 6, 8, 12, 18,20,22,23,32,35). To be sure, with 
respect to the goals of the Lisbon strategy and the exercise of power necessary to 
work towards them, the presidency conclusions state that "the Union must shape 
these changes in a manner consistent with its values and concepts of society ... " 
(European Council2000: §1), Yet the presidency conclusions just mention values 
in general, but do not make a link between the economic performance objective 
and these values. In fact, the document indirectly reveals growth to be a means 
rather than an objective. §32 states that the "new knowledge-based society offers 
tremendous potential for reducing social exclusion, ... by creating the economic 
conditions for greater prosperity through higher levels of growth and 
employment ... " Perhaps then, the "real" goal is prosperiry? But what would be 
meant by that? Whatever the answer to this difficult question, the Lisbon strategy 
certainly illustrates the entanglement of objectives and indicators, goals and 
measures in this large system of governance. 
What might be the implication of these conclusions for the legitimate 
exerClse of power? In Fritz W. Scharpf's terminology, input legitimary refers to 
political legitimacy Vla processes of participation and consensus. But input 
legitimacy is notoriously difficult to achieve in societies of a large size and where 
views differ widely, as is in particular the case in large and/or newly established 
political units such as the EU that may not be able to draw on a sense of cultural, 
linguistic or political identity and habit. In this case, Scharpf argues, output 
legitimary cornes to play an important role. It is based on shared interests that 
require collective solutions, but no strong sense of identity (Scharpf 1999, 18ft). 
Accordingly, he argues that output legitimacy plays an important role for the EU 
(Scharpf 1999,21). In this light, the growth objective just discussed could be seen 
as an example of output legitimation. But as noted in essay four, objectives and 
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measures also play a role for democratic accountability in nation states, where 
electoral research suggests that voters assess the performance of governments 
with the help of economic and social indicators. 1 
However, if objectives and measures such as economic growth play a role 
for the legitimacy and accountability of large-scale systems of govemance, and 
especially as they help establish, stabilize and make objective agendas that are 
there to stay for more than the short run, their long-run viability is of evident 
importance if potentially disasttous outcomes are to be avoided. It is not least the 
concern that the objective and measure of economic growth does not meet this 
condition that prompts Cobb and Daly's intervention, which l will now tum to. 
3. THE ONTOLOGICAL OPTION 
The brief discussion of the Lisbon strategy in the last section showed how 
difficult it is to fmd justification for macro objectives and measures, rather than 
merely their repeated statement. In For the Common Good, Cobb and Daly develop 
what l will calI an ontological option for thinking about the legitimacy and 
accountability of power. The ontological option brings to attention issues that are 
of basic importance, that con cern our basic understanding of being, but which 
are precisely for that reason usually simply assumed and taken for granted. For 
this reason, the ontological option can help "structure the field of possibilities in 
a more perspicuous way" (Taylor 1995, 183). 
Cobb and Daly, long before they present their index, labour to develop a 
description of what they call our being persons-in-community. Their work is 
meant to show how some approaches, at least if taken in a universalizing manner, 
1 See essay four, section three ff. 
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are simply parochlal, and hence potentially problematic, if they dominate thlnking 
about political goals and their measures. Put in the above terms, Daly and Cobb 
aim to "structure the field of possibilities in a more perspicuous way" for the 
development and scrutiny of visions, objectives and measures. 
It is a characteristic feature of ontological approaches to argue against, or 
more precisely, to resituate a prevailing understanding. Thus, as Heidegger 
labours to reveal the derivate standing of the "present-to-hand-understanding" of 
human beings, Cobb and Daly target what they view as the dominant 
understanding of economic actors as defined by neo-classical economics. They 
argue against a narrow conception of the self in the latter, and show how 
neoclassical goals and their measures are flawed once the structure of the 
ontological field is made explicit. 
As we will see, they aim to establish a narrow-self thesis and a misperception 
thesis respectively. To this end, they develop an account of the self as a person-in-
community and, eventually, the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare. Let me 
turn first to the authors' ontological approach and then to the discussion of this 
index, its contribution to political perception and action, and the paradoxical 
questions it raises. 
4. PERSON-IN-COMMUNITY 
As the authors target their critique against neoclassical economics, we encounter 
a well-known villain: Homo Economicus, which Cobb and Daly argue, 
misleadingly describes important features of human beings (Daly and Cobb 1990, 
86f). Human well-being, they argue, is not just a matter of consumption-derived 
individual preference satisfaction as the proponents of Homo Economics would 
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have it, but importantly related to the preference satisfaction of others. To be 
sure, it might be argued that "keeping up with the Jones" is a petty preference to 
have, and ought not to influence the well-being of a mature person - but that 
argument requires a value judgment, and Homo Economicus is supposed to be 
beyond the good and evil of preference evaluation. For the authors, the result of 
this supposed value-neutrality is an "extreme individualism" (Daly and Cobb 
1990, 87) that effectively amounts to a preference of independence and personal 
freedom over other values (Daly and Cobb 1990, 92). Rather than thinking of 
society as an aggregate of individuals with given preferences, they propose to 
replace this description "with an image of Homo Economicus as person-in-
community" (Daly and Cobb 1990, 159). Let me first tum to the communiry aspect 
of person-in-communiry. 
In order to qualify as a community, relationships between community 
members must be such that they contribute to self-identification. Daly and Cobb 
understand this first of ali to require consciousness "of the relationship ... of its 
limits, and ... of its differences from other similar relationships" (Daly and Cobb 
1990, 172). Second, decision-making in the community must involve the 
extensive participation of ali its members in the decisions by which its life is 
governed. Third, the community as a whole takes responsibility for its members, 
which fourth must be understood to include due respect for the "diverse 
individuality of its members" (Daly and Cobb 1990, 172). 
Somewhat surprisingly, the authors cali community one "form of society" 
(Daly and Cobb 1990, 171). Does this mean that other forms of society are 
possible? Is for example a "fragmented" or "atomistic" society of rational 
preference-maximisers a possibility? What then about the ontological status of 
the proposed concept of a "person-in-community"? Does this concept refer to a 
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possibility of being a person, alongside other possibilities such as atom-in-
preference-land? Is a normative neo-classical notion of the self to be replaced by 
a normative communal one? Or is the concept rather intended as an articulation 
of the self that is stable across various types of society? 
It is clear that the authors intend to develop a mode! that is of general 
applicability (and thus also in circumstances in wruch the "community" is under 
strain). Their basic point is that "persons are intemally related to one another (i.e. 
their re!ationships defme their identities as persons)" (Daly and Cobb 1990, 169). 
Therefore a qualification of their presentation is needed. The formulation 
"community as one form of society" is misleading, and probably an unintended 
concession to the Homo Economicus idea. Community, in the technical sense in 
which it is used here, is not one possible type of society; rather, all societies meet 
the community criteria to various degrees. Person-in-community requîres a scalar 
community concept.1 On the one hand, we can imagine a (presumably small) 
polis or village that meets all four criteria to a very high degree; whereas on the 
other hand a large-scale market democracy might score particularly low in the areas 
of participation and community responsibility.2 
Is this an adequate reading? Let me turn to the person in "person-in-
community." Cobb and Daly's main criticism of Homo Economicus is that as a 
description of persons it views individuals as merely "capable of relating 
1 The term is used in democratic theory; see for instance Frank Cunningham (Cunningam 2002) 
2 However, even with this attempt to rescue the ontological status of Daly and Cobb's person-in-
communiry approach, problems rernain. Especially conspicuous will be the requirernent of 
"extensive participation." If participation is understood widely rather than narrowly as specifically 
political participation, then there is a prospect of a scalar reading here as weIl, although admittedly 
it remains strained. 
Note also the relation between their description of self-identification and the discussion of co-
operation in essay one. As Cobb and Daly understand self-identification primarily in terms of a 
consciousness of the relationships within the community, a system of fair co-operation in the 
Rawlsian could be interpreted as a specifie modification of large-scale comrnunity. No doubt, 
these are no more than indications. But 1 hope they suffice for the present purpose, which is to 
outline Daly and Cobb's general approach given the prevailing "appendix-reading" of their work. 
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themselves to others in diverse ways, basicaily either in benevolence or in self-
love, but they are not constituted by these relationships or by any others. They 
exist in fundamental separation from one another, and from this position and 
separateness they relate" (Daly and Cobb 1990, 160). But, Cobb and Daly argue, 
persons are constituted by the relationships that they are involved in, in the sense 
that only the background of these relationships gives their doings and choices 
meaning. 'We come into being in and through relationships and have no identity 
apart from them. . . How we think and feel, what we want and dislike, our 
aspirations and fears - in short, who we are - ail come into being sociaily" (Daly 
and Cobb 1990, 161). Thus the daim is not that people cannot make choices or 
change sorne of their views and standing within a community, but rather that 
choice and change only becomes meaningful in a social context. 
Consequently, they arrive at the naTTOw-selfthesis. In their view, the concept 
of Homo Economicus fails as a concept that is true to who we are as social 
beings. Consequently, there is a danger that the use of Homo Economics for the 
development of political goals willlead to policies that remain blind to, and that 
will distort important features of persons and their communities. Homo 
Economicus is "an abstraction that ... cannot provide adequate guidance for 
policy" (Daly and Cobb 1990, 86). 
5. ECONOMIC ACTIVIlY AND ECONOMIC WELFARE 
How does structuring the field of possibilities in terms of the person-in-
community concept prepare a critique of existing objectives and measures and 
their legitimacy and accountability? Daly and Cobb argue that the narrow-self 
thinking paves the way of, and thereby legitimises, a particular road to freedom 
155 
belonging to an outlook that takes a partial measure of economic activity as an 
indicator for economic well-being (and sometimes even for total human-well-
being). "This ... view of reality govems the influential measures of welfare 
employed by economists. Per capita gross national product is the total production 
of the nation divided by the number of people in the country. It ignores the 
human relationships that make up so much of what is prized in life. Similarly per 
capita gross world product is the total world product divided by the population 
of the world. It ignores the diversity of cultural and national societies" (Daly and 
Cobb 1990, 162). 
On the one hand, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), i.e. the objective and 
measure on which the authors focus their criticism, serves as a measure of 
economic activity that attempts to account for ail the goods and services 
produced within a country. On the other hand, GDP plays an important role in 
poli tics as it is taken to be an indicator for an economic process that contributes to 
well-being. Politicians pay much attention to this indicator. It is perhaps the 
single most important example for the way in which a statistical measure can be 
both a cognitive and normative commitment in modem systems of govemance: it 
defmes the phenomenon, and it de facto tends to prescrihe directions and 
policies, which decision-makers ought to follow as a matter of output legitimacy, 
and that they will be held accountable for. 
However, stepping back from the effective role of GDP as a measure and 
objective, there is the question whether here a measure of economic activity and 
a measure regarding the contribution of the economy to the well-being of its 
members are not implausihly identified. It can only be answered, if at least 
initially the latter task is kept conceptually distinct from the task of measuring 
economic activity. While scrutiny of the accounting method of GDP with the 
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help of the person-in-commuruty concept might be expected to already provide 
sufficient reasons for rejecting the role of GDP as an indicator for economic 
welfare, Cobb and Daly attempt to go further and to so to speak show in kind, 
i.e. in the statisticallanguage of an index, the limitations and consequent errors of 
the belief that the measure of economic activity can serve as an indicator of 
economic welfare. l t is this aspect of their work, which has received so many 
reactions. Before tuming to the ISEW in more detail in the next section, let me 
briefly tum to the interpretation of their and subsequent ISEW calculations. 
The calculations of the ISEW in various countries have been interpreted 
as suggesting that positive development of GDP cannot be taken as an indicator 
for improved economic welfare in general, but can at best serve as su ch an 
indicator in a particular stage of the development of economies. The calculations 
indicate that once a certain level of economic activity has been attained, there is a 
de-linking of economic welfare (as indicated by the ISEW) and economic activity 
(as measured by GDP). While GDP might grow further, economic welfare as 
indicated by the ISEW stagnates or even declines. This hypothesis has become 
known as the "threshold hypothesis" t, and has been examined for various 
countries. 
As a result, the ISEW leads to the misperception thesis. Economic growth as 
a criterion of output legitimacy is not a plausible indicator of economic welfare 
tout court; and as justifications of economic growth based on the idea of growth 
as an indicator of welfare lose in plausibility, so does growth as an objective. But 
note that even though Cobb and Daly prepare the misperception thesis by laying out 
the structure of the ontological field, e.g. the description of the self as a person-
in-community, the main way in which Cobb and Daly's misperception the sis has 
t As far as 1 know, the tenn was coined by Max-Neef 1995. 
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been noted in the literature is in terms of the ISEW (and its subsequent further 
calculations) rather than directly in terms of the person-in-community account. 
Let me therefore tum to the ISEW in more detail. 
6. THE INDEX OF SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC WELFARE 
Cobb and Daly distinguish between the question "wh ether growth in the 
economy as measured by GNp l actually contributes to the total well-being cf 
people"(Daly and Cobb 1990, 63 italics added), and the question "about the 
relation of GNP to economic wetfare itse!f' (Daly and Cobb 1994, 64, italics added). 
The purpose of the index is explicitly defioed in relation to the second question.2 
But if economic welfare is the indicandum, what then is meant by economic 
welfare? 
Economic welfare, Daly and Cobb state, is a matter of consumption 
(Daly and Cobb 1994, 77). Yet, as not all consumption is desirable, the authors 
deduct regrettable necessities that are the result of other acts of production (Daly 
and Cobb 1990, 79).3 And the authors add an estimate for the services obtained 
through household labour; an adjustment for income distribution; and a tax on 
the consumption of non-renewables (so as to take into account the damage done 
to the natural environment, and the costs of this to future generations). For Cobb 
and Daly economic welfare can therefore be indicated in monetary terms and 
based on personal consumption. The monetary deductions and additions to 
1 GNP is another member of the family of national accounting measures. It also includes profits 
from capital held abroad. 
2 Conceming the first question see section 3.5: "Towards a Measure of Total Human Welfare" 
(Costanza, Cumberland, Daly, Goodland and Norgaard 1997, 135ff) and Daly and Farley (2004, 
Chapter 13). 
3 The assumption is that there are "normal baseline environmental conditions of cold, rain, and so 
on" (Daly and Cobb 1994, 78), which must be counted as normal consumption; regrettable 
consumption is consumption made necessary by the unwanted side effects of production. An 
example in the index would be the cost of commuting. 
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personal consumption are meant to provide a more accurate picture of economic 
welfare. So what about this measure of economic welfare? 
Recall that the move from Homo Economicus to person-in-community 
was meant to alert us not to bracket the whole of relationships that are important 
for self-understanding, preference formation and well-being. Consequently, the 
ISEW conceptualisation of economic welfare in terms of personal consumption 
cornes as a surprise. After all, the subject-object structure of consumption 
renders secondary the relation ship s said to be constitutive of persons-in-
community. Consumption brackets relationships at work, recognition and 
stigmatisation, and more generally the social fabric of the production and 
consumption process. These features of economic welfare are not even "added" 
to the consumption base, contrary to the fact that consumption can go up, but 
work relations deteriorate (or conversely recognition via workplace democracy 
may increase, but income decrease).l 
This puzzling situation also does not change, if we turn from the construction 
of the index to the justifications given for the choice of additions, and the way 
1 Such index problems have also been discussed following Rawls' difference principle and the 
index Rawls associates with it (See Krouse and McPherson 1988; Van Parijs 2003). They put into 
doubt the saliency of the ISEW as the index of sustainable economic welfare; and they do so 
against the background of accounts of persons and communities, which Daly and Cobb Oust as 
Rawlsians) view as necessary prerequisites for all questions of index construction. Mutatis 
mutandis, the argument also applies to the successor of the ISEW, the Genuine Progress Index. 
This index adds further considerations such as the costs of crime and the dependence on foreign 
assets, but it is heir to the ISEW in that is based on personal consumption: "The GPI starts with 
the same personal consumption data the GDP is based on, but then makes sorne crucial 
distinctions. " 
(http://www .redefrningprogress.orgl newprograms 1 sustIndi/ gpil gpi_contents.shtml. Last 
retrieved 18.03.2006). ArguabIy, the switch from an index of sustainable economic welfare to the, 
1 think, much larger issue of genuine progress makes the critical points raised in the paragraph 
even more obvious. The GPI may be a more extended index (and the ISEW a stepping stone to 
it), but the conceptual problem of an Index based on personal consumption has remained the 
same. This being said, there are two caveats: 1) The argument above assumes the person-in-
community account, but proponents of the GPI may reject this account. If so, further discussion 
would be required. (However, to my knowledge no work expounding a rival view to that of Daly 
and Cobb has been published by the advocates of the GPI). 2) The very name "GPI" suggests a 
quite different, political debunking intention. 1 turn to this intention and its democratic role in 
section 8. 1 thank an anonymous referee of Environmental Values for pointing out the need to 
discuss the G PI in this context. 
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they are added. Due to the authors' criticism of neoclassical economics, it is 
surprising to fmd out that the proposed new index is "built on the 
accomplishments" (Daly and Cobb 1990,401) of such economists as Nordhaus 
and Tobin, who endorse the view of economics criticised throughout the work of 
Cobb and Daly. Moreover, community and the concept of person-in-community 
play no explicit role even when it cornes to justifications for addenda to the 
Nordhaus/Tobin work. Consider the argument for the inclusion of income 
distribution: ''We have factored in income distribution on the assumption that an 
addition al thousand dollars in income adds more to the welfare of a poor family 
than it does to a rich family" (Daly and Cobb 1990, 402). The argument rests on 
the principle of marginal utility, and thus the ide a that there is a decreasing utility 
to each addition al unit of a commodity. It does no! rely on an argument based on 
community and the person-in-community. There is no justification in terms of 
equality considerations as a demand of democratic communities. 
Pinally, Cobb and Daly are advocates of strong sustainability (Daly and 
Cobb 1990, Chapter 3; also DalY 1995). They argue that natural capital is in 
important respects a complement rather than a supplement to economic capital! 
and that there are important limits to substitutability of resources and 
ecosystems.2 And yet, as Eric Neumayer has pointed out, the ISEW falls in the 
weak sustainability paradigm (Neumayer 2003, Chapter 5). The aggregation 
technique used in the index indirecdy implies that natural, man-made and social 
1 For a critical exploration of the notion of capital in this context see Hoiland 1999. 
2 It is difficult to pin down the contested distinction between weak and strong sustainable 
development in a few words. Weak sustainable development is frequently understood as the 
requirement that total (monetary or utility) value be maintained coupled with the belief that 
improvements in technology ailow goods and services to be produced drawing on different 
andf or less natural capital over rime so that scarce natural resources can generally be substituted 
for. In contrast, advocates of strong sustainable development argue that natural capital must be 
maintained because it is on the whole irreplaceable and therefore a complement rather than a 
substitute in the economic process. For a book length discussion see Neumayer 2003. 
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factors are substitutable (i.e. an increase in resource depletion can be offset by an 
increase in personal consumption).l 
In short, the ISEW is not systematically built from the approach 
developed in For the Common Good. The extensive prior development of person-in-
community and their place in the world informs their construction and 
justification of the Index only to a limited extent. As a ftrst conclusion therefore, 
even though Daly and Cobb prepare the grounds for a critique of the objective 
and measure of economic growth, their fmal demonsttation seems to draw 
surprisingly little on their prior discussion. And this in tum may exp Iain why 
critics dismiss the ISEW as an artefact of the assumptions going into the index 
(Neumayer 1999) and the result of the "personal beliefs" of the authors 
(Giampietto and Mayumi 2001, 16). 
Against the background of the person-in-community account, this 
criticism still seems to hold for a recent theoretical defence of the ISEW in reply 
to such criticism. In his outline of the theoretical foundations of the ISEW (and 
related indexes), Philip Lawn draws on Irving Fisher's concept of income and 
capital (Lawn 2003, lllt). On this view, the ISEW brings together all types of 
capital that contribute services to the "psychic income" or "utility satisfaction" of 
consumers. Welfare becomes a "psychic flux," and it is therefore hard to see why 
a "pleasure machine" - symbol of faith in technological progress - could not Just 
as weIl enhance economic welfare. In short, this defence in terms of the psychic 
flux of individuals likewise stands in tension with the description of person-in-
community. 
1 In bis defence of the ISEW and related indexes, Philip Lawn recognises the problem, and 
suggests a satellite account of natural capital as a supplement (Lawn 2003, 115) 
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And yet, the preparatory work on person-in-community does achieve 
something. It highlights how intricate the development of an indicator for 
economic welfare really is. If Cobb and Daly's community structure is recalled -
their emphasis of the consciousness of community relations, participation, 
communal responsibility for the members and respect for individuality - an 
approach based on one monetary value for personal consumption appears 
questionable in spite of all refinement with items for distribution al inequality, 
services (household, consumer durables, streets), public expenditure on health & 
education, expenditure on consumer durables, defensive private expenditures on 
health and education, costs of commuting, of pollution control, auto accidents, 
and the cost of various environmental damages (loss of wetlands, of farmlands, 
costs of ozone depletion). How are these items to account for respect at the work 
place? For participation possibilities in the economic process? Or for the 
members' consciousness of the relationships in the production process? The gap 
between person-in-community and the Index and its account of sustainable 
economic welfare suggests the need for a reconsideration of its role. Is the ISEW, 
perhaps, a tongue-in-cheek-indicator, bringing out the problem with one 
monetary index as an indicator for the elusive concept of welfare? 1s it a serious 
attempt to debunk, but a not so serious attempt to "really" measure welfare? Let 
me in the next section first tum to the first conclusion and in the subsequent 
section to the reconsideration just indicated. 
7. A CONVENTION-FOLLOWING FALLACY? 
Cobb and Daly single out the objective and measure of economic growth as a 
basic legitimacy and accountability criterion in large-scale systems of governance. 
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This criterion has become a cognitive and normative commitment more resilient 
than particular governments and endorsed across parties and countries. The 
examp1e of the strategy endorsed by the leaders of the EU shows that it is not 
even necessary to provide reasons for this objective and measure. Its critical 
scrutiny is therefore aIl the more important for democratic accountability. 
Even though Daly and Cobb initially approach the task systematically in a 
way that develops conditions of agency and that suggests a rich perspective from 
which to think about questions of objectives and measures, they in the end do 
not appear to follow through this approaeh. Faced with the measure and 
objective of economic growth, they develop one alternative index. The need to 
produce an alternative measure seems so strong that it leads to the almost 
complete bracketing of their prior work on person-in-community, its emphasis 
on communal structure and the consequent question mark behind any attempt to 
capture economic welfare with one, monetary numeraire based on consumption. 
Their alternative index seems to commit them to the assumption that it makes 
sense to indicate sustainable eeonomic welfare with one, monetary measure. 
As the authors therefore end up doing in no small part what they criticise 
elsewhere, they seem to commit a eonvention-following fallacy. In this spirit, 
Clifford W. Cobb observes that "alternative measures have thus paid economics 
the highest form of flattery: they have imitated the framework being criticised. 
This is most evident in the case of indices that expanded the GDP by adjusting 
for non-market transactions, but retaining the monetary valuation system. The 
Measure of Economie Welfare ... was the first of these extended accounts. The 
Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare or ISEW used the same framework and 
ineorporated environmental factors and income distribution" (Cobb 2000, 8). 
And Mario Giampietro and Kozo Mayumi in their discussion of eeological 
163 
economics and the ISEW speak of "the risk of carrying neo-classical economics' 
epistemological problems into the field of ecological economics, even when 
attempting to do the right thing" (Giampietro and Mayumi 2001, 11). 
This fallacy-charge considers the index in its scientific (economic), but 
not yet in its political, historical context, or so l will suggest below. The charge 
makes it tempting to conclude that such one-size-fits-all measure as GDP or the 
ISEW should simply be ignored; at least as long as they are taken to "indicate" or 
"measure" what they neither are capable of capturing, nor what they strictly 
speaking have been developed for. GDP is a measure of economic activity, not of 
we!fare, or so Cobb and Daly's critics insist (Neumayer 1999, 79). Indeed, official 
sources confirm this view: "Neither gross nor domestic product is a measure of 
welfare. Domestic product is an indicator of overall production activity" (CEC et 
al. 1993,41). 
However, politically speaking, this is not ttue. The measure is taken as an 
indicator for welfare, and the "just-a-measure-of-activity" stance therefore 
implausible in practice. Daly and Cobb started their work precisely because GDP 
is an accepted cognitive and normative commitment, and see the task as 
developing another index to debunk GDP.I Not to commit the convention-
following fallacy does not do away with the convention. lndeed, even such a lucid 
critic of the ISEW as Neumayer indirectly acknowledges this when he writes 
elsewhere that he "doubts whether one could succeed in preventing policy 
makers, the media and the general public From misusing GNP as a welfare 
indicator. Unfortunately, the welfare interpretation of GNP has become absolute 
folklore and a commonplace" (Neumayer 2003, 196). 
1 Daly calls the ISEW a strategy to debunk GDP (personal communication). 
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So what does it take to effectively criticise the interpretation of a measure 
that is already widely available, endowed with the objectivity of statistical method, 
and stabilised by its regular calculation in statistical agencies around the world?l 
8. THE SCALE OF THE ECONOMY AND 
THE POLITICS OF SCALE 
Cobb and Daly see the problem with the existing measure and objective of 
economic growth as a problem of truthful depiction.2 From a sustainability 
perspective of most importance, it does not address the question of the 
economy-ecology scale, i.e. to what extent economic activity develops on a path 
that does not overuse the ecosystems in which economic production is 
embedded. In a famous passage, Daly writes that "to avoid overloading and 
sinking even a well-balanced boat we have a Plimsoll line defming the absolute 
scale limit. But the boat can be weIl or badly balanced even when the water line is 
far below the Plimsoll mark, and if the water line is above the Plimsoll mark, 
rearranging the load will be only a small help. Economists who are obsessed with 
allocation to the exclusion of scale really deserve the environmentalists criticism 
that they are busy rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic" (Daly 1990, 92). 
What is needed, Daly suggests, is a measure, a Plimsoll line that does not fail to 
address the question of scale. 
As the Greek kybernan means to steer or pilot a ship, the metaphor of the 
Plimsoll line recalls an old governance metaphor. 3 Today, we could say, 
1 Its wide calculation in most countries, the relatively sirnilar manner of calculation in each 
country, and its regular calculation are sometimes cites as arguments in favour of GDP as an 
indicator. 
2 Personal communication with Herman Daly. 
3 See Cohen 1971,5 
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sustainability indicators must provide a compass for politically guided 
development. Indeed, Cobb and Daly write that the ISEW "give[s] guidance to 
those interested in promoting economic welfare" (Daly and Cobb 1990, 401). 
Indicators offer the "cap tain" some orientation, and the image of the Plimsoll 
line specificaIly draws attention to the task of "drawing the (correct) line" with 
respect to the scale of the economy to the biosphere. 
However, pointing out the govemance context does not yet clarify why 
anyone would address questions of economic welfare or of scale in this wqy. Why 
propose an index? Is this way of approaching the question of scale reaIly that 
obvious, in particular given the person-in-community approach? In search for an 
answer, we must, l think, tum from questions concerning the scale of the 
economy with respect to the biosphere to a quite different problem of scale: the 
politics of scale in large political societies. 
RecaIl that the second feature of the community-concept proposed by 
Cobb and Daly is extensive participation of ail members. Yet, it is notoriously 
difficult to ensure extensive participation in large societies: they are not 
democracies where "each citizen can easily know ail the others" (Rousseau 
1762/1987: Book 3, Chapter 4), but to the contrary face a serious information 
problem conceming others, their problems and proposaIs, their needs and wants. 
In this situation, statistics acquires an important role as a "technology of 
distance" (porter 1995). Statistical accounts, and the indicators they give rise to, 
are usuaIly the product of the labour of trained people following standardized 
rules of statistiCal methods. This production makes available facts endowed with 
the objectivity of statistical methods and thereby a source of trust that helps set 
aside a number of questions. With and through statistics issues conceming 
society become available, the subject of discussion, and of governmental and 
166 
administrative action. Conversely, citizens rely on statistics ta hold government 
accountable and to push for issues in between elections in a way that shows these 
issues of more than anecdotal, private relevance (e.g. use of statistics on traffie 
accidents, life-expectancy and the like). 
Now, if issues are expressed with, or draw on statistics in large-scale 
societies, then this framing also affects those critical of current ways of 
govemance. Politicians, activists or scientists aiming to validate their point of 
view will have to consider their stance with respect to, and their use of this 
technology of distance. It is all well to criticise GDP on conceptual grounds, but 
these efforts also remain arguments that do not attain the objectivity of that 
which is criticised - not the existing measures empirical reach, which continue to 
be calculated and refmed. l would therefore argue that political scale provides a 
clue why critics such as Cobb and Daly choose to complete their criticism of the 
objective and measure of growth with an alternative index - and why reactions to 
their work tend to focus almost exclusively on the appendix with its index. 
However, due to the considerations in the preceding sections, l would 
argue that the primary role of the index is to de-bunk - or in Daly's metaphor: 
throw the sleepers in the titanic out of their bunks, in a way that speaks the 
empirical and objective language of statistics as a technology of distance in large 
societies, the language that captains and passengers expect and are used to 
communicate with. But on the reading proposed here, this is also to say that the 
index is no more than a tool of de-bunking, and that it might be just "so much 
bunk" if considered as an objective tool for the measurement of economic 
welfare. This at any rate suggests itself, if the person-in-community approach is 
taken seriously. To be sure, the statisticallanguage fosters the expectation that the 
debunking tool is itself an objective measure. Yet, this need not be the case, or 
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else it would be impossible to argue with numbers that something simply cannot 
be measured or cannot be reasonably indicated by one number. 
Finally, the debunking interpretation raises one last point conceming the 
critical discussion of the ISEW. Many critics do not draw a distinction between 
different uses. They then arrive at the conclusion that the ISEW considered as an 
objective indicator seems to be just so much "bunk," but fail to see its role for 
"debunk." While the person-in-community approach provides the reasons for 
debunking the interpretation of GDP as an indicator of welfare, it does not imply 
the need for one alternative, monetary indicator.1 It is, l think, much more 
plausible to take from the person-in-community account and its critique of GDP 
with the help of the ISEW 1) the need for special sustainability indicators so as to 
deal with the complex question regarding the relation of communities with 
respect to the biosphere (in a way that is sensitive to the politics of scale)2 and 2) 
a strong sense that an exclusive focus on the "one number" is severely distorting. 
Its pursuit would be a kind of "general convention following-fallacy" that so to 
speak runs the risks of putting all efforts in the objective measurement of 
(Physical or monetary) footprints at the cost of analyzing the action that left them 
behind (and of ignoring the interesting analysis of these actions already offered in 
the body of For the Common Good). 
9. CONCLUSION 
The influence of statistiCal measures, in particular macroeconomic ones, is a fact 
of contemporary large political societies: they shape political perception, and 
consequently play a role for the legitimacy and accountability of power in these 
1 Except, of course, for debunking. 
2 Something 1 will turn to in the next es say. 
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societies. This essay has considered the critique of one large-scale objective and 
measure, economic growth, wruch is at the heart of many controversies over the 
meaning and possibility of sustainable development. 
Rather than focusing the discussion exclusively on the macro level and its 
objectives and measures, 1 have tried to reeonstruet the ontological option that 
Cobb and Daly develop in For the Common Good. The person-in-eommunity 
approaeh aims to clarify the space of possibilities, and accordingly the spaee of 
possibilities and issues that need to be eonsidered when dealing with, and even 
more so when measuring, questions of agency and being. Person-in-community, 
strongly resonant as it is with communitarian approaches as well as many liberal 
egalitarian approaches Ce.g. those approaches that acknowledge the importance of 
community, but without thereby claiming that the person is entirely determined 
in its ehoices by the community), provides a space for thinking about the 
objectives and measures in large societies, and especially about the often opaque 
relation between objective and measure in politics of scale. 
The reeonsideration of trus starting point of Cobb and Daly's approach 
has been motivated by the almost exclusive foeus paid to the ISEW, or what 
could be called to the appendix-reading of their work. In its place, l have tried to 
explore an approach that is convention-sensitive, but aims to avoid convention-
fallacies. More specifically, 1 have argued that the issue of scale, wrueh the 
sustainable economie welfare index addresses, is not just a scÏentific question 
about the relation and size of the economy with respect to the biosphere. Taking 
the ISEW as an objective measure of sustainable economic welfare is indeed 
counter-Întuitive on the person-in-community aecount. Rather, there is a second 
issue of scale, that of politics, wruch has its own means of communication and 
representation. Here statisties plays a role as a teehnology of distance for 
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establisrung legitimacy and accountability. Consequendy, the power and the need 
to communicate in this language become apparent (at least where the issues are 
strongly statistically pre-structured as in the case of GDP), and also why the 
appendix, rather than the proper body of Cobb and Daly's book has received so 
much attention. 
Analytically separate, is the further daim that the ISEW is best considered 
as a de-bunking indicator. In terms of Cobb and Daly's work the reason 
suggested for thinking so are the evident tensions produced by the ISEW given 
the general approach of the authors. They are in favour of strong sustainability, 
and yet the ISEW is an index of weak sustainability; they describe the person-in-
community, and yet the ISEW is based on personal consumption. Stepping back 
from the work of the authors, the idea seems peculiar that sustainability requires 
"one number" - a plurality of sustainability indicators (as well as other measures) 
just seems likely to be more accurate given the complexity of the 
economy / ecology relation and the scale of politics. Therefore l have argued that 
the ISEW has an interescing, if paradoxical, role as a debunking index. It 
undermines certain belief in an exiscing objective/ measure of large systems of 
governance, but it is also "just that" - as "that" it is reaIly quite important. 
If the ISEW can therefore be seen as a contribution to an effective 
critique of a dominant sodetal mode of perceiving development, its ftnal 
contribution may be its limitations as "only" a debunking index. These limitations 
make it a natural stepping stone to seek improved indicator systems. In the next 
essay l will turn to an interescing proposal regarding the latter. 
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Essay 6 
Ec(c)o-Spazio! 
On the Operationalisation of Sustainable Development 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Sustainability is ail about growth, and about seeing nature as a resource with a 
narrowly defined purpose. Or so it appears, if we tum to what is commonly held 
to be the modem origin of the term sustainability in German forestry and its 
Nachhaltigkeit [Sustainability].1 The development of scientific forestry in the late 
eighteenth century Prussia and Saxony served the state's interest in revenue. This 
interest was developed systematicaily with the help of a scientific forestry that 
viewed the forest primarily as a natural resource thereby reducing the diversity of 
the forest and its many uses to the function of timber provision. Things could be 
simplified by focusing on timber and leaving aside ail unnecessary brushes and 
whatever other living beings inhabited the forest, but even more so by reshaping 
the forest in a way that would make it less diverse, easier to count, and therefore 
more manageable - or so it was hoped. The approach pursued the "utopian 
dream of scientific forestry" (Scott 1998, 19): to produce a sustainable and 
maximaily efficient yield of timber. 
Sustainable development is a political concept that political visions for the 
21 st century must address one way or the other. The concept is not only global 
1 The account of scientific forestry in this paragraph follows James Scott (Scott 1998, 11ff). The 
sustainability literature often refers back to forestry, but there is rarely an appreciation of the 
developments described by Scott. Scott himself does not make a link to the current sustainable 
development discourse in his chapter on scientific forestry, but the connection is fairly clear as 
will become apparent. 
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and future-oriented, but it also links the se concems inextricably with the way 
human societies live in and from the natural environment.1 
And yet, sustainable development seems mostly about talking. Even 
though sus tain able development has been endorsed widely, there is a corn mon 
sentiment that "sustainable development has not happened," that there is a need 
to fmally "walk the talk" and to put sustainable development into action. In this 
situation, eco-spac/ has been advanced since the beginning of the 1990ies as one 
way to operationalise sustainable development. The concept promises 
measurements delineating boundaries of resource use, and of emission and waste 
production that are rigorous and less subject to ideological hijacking and green-
washing manifestos. It has been advocated primarily by economists, 
envÏronmental scientists, and civil society groups,3 but political philosophers have 
recently also claimed the relevance of eco-space for issues of justice (Hayward 
2006). 
This essay examines a relation that is basic to the proposal, but has so far 
received surprisingly little direct attention. What operationalisation of sustainable 
development does the eco-space proposal seek? Let me motivate the question 
with two introductory observations. First, eco-space already con tains an idea of 
operationalisation in that it proposes various measurements that allow the 
1 A by now common starting point for discussion of sustainable development is the Brundtland-
definition: "Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs It contains within it two 
key concepts: 
the concept of 'needs', in particular the essential needs of the worlds poor, to which 
overriding priority should be given, and 
the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the 
environments ability to meet present and future needs" (World Commission on 
Environment Development 1987, 43). 
For a critical survey see Lélé 1991, for extended discussion see Diefenbacher 2001, for a critique 
of the "sustainability school" and of "Brundtland's sustainability" see respectively Brown 2001 
and Gosseries 2005. 
2 In the literature one can find "eco-space", "environmental space", "ecological utilization space" 
without any distinctions being made. 1 will use "eco-space" as an umbrella term, and point out 
more specifie proposals as we go along. 
3 See section 2. 
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delineation of the boundaries of eco-space. Operationalisation in this sense is one 
way to make a concept determinate that has been proposed for the natural and 
social sciences.1 Instructions concerning the delineation of the space and the 
testing of its boundaries allow the formation of the eco-space concept. Yet, how 
does trus operationalisation relate to sustainable development and the proposed 
operationalisation of sustainable development? Does the proposal tacidy 
substitute eco-space for sustainable development? And if so, does it matter? 
Second, scientific forestty and its Nachhaltigkeit provide a local example of making 
a sustainable space, i.e. a "scientific forest" with its Normalbiiume [normal trees]. 
However, it did not only inttoduce Nachhaltigkeit, but also not much later, wh en 
the resttucturing of the forest proved too simplistic and ultimately destructive, 
Waldsterben [forest death].2 Contrary to the widespread contemporary mythology 
regarding the origin of sustainability in "good" and "green" forestty, the actual 
historical developments suggest the need for reconsideration. Does scientific 
forestry illustrate operationalisation in practice? If not, how does the proposed 
operationalisation of sustainable development with eco-space differ? 
l will first outline the eco-space proposal. My goal is to sharpen the edges 
of the eco-space proposal ln order to then examine the proposed 
operationalisation. The examination will turn to the exact form and coherence of 
eco-space in terms of the meaning of operationalisation stated in the first 
preparatory question, and it will examine the exact way in wruch eco-space 
proposes to deal with sustainable development. 
On the topic of the thesis, the essay thereby offers a case study of the 
relation between vision and accounts, and as such also an opportunity to engage a 
1 An influential source of operationalism or operationism is Percy W. Bridgman (Bridgman 1927). 
For a critical discussion see Hempel 1966, Chapter 6. 
2 l will turn to the example in more detail below. 
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contemporary political issue with the political philosophy of statistics so far 
developed. As the language of operationalisation is by no means only 
encountered in discussions of sustainable development, I hope that the 
discussion might also be of some value to readers with no direct interest in 
sustainable development. 
On the topie of the essay more specifically, the examination of the 
proposed operationalisation will lead me to a number of criticisms of the 
proposal. They need to be addressed for a qualified endorsement of the proposal, 
or so I will argue. 
2. ENVIRONMENTAL UTILISATION SPACE 
The Dutch economist Hans Opschoor is generally credited for having introduced 
what 1 will call environmental utilization space in the early 1990ies (Opschoor 1992).1 
Opschoor focuses on the role of ecosystems as an environmental infrastructure 
for basic functions of human life, and he analyses this role in terms of inputs and 
outputs: Human societies exttact and harvest resources as an input for economic 
production and the reproduction of society, and they thereby also create waste 
and pollution as an output (Opschoor 1995, 138). The regenerative processes of 
ecosystems permit the continued utilization of renewable resources such as wood 
and water, while absorption processes store, decompose and recycle the pollution 
and wastes produced as an output of human activities. In short, nature cornes 
1 1 use "environmental utilization space" so as to have a name for the specifie proposaI made by 
Opschoor; 1 use eco-space as my generaI name for proposaIs made by Opschoor and others, who 
generally refer back to Opschoor, but do not necessariIy share all aspects of bis proposaI. As 
Opschoor speaks of "environmentaI utilisation" and "utilisation boundaries," 1 think the term is 
true to the spirit of his proposaI; indeed, Opschoor has used the term "environmental utilisation 
space" himself (see Opschoor 1992, Section 1.1.). 
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into focus as an "environmental infrastructure" (Opschoor 1995, 138) of 
regenerative and absorptive processes, as the input and output of the economy. 
But how exactly does this "environmental infrastructure" give rise to a 
"space"? In the subsequent two sections, l will suggest sorne reasons why there is 
sorne ambiguity in the proposals with respect to this question. First however, let 
me attempt a more exact specification of the space?l Opschoor understands 
resource regeneration as a function of resource stocks and the effects of 
environmental pressures. This function can be articulated in terms of a three-
dimensional space with resources and environmental pressures on the horizontal 
axes and the growth of resources in cime - i.e. the derivative of resources with 
respect to cime - on the vertical axis. Turning first only to resource stocks and 
the growth of resources, Opschoor assumes that there are respective minimum 
and maximum sustainable stocks, i.e. in each case the resource stock is constant 
in time. FolIowing the work of other economists, he understands these minimum 
and maximum sustainable stocks in terms of (Lotka-Volterra) regeneration 
functions, i.e. From the minimum sustainable resource stock resource growth 
increases up to a maximum and then decreases again until it reaches the 
maximum sustainable resource stock.2 In a graph, the relation between stocks and 
growth can therefore be shown as a parabolic curve with x-axis intersections at 
the maximum and minimum sustainable stocks (see figure 1 below). Including 
now the dimension of environmental pressures, the pressures are assumed to 
negatively affect regeneration. Increases along the environmental pressure axis 
reduce resource growth, i.e. the parabolic curve decreases in width and height 
with increasing environmental pressures. ''The result is literally a space, the 
boundaries of which represent patterns and levels of environmental utilisation 
1 Here l would like to acknowledge helpful correspondence with Hans Opschoor. 
2 See Plourde 1970 for this way of rnodelling resource regeneration. 
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that can be maintained as long as the underlying environmental infrastructure 
exists" (Opschoor 1995, 138).1 Ec(c)o spazio! (See figure 2 be1ow). This one and 
no other? For now it suffices to note that the description is an operationalisation 
in the sense that it indicates the dimensions of the space and specifies the eco-
space boundaries.2 
Opschoor's proposal has been quickly adopted as a way to concretise and 
operationalize sustainable deve1opment. Notably the NGO Friends of the Earth 
promotes the concept with its publication of national sustainability reports. !ts 
well-known Sustainable Netherlands report in 1993 was followed by 30 further 
national reports (Spangenberg 2005, 106; Hille 1997; Larrafn 2002). The German 
report Zukunftsfiihiges Deutschland (BUND3 /Misereor 1996), to which l will return 
again be1ow, sold over 30 000 copies, and has been called the "green bible" by a 
leading news magazine. These reports have a primarily (although by no means 
exclusive1y) national focus. More recent studies have increasingly focused on eco-
space in terms of international and global issues (See for example Wuppertal 
Institute 2005, and Marcinez-Alier 2002, 227ft). 
3. THIS SPACE AND NO OTHER? 
Interestingly, Opschoor's exposition of environmental utilisation space begins 
with the following notion of space: "The biosphere is a complex life support 
system" (Opschoor 1995, 137, italics added). Let me briefly turn to this notion of 
1 As Opschoor notes, the construction of an environmental utilization space and the 
mathematical assumptions it rests on are discussed in detail in Siebert 1982. 
2 The reader will have noted the ambiguity of my "space" language. lndeed, "space" is often used 
to refer to a delineated body or room (for example a "space for meditation''), and it is used to 
refer to space as a structure within which to locate bodies. 1 follow this use in the literature and 
use "space" in the latter sense for a three-dimensional structure and in the former sense of a body 
or room with a specific volume. The delineation of eco-space concerns the latter task, but this 
presupposes a specification of "space" in the former sense. 
3 BUND is the German branch of Friends of the Earth. 
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space, which at first sight may be taken to be simply "the" eco-space. 
The biosphere has been anchored in the imaginations world-wide ever 
since satellite pictures of the blue planet became available in the late 1960ies. 
Many variations on these images began to circula te on logos of environmentalist 
groups and banks with global aspirations, book covers and news presentations. 
Already in 1970 environmentalist Lynton Caldwell writes "the change from the 
belief that the sun, moon and stars revolve around the earth to the Copernic an 
view of the earth's place in the solar system was a paradigm shift. The change 
marked by [the aftermath of Apollo] is from the view of an earth unlimited in 
abundance and created for man's exclusive use to a concept of the earth as a 
domain of life or biosphere ... " (Caldwell quoted in ]asanoff 2001,317); and the 
Brundtland Report, i.e. the probably most influential document on sustainable 
development, reads as follows on page 1, sentence Hf: "In the middle of the 20'" 
century, we saw our planet from space for the first cime ... From space, we see a 
small and fragile ball dominated not by human activity and edifice but by a 
pattern of clouds, greenery, and soils. Humanity's inability to fit its doings into 
that pattern is changing planetary systems fundamentally. Many such changes are 
accompanied by life-threatening hazards. This new reality, from which there is no 
escape, must be recognized - and managed" (World Commission on 
EnvÎronment and Development 1987, 1).1 
The scientific discussion of the biosphere is older than the satellite 
images. Already in 1875, the Austrian geologist Eduard Suess spoke of the 
"biosphere." 2 In a work on the genesis of the Alpes, Suess specified the zone of 
life on earth. From a geological point of view, he wrote, the Earth is a planet 
t PinalIy, at Ieast since the 1990 the raIe of the satellite "image" in global political, economic and 
ethical debates has itself received much academic discussion (Sachs 1999, ]asanoff 2001). 
2 1 am indebted in this paragraph to Sabine Hôhler's history of the biosphere in her article on the 
"Spaceship Earth" (Hôhler 2005, 260ff). 
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made of various spheres; life clusters on the crust of the earth thereby taking part 
in lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere. He thereby delineated a space, or 
more precisely a "sphere" or "envelope." Further developments were soon to 
follow. In bis classic Bioifera from 1926, the Russian mineralogist and bio-
geologist Vladimir Ivanovich Vemadsky carried on the discussion and analysed 
life not only in terms of its dependence on geological features, but saw life 
processes as themselves changing the earth and its geology. Finally, with the work 
of George Evelyn Hutchinson in the 1970ies the concept of the biosphere as the 
envelope of life could serve as a starting point for eco-systematic studies 
(Hutchinson 1970, 451). In bis classic article 'The Biosphere," Hutchinson 
analyses the various biological materials - carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, rutrogen etc. 
- that organisms ucilize and the cycles that make them continually available, their 
different rates of circulation and the important role of the sun as an external 
source of energy. 
Now, the biosphere is a thee-dimensional space of geometrical 
proportions - that "part of the Earth in wbich life exists . a terres trial 
envelope" (Hutchinson 1971, 45). The precise contours of this "envelope" are of 
course not simple. For example, at "considerable altitudes above the earth's 
surface the spores of bacteria and fungi can be obtained by passing air through 
fIlters. In general, however, such 'aeroplankton' does not appear to be engaged in 
active metabolism. Even on the surface of the earth there are areas too dry, too 
cold or too hot to support metabolizing orgarusms - except technically equipped 
human explorers -, but in such places also spores are commonly found. As a 
terrestrial envelope the biosphere obviously has a somewhat irregular shape, 
inasmuch, as it is surrounded by an indefinite 'parabiospheric' region in which 
some dormant forms of life are present" (Hutchinson 1971, 45). Scill, granted 
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these complications, the dimensions of the space at issue cliffer from those of the 
environmental utilization space introduced above. l have therefore added the 
third figure of a sphere in order to inclicate the difference also graphically.l The 
boundaries of environmental utilisation space are not those of the biosphere as 
an "envelope" covering the Earth. It is possible to exit the biosphere - for 
example by sending a probe to explore the solar systems (e.g. Voyager 1) - and to 
remain within the boundaries of environmental utilization space. Conversely, 
environmental utilisation space can be left behind - the required inputs and 
outputs for the human system of production and reproduction are used 
unsustainably -, but this need not imply exit from, and end to the biosphere. For 
all we know, there can be a biosphere without human beings. But why point out 
these differences? 
They indicate a fine ambiguity of the eco-space proposals, which tend to 
blur the differences between biosphere and environmental utilization space. 
Recalling the political context of the proposal, two reasons suggest themselves. 
First, the biosphere just described is closely related to the conception of everyday 
space. Three-dimensional space is the space in terrns of which we tend to 
experience the world, i.e. the space in which we conceptualise our everyday 
perceptions and actions.2 Without an explicit distinction between the space of the 
biosphere and environ mental utilization space, the eco-space proposal therefore 
can be used to pick us up as it were from the three dimensional space that the 
biosphere shares with everyday experience. Opschoor speaks of literalfy a space 
with height and width (Opschoor 1995, 137). Yet, all bodies - 3, 4, 5 or n-
1 The difference could also be illustrated with one of Hutchinson's illustration of the various 
cycles in the biosphere (see for example Hutchinson 1971,50). 
2 Kant famously argues that three-dimensional space is a condition of all possible experience. This 
thesis has come under much attack due to the invention of non-Euclidean geometry on the one 
hand, and philosophicaI approaches (for example Heidegger's) retrieving a conception of space as 
"place." Nonetheless, the point remains that three-dimensional space is a major, arguably the 
primary conceptualisation of spatial experience. 
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dimensional - have boundaries defmed in tenns of the respective dimensions, 
and there would therefore seem nothing surprisingly literal about boundaries -
unless these happen to be the boundaries of a three-dimensional space. For now 
there is a suggestive continuity of everyday three-dimensional space and 
environmental utilization space. Strikingly, the BUND /Misereor report even 
speaks of "life-space." l "Space" serves as a transporter from everyday 
experiential space to enYÏronmental utilization space. 
Second, not only does the space language suggest a continuity of 
enYÏronmental utilization and our experience of the natural environment that 
suffuses the proposal with immediacy and naturalness, but it thereby also carries 
on the dramatic elevation of the everyday experience to the "view from above" -
the biosphere as seen "from space,,2 as the report of the World Commission puts 
it, i.e. the view on the fragile blue planet with its greenery and clouds, which 
removes us from "aimless everyday wandering" and its "myopie circumspection," 
and establishes the bigger picture. 3 As the ambiguity of biosphere and 
environmental utilization space makes it possible to carry the view from above to 
the operationalisation proposal, envÏronmental utilization space becomes the 
promise of its quantitative specification.4 
1 See for example Bund/Misereor 1996, 237. 
2 Yet another usage of "space" ... 
3 Prior to ail satellite images, tbis perspective has been anticipated by the scientists mentioned 
above. Vernadsky wrote: "The face of the Earth viewed from celestial space presents a unique 
appearance, different from all other heavenly bodies. The surface that separates the planet from 
the cosmic medium is the biosphere" (Vernadsky 1926/1997,43). Suess did not even forget ta 
"push away" those douds that would later become a challenge for the making of satellite images. 
In 1883, he wrote: "If we imagine an observer from outer space, and pushing aside the belts of 
douds which obscure our atmosphere, to gaze for a whole day on the surface of the earth ... " 
(Quoted in the annotated English translation ofVernadsky's book on page 43) .. 
4 Incidentally, the best-known sustainability indicator, the ecological footprint, ingeniously plays 
with just such a switch of "spaces." The name introduces the footprint on the biosphere - and 
the imagination is helped with cartoons in the publication -, but the calculation of footprints 
works with virtual hectares and accounting equivalences that make different capacities 
comparable (Wackernagel et al. 2004). 
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To sum this up, the ambiguity in the proposals makes it possible to 
establish continuity with everyday spatial experience while at the same time 
elevating this experience to the "view from above:" the blue planet in a vast and 
dark universe, a fragile ball that needs to be "managed" - and environmental 
utilization space is to be the instrument for this. And yet, there is a subtle play of 
dependence and interdependence between the biosphere and envÏronmental 
utilization space that on the one hand makes it possible to leave the biosphere 
without leaving environmental utilization space, although that is rare and requires 
ingenuity. On the other, the boundaries of envÏronmental utilization space are 
likewise permeable - its boundaries can be passed without leaving the biosphere. 
This gives rise to border conilicts that, as we will see below, make it necessary to 
think of the eco-space proposal as more than just a quantitative specification of 
the gaze from space. 
4. DELINEATING ECO-SPACE 
But in what sense is envÏronmental utilization space even three-dimensional? 
AIready the resource dimension consists for example of a variety of renewable 
resources each with their utilization boundaries. By implication, different 
regeneration functions have to be specified for the renewable resources as weil as 
the interrelations between the various resources. If there is no plausible way of 
aggregating or linking together the number (n) of renewable resources, the space 
to work with is in practice so to speak n-dimensional. It is therefore not 
surprising that in his rigorous discussion of resource regeneration, Horst Siebert 
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focuses on one resource only and merely suggests the possibility of extenrung the 
analysis to more than one resource at the end ofhis article (Siebert 1982, 142).1 
What is more, the formulation of the challenge in terms of various 
resources and their rufferent utilization boundaries still understates the problem. 
Non-renewable resources by defInition do not regenerate. How then delineate 
the space with the vertical axis as specifIed ab ove? 
Noting the challenges that Opschoor's theoretical proposal faces, we may 
ask how the aUthors of the abovementioned national reports draw the contours 
of eco-space in practice. One example is the German eco-space report, which 
explicitly draws on, and seeks to elab 0 rate Opschoor's proposal 
(BUND/Misereor 1996, 27). According to its authors, the most pressing 
environmental issues concern not so much the limited nature of resources, but 
rather the environmental problems due to pollution and waste (BUND/Misereor 
1996, 43ff). They propose a number of emission inrucators (C02, S02, NOx, 
NH3, VOC, Erosion, Synthetic fertilizers and pesticides; BUND/Misereor 1996, 
47) and complement these inrucators with a precautionary approach that attempts 
to reduce the general sources of environmental problems. Claiming the overall 
quantity of material and energy as the primary source of these problems 
(BUND /Misereor 1996, 45), the report proposes inrucators for material 
(materials withdrawn, proportion of renewable materials), energy (primary energy 
consumption, proportion of renewable energy), water (water withdrawal, 
proportion of ground water withdrawal) and land (growth/ reduction of use for 
settlement and transportation, growth/reduction of number of non-fragmented 
areas of critical size). It is in terms of these categories and the inrucators 
belonging to them that the contours of the eco-space emerge in the proposaI, 
1 Opschoor acknowledges Siebert's work as inspiring his environmental utilization space proposaI. 
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because now objectives regarding the various indicators can be specified, i.e. how 
much reduction of x, what rate of y etc. 
A look at the specification of eco-space in practice therefore brings to the 
fore the crucial role of statistics. It is with the help of various indicators and the 
objectives related to them that the boundaries of eco-space are drawn. To this 
end, the authors follow the orientation in terms of inputs and outputs put 
forward in Opschoor's environmental utilization space proposal. However, they 
give no indication that they ultimately seek to reduce for example all emissions to 
one environmental pressure index. The comparison between Opschoor's 
theoretiCal proPOSal and the use made of this proPosal in the practice of national 
reports therefore suggests that environmental utilization space takes the role of 
an idea that offers central categories and with them initial orientation, but not a 
detailed set of instructions for the making of eco-space reports in practice. The 
boundaries of the respective eco-space come into view as objectives stated in 
relation to indicators (e.g. specifie emission and resource targets) that express the 
expert judgment of the authors of the report. This final observation takes us to 
an important further aspect of the operationalisation. 
5. DISPLACEMENT 
"For the concept of sustainability ... to be operationally useful it must be more 
than just an expression of social values or politiCal preferences disguised in 
scientific language. Ideally it should be defmed so that one could specify a set of 
measurable criteria such that individuals and groups with widely differing values, 
political preferences or assumptions about human nature could agree whether the 
criteria are being met in a concrete development program" (Harvey Brooks, 
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quoted in Jacobs 1999, 24). Remarkably, Harvey Brooks notes widely differing 
values, political preferences and assumptions, yet envisages in the same sentence 
agreement on the meeting of criteria. There is a subtle shift from criteria, which 
people with widely differing values presumably disagree on, towards agreement 
on already set criteria. 
So how are the criteria set? How are the contours of eco-space specified? 
l noted in the last section that non-renewable resources by definition do not 
regenerate and that the specification of their regeneration function is therefore a 
daunting task even for experts. Agam, it is instructive to consider the eco-space 
approach in the practice of the national reports. The German report, already 
introduced above, licenses the use of non-renewable resources provided that 
there is a physically and functionally equivalent replacement of the used resource 
in the form of some renewable resource (Bund/Misereor 1996, 30). This rule 
requires difficult judgments regarding the physical and functional equivalents. "ls 
nuclear power good enough, even though we will be leaving radioactive waste, 
which will be potentially dangerous to human beings and other living creatures 
for thousands of years? Is hydraulic power good enough, even if we have to flood 
some beautiful or historically significant valley and block some salmon 
pathways?" (Arler 2003, 161). The proposed rules for the use of renewable 
resources and environmental pressures is respectively to only use up as many 
renewable resources as can be regenerated, and not to exceed the absorptive 
capacity of the environment (Bund/Misereor 1996, 31). But, as Finn Arler notes, 
it is quite possible to go beyond the sustainable rate for a while provided that the 
resource does not disappear altogether. Offering the example of the 
eutrophication of lakes and watercourses, he argues that emissions likewise may 
significantly change the respective environment and in this sense surpass the 
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absorptive capacities without this automatically implying a threat to the survival 
of human beings. 'We can live with lower water quality, even if the salmon 
cannot" (ArIer 2003, 163). 
Arler's sceptical points bring to the fore a sensitive spot of the shift noted 
above. It defers the specification of criteria to experts. In terms of the value 
pluralism stated by Brooks, the operationalisation proposal places disputed 
questions away from the controversies between various societal groups into the 
hands of experts. So is the hope that we might learn to forget or bracket these 
disputes and come to accept the criteria proposed by the experts? 
On the one hand, the benefit of the shift is evidently that the experts qua 
experts have a greater understanding of various aspects of emissions and 
resources. Moreover, their work can help spell out the criteria in a rigorous form 
that will make it harder to contest their measurement, and in this sense helps 
ensure the envisaged agreement on criteria. On the other hand, the experts are 
qua experts not better "equipped" than anyone else to decide on overall societal 
goals to which the specification of criteria is inevitably linked (as the sceptical 
questions noted ab ove made clear). It is therefore possible that decisions are 
displaced from the public domain, and this gives rise to a danger that advocates of 
eco-space must take into account, or so l aim to show in the next section. 
6. TREES INTO THALERS 
Environmental utilization space draws on the notion of regenerative and 
absorptive capacities, or in one word: carrying capacity. In her article on the 
history of the notion of carrying capacity in relation to attempts at population 
management, Sabine Hôbler traces the implication of a quantified notion of space 
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and points out that it led the actors to a focus on storage, circulation and 
classification (Hahler 2004, 2ff): What is the maximum number of population 
given carrying capacity (storage)? What system of material reproduction can 
sustain this population (circulation)? If the population exceeds the carrying 
capacity, who has to go (classification)? Hahler concludes that the concept 
"tends to produce categories like 'overpopulation' ... " and talk of "surplus 
people," and hints at the direct and indirect euthanasia policies this gives rise to 
(Hahler 2004, 10).1 
Complementary to the management of the population is the management 
of resources and wastes, i.e. the planet as a storage system posing questions of 
circulation (sustainable yield, sustainable pollution etc.) and classification 
(renewable and non-renewable resources, natural and critical natural capital and 
so forth) so as to make the specification of circulation determinate. Recall the 
example of scientific forestry, i.e. the attempt to achieve a maximum sustainable 
yield of timber. It provides an instructive case study for the making of a 
sustainable space. First, there is a limited set of purposes, in this case the rulers' 
interest in revenue. The defmition of purpose leads to a perspective on the forest 
as primarily an economic resource for the ruler. A step towards the making of a 
scientific forest 1S therefore simplification in the sense that other uses and 
perspectives of the forest, e.g. the uses of the forest by the non-governmental 
multitude (gathering wood, hunting etc.), must be ignored or attain secondary 
status. Moreover, because the forest 1S messy - full of brush, slow-growing trees 
and other obstacles to measurement -, scientific forestry attempted to improve 
1 Paul Ehrlich "suggests a 'triage' system for the 'classification of nations' into those, who are in 
the situation to give aid ('us', the Western world, particularly the US), those who may undergo the 
demographic transition without drastic help, those who may succeed to self-sufficiency with food 
aid, and, fmally, the tragic category of underdeveloped categories without hope that should not 
receive more food" (Hôhler 2004, 10). 
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their measurement by re-growing the forest and retraining the staff so as to better 
turn "trees into thalers" (Lowood 1990, 322). With these changes of forest and 
people it became easier to manipulate and experiment, and thereby further form 
the forest-space.1 
The example highlights the need to also pay attention to the political 
dimension of the eco-space proposal. It serves as a cautionary reminder that the 
making of a sustainable space is also an administrative exercise. If "scientific 
forestry" or "environmental utilization space" are scrutinized only in terms of 
their conceptual consistency, falsifiability or related criteria, this managerial 
dimension is likely to be overlooked; environmental utilization space is envisaged 
as already there, and the delineation of its boundaries is delegated to the expert-
"geometer" without the administrative dimension coming into view. But as the 
example dramatically illustrates, the operationalisation entails novel management 
possibilities and with them the possibility of administrative abuse, i.e. in the 
present case ultimately the spectre of a global technocracy that weeds out 
whatever is too messy for the delineation of a global eco-space. Therefore, a 
criterion of adequacy for the eco-space proposal is the specification of the 
societal place of the delineation of eco-space in political society. 
As noted in section four, the delineation of eco-space in practice centrally 
involves the production of statistics. This suggests that we can draw at this point 
on the specification of the political place of the statistical accounts proposed in 
essay four. Accountability institutions, as part of a system of institutions 
operating on the basic structure of society, are to provide independent and 
1 This is not meant to suggest that scientific forestry succeeded in crea ring a sustainable forest 
space. Scientific forestry quickly ran into troubles - "it took about one century for them (the 
negative consequences) to show up clearly - many of the pure stands grew excellently in the first 
generation but already showed an amazing retrogression in the second generation" (Richard 
Plochmarm quoted in Scott 1998, 22). This is the rime when the term Wa/dsterben begins to be 
used. 
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assessable information that improve citizen s' capacity to hold govemment 
accountable and that impel the other institutions to promote and secure society 
as a fair system of co-operation. Now, the separation of information provision 
and govemmental executive is one way to limit the danger of technocratie abuse 
noted by cri tics, and intended ta strengthen the resilience of large political 
societies against such dangers via the promotion of democratic accountability. 
However, the capacity to promote democratic accountability also depends on 
dealing with a further problem with the eco-space proposal Ca problem that the 
prior discussion of accountability institutions as part of a system of co-operation 
already indicates). In the example of scientific forestry, the risk of abuse is 
intimately linked to the rulers' insensitivity to the multitude's various ways of 
using and being in the forest. This brings to the fore a further aspect of the 
proposed operationalisation that l will turn to in the next section. 
7. INVISIBILITY 
Eco-space is to operationalise sustainable development, but the proposal narrows 
down what is to be sustained. EnvÏronmental problems such as the 10ss of a 
forest and the flooding of a place, which do not pose a threat to survival -
another forest can be planted, people can move somewhere else - offer one kind 
of example ta see this. If Denmark is flooded, the Danish people might survive 
by moving to other parts of Europe, but there would be something rotten in the 
state of Denmark. So does the proposed operationalisation of sustainable 
development render sorne salient issues invisible? 
Arler criticises eco-space proposals for leaving out a category of "unique 
resources." These are resources that are "so important to us in one way or 
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another that their disappearance would cause a profound sense of loss and 
serious damage to our sense of who we are. They cannot easily be replaced by 
something else, nor bought and sold in an ordinary bargain, because they are 
loaded with meanings that are more or less crucial, not for our survival as 
biological creatures, but for our identity" (Arler 2003, 175). Arler makes a 
communitarian argument in terms of identity and Hthe sense of who we are," 
which he targets against what he views as the Kantian liberal or modemist story 
told by the advocates of environmental utilization space. 
However, for the present observation we can sidestep the debate between 
liberals and communitarians, because eco-space renders goods invisible in a way 
that can be recognized by liberals and communitarians alike. It is simply not 
possible to make a number of widely recognized sustainability concerns a matter 
of eco-space and its boundaries. Thus, in the spirit of Arler's critique, we can 
note that Rawls' intergenerational savings principle demands the Hpreservation of 
the gains of culture and civilisation" (Rawls 1971, 252). But the se gains do not 
appear in environmental utilization space. Neither the environmental utilization 
space outlined in the second 2, nor the categories of the national eco-space report 
cited in section 3 capture "gains of culture and civilisation." 
Sensing the problem, the BUND /Misereor-report notes the diverse 
relations of people to the environment and the diverse uses they make of it, but 
daims boldly that the eco-space proPOSal recognizes the diverse ways in which 
human beings use and relate to the natural environment, induding such aspects 
as the integrity and beauty of the environment and its species (Bund/Misereor 
1996, 27). Yet, when it comes to the specification of objectives, the beauty and 
integrity of the landscape simply do not Hshow up" as objectives in the report. 
Nor is it obvious how aesthetic, cultural or social objectives are to be specified in 
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terms of eco-space boundaries.1 The space language creates pressure to formulate 
everything in its terms. Even a critic like Arler ultimately appears to seek an 
extended notion of space when he urges not to ignore a category of "wùque 
resources." There is a totalizing effect of the language of a quantified space: 
How could anything not show up in "it"? 
As there is even on a general level beyond the particular demands and 
specifications of political philosophies such as communitarianism or the Rawlsian 
vision of co-operation unquestionably more than just an environmental wing to 
sustainable development, it follows that the operationalisation of sustainable 
development is a partial one, and that, left unqualified, eco-space proposals are 
deeply problematic. Other wings of sustainable development - the social, cultural 
and political sides of meeting needs - must be recognized in their partial 
independence. They are independent in that it makes little sense ta think of 
primary goods such as in come and wealth (or likewise of capabilities) as 
boundaries of eco-space. But they are only partial!J independent in that they are 
clearly interrelated - for example the in come level to resource use, waste 
production and exposure to pollution. However, such relations - important as 
they are on the national and especially on the global level - can only be properly 
stated once the partial nature of the proposed operationalisation is acknowledged. 
1 This is not to say that there are no important relations. l return to this point below. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
Sustainable development, as a political concept, is contested and the object of 
rival interpretations. So as to be able to focus as much as possible on the relation 
of operationalisation, l have tried to stay on a general level regarding various 
political visions and the exact interpretations of sustainable development they are 
conducive to. This strategy does not imply that the vision of co-operation, wruch 
l introduced in the earlier essays, does not offer a way, indeed l would argue an 
especially persuasive one, ta spell out the sustainability concem with needs.1 Nor 
does it imply that the eco-space proposal does not offer a way to elaborate the 
relation between the natural environment and co-operation. 
That such elaboration is needed can be seen with the help of the so-called 
circumstances of justice, wruch occupy an important place in a tradition of 
theorizing about co-operation from David Hume to John Rawls. 2 The 
circumstances of justice are meant to specify the conditions that make co-
operation both possible and necessary, and include conditions of moderate 
scarcity, rough mental and physical equality, the vulnerability of human beings to 
attack from others as weIl as the limited altruism and limited cognitive capacities 
of hum an beings (Rawls 1971, 110). However, its elaboration and beauty 
notwithstanding, there is a curious absence in Hume's discussion. He contrasts 
the circumstances of justice to circumstances where questions of justice do not 
arise: "public war,,3 and environrnental conditions of "extreme necessity.'>4 But 
Hume discusses these different circumstances separately. He asks for example 
1 For an outline of this reading see Ziegler 2oo5b. 
Z And Hume draws a line to philosophees such as Plato and Hobbes, as weil as the itnagination of 
poets (Hume 1751, Section III, Part 1). 
3 "A society of ruffians" Hume 1751, 18. 
4 "Utmost frugaIity and industry cannot preserve the greater numbee from perishing, and the 
whole from extreme misery" Hume 1 7 51, 18. 
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whether it is "a crime, after a shipwreck, to seize whatever means or instrument 
of safety one can lay hold of, without regard to former limitations of properry?" 
(Hume 1751, 18, italics added).l However, he does not discuss co-operation as a 
cause of future shipwreck, i.e. of future extreme scarcity due to co-operation 
undermining the possihility ta co-operate, and therefore sees no need to draw any 
"Plimsoll line." Placing himself in the same tradition, Rawls specifies a "definite 
geographica! territory" on which human co-operation takes place. lbis 
specification, tagether with the condition of moderate scarcity, is as far as Rawls' 
account of the natural environment as "a circumstance of justice" gets. The 
relation to the future as a question concerning the relation hetween the system of 
co-operation and its natural environment is not directly present in his discussion 
of the circumstances of justice. There is, to he sure, a discussion of future 
generations later on in his work. An intergenerational savings principle is meant 
to preserve "the gains of culture and civilization" and "real capital accumulation" 
in terms of "various forms of net investment in machinery and other means of 
production to investment in learning and education" (Rawls 1971, 252). At the 
very least, this economic and cultural-institutional focus leaves much to be 
spelled out regarding the natura! environment - eco-space suggests part of the 
work required to meet this outstanding task. 
l Here is the passage From which the question is taken: "Suppose a society to faIl into su ch want 
of all common necessaries, that the utmost frugality and industry cannot preserve the greater 
number From perishing, and the whole from extreme misery; it will readily, 1 believe, be admitted, 
that the strict laws of justice are suspended, in such a pressing emergence, and give place to the 
stronger motives of necessity and self-preservation. Is it any crime, after a shipwreck, to seize 
whatever means or instrument of safety one can lay hold of, without regard to former limitations 
of property? Or if a city besieged were perishing with hunger; can we imagine, that men will see 
any means of preservation before them, and lose their lives, from a scrupulous regard to what, in 
other situations, would be the rules of equity and justice? The use and tendency of that virtue is to 
procure happiness and security, by preserving orcier in society: but where the society is ready to 
perish from extreme necessity, no greater evil can be dreaded from violence and injustice; and 
every man may now provide for hirnself by all the means, which prudence can dicta te, or 
humanity permit" (Hume 1751, 18). 
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Yet, in this case a proper understanding of the proposal becomes aU the 
more urgent. In accordance with the focus of this thesis, l have investigated the 
role statistical accounts may have for such an elaboration 1 - and indeed for 
achieving sustainable development. To this end l asked: What operationa/isation of 
sustainable development does eco-space propose? Environmental utilization 
space offers one way to organize our thinking about the relation between the 
natural environment and the human system of production and reproduction in 
terms of that system's reliance on the regenerative and absorptive capacities of 
the natural environment. l aimed to show that the intimate relation of the 
proposaI to the biosphere - and via the latter to everyday experiential space -
make it intuitively accessible and invest it with the promise of a quantitative 
specification of the environmentalist "view from above" on the biosphere as the 
thin sphere of life of the blue planet seen from space. Indicators and the 
objectives related to them are ta specify to what extent the resource use and 
pollution and waster production of a society are sustainable. The proposal 
thereby draws on statistics as a technology of distance that can improve 
democratic accountability in large political societies. 
However, there is more to the proposed operationalisation. RecaU the 
first introductory observation of section one: Eco-space aIready con tains an idea 
of operationalisation in that it proposes various measurements that aUow the 
1 This is to say that there a ntunber of importance issues aiso raised by the proposaI, which are in 
many ways complementary to the present work, but cannot be discussed here. In terms of the 
Rawisian vision of co-operation these concern for example the extension of the list of primary 
goods. The already existing literature on this and related issues is discussed in Them 1995. 
Incidentally, the authors of the Brundtland report, who draw on a more extensive account of the 
natural environment, propose an extension of the traditional account of rights and liberties. The 
authors place human societies and theÏr activities in the biosphere (World Commission on 
EnvÏronment Development 1987, 3, 8, 34f, 136, 141, 161, 251, 307), and have in view the 
regeneration and absorption question of eco-space (World Commission on Environment 
Development 1987, 21, 33f, 58, 128, 271). Their "cÏrcumstances" posit human beings as living 
beings in the biosphere rather than on a "dermite territory." The report then demands a 
fundamental human right to an "environment adequate to human health and well-being" (World 
Commission on EnvÏronment Development 1987, 348). Tim Hayward has offered a sophisticated 
justification of this right as a constitutional right (Hayward 2005). 
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delineation of the boundaries of eco-space. But how does trus operationalisation 
relate to sustainable development? Is the operationalisation in the end a 
problematic substitution? Closer examination revealed the pertinence of the 
question: the proposed operationalisation is a partial one. If eco-space is taken as 
"the" operationalisation of sustainable development, then a number of 
sustainable development issues are thereby simply rendered invisible (nowhere is 
trus more problematic than on the international level, where countries of the 
South have long worried that sustainable development will be reduced to dealing 
with environmental issues only and thereby lead to a bracketing of global 
economic inequalities l ). In section seven, l noted that it makes little sense to 
conceive of the social, cultural and political wings of sustainable development in 
terms of eco-space boundaries. Still, they clearly pertain to the questions what 
ought to be sustained and what type of development it is worthwhile to endorse. 
It follows that upon consideration the endorsement of the eco-space proposal 
requîres recognition of its limitations. Indeed, as these limitations are recognized 
and as other aspects of sustainable development are given their place, the 
relations between eco-space and these aspects can be worked out. Consequently, 
there is greater possibility not to stay at a society-environment relation only - a 
temptation that eco-space proposal in spite of daims to the contrary frequently 
tend ta succumb to -, but to also examine the differential exposure to 
environmental pressures and use of resources, and the relation of these 
differences to goods such as self-respect, opportunities and income. 
The second introductory observation in section one noted the dangers of 
the politics of operationalisation. Is scientific forestry the exemplar for what the 
proposed operationalisation of sustainable development would look like in 
1 See Sachs (1999) for this line of criticism. 
195 
practice? Operationalisation, as a proposal made by scientists, ought not to lead 
to a negligence of the administrative and democratic dimensions of the proposal. 
Space concepts, as the history of sustainability shows, can be conducive to 
technocratie abuse. Looked at more closely, operationalisation implies a subtle 
shift empowering those delineating its boundaries. A qualified defence of the eco-
space proposal must therefore specifY the place of the delineation of eco-space 
and the measurements it involves as part of the operationalisation proposal. In 
turn, critics painting the spectre of technocracy and planetary management can be 
replied to, or sa l have tried ta do drawing on the depiction of accountability 
institutions developed in essay four. 
Finally, the discussion in this essay offers a case study regarding an 
important relation between political concepts and statistical accounts. The eco-
space proposal in this sense may be of more general interest for an understanding 
of the politics of operationalisation, which seem to increasingly gain a central 
place in large political societies (consider the domain of education and 
international indicators for educational performance). To be sure, l do not know 
whether the present case study confirms experiences made in other domains, 
and/ or offers surprises and contrast. Still, the tendency of the accounts to 
substitute and re-de scribe in their own image appears to be worthwhile paying 
attention to more generally, and likewise the shift that accompanies the move 
towards criteria designed to make widespread agreement possible. It is this shift 
that makes the clarification of the democratic place of the accounts sa important. 
196 
Concluding Remarks 
Quetelet launches rus classic Sur j'homme with the following example: 'We may 
instance the case of a person examining too nearly a small portion of a very large 
circle, and who, consequently, would see in this detached portion merely a certain 
quantity of physical points, grouped in a more or 1ess irregular manner, and so, 
indeed, as to seem as if they had been arranged by chance, notwithstanding the 
care with which the original figure may have been traced. But, placing rumse1f at a 
greater distance, the eye embraces of necessity a greater number of points, and 
a1ready a degree of regularity is observable over a certain extent of the segment of 
the circle; and by removing still farther from the object, the observer 10ses sight 
of the individual points, no longer observes any accidental or odd arrangements 
amongst them, but discovers at once the 1aw presiding over their general 
arrangement, and the precise nature of the circle so traced. But let us suppose, as 
might happen, that the different points of the arch, instead of being material 
points, were small animated beings, free to act according to their will, in a very 
circumscribed sphere, yet these spontaneous motions would not be perceived by 
the eye p1aced at a suitab1e distance" (Quetelet 1835, 5). The examp1e exhibits the 
perception of order associated with the statistical macro-scopic point of view that 
Quetelet promoted so e1oquently. Statistics, Quete1et's examp1e insinuates, offers 
a "view from above" and with the distance philosoprucal consolation and 
tranquillity. 
"Removing" from things with the he1p of statistics reveals a form long 
held to be divine: the circle. Its "points" are all at the same distance from the 
centre. From a "suitable distance" the "animated beings" can be seen in a 
harmonious political structure, or so the example seems to promise. No doubt, 
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few still share Quetelet's enthusiasm and hope for a "social physics." Still, we 
have come to understand ourselves as members of a society with the help of 
statistics and the regularities they make visible; in fact, we are so accustomed to 
the use of statistics for the making and communication of policies that we hardly 
even note them. In the preceding essays, 1 have attempted to enter the "circle" in 
order to make sorne steps towards a political philosophy of statistics. 
The first two essays introduced the vision of co-operation, the demand 
for visible justice built into it, and retrieved the statistical macro-scopic point of 
view in this vision. Essay three offered a contrast via an examination of a 
philosophy that is generally associated with the rejection of the co-operation 
approach as a dangerous "modernist" or "liberal" fantasy. Yet, looked at more 
closely, Heidegger's phenomenology of everydayness presents testimony for the 
public self-understanding in terms of statistics, and an original approach for 
thinking about the perception and agency that tends to be associated with this 
self-understanding. 1 argued that it sensitizes to the dangers associated with this 
self-understanding, and in this way contributes to a political philosophy of 
statistics. 
Yet the retrieval of the use of, and reflection on, statistics in these 
philosophical works is not only interesting for its own sake - the story of the 
statistical macro-scopic point of view and the emergence of a public self-
understanding characterised by "averageness" adds a new perspective, 1 
suggested, on philosophical classics -, it also prepares the grounds and raises the 
issues to be considered for a specification of the place of statistics as part of the 
vision of co-operation. In contrast to the prevailing technocratic-managerial 
understanding of statistics, 1 have attempted to specify this place in terms of the 
role of statistics for democratic accountability. 
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Finally, a political philosophy of statistics ultirnately must help us think 
through urgent political issues. There is a clear sense that the present mode of 
organisation and its economically-centred ide a of development need to be 
reconsidered in view of omnipresent signs of their great ecological and social 
costs. But this idea is made visible and thereby in part maintained with the help 
of statistics. So what does it take to critique this idea? Essay five defended the 
ISEW as a debunking index that promotes democratic accountability and that, 
not least due to its inherent shortcomings, serves as a stepping-stone for more 
systematic approaches. Essay six therefore tumed to a more systematic proposal: 
eco-space. Statistics has a key role in the proposed operationalisation of 
sustainable development with eco-space. l argued that the idea of eco-space 
provides a promising route to systematically think about the statistical accounts 
required so as to take our place in the eco-sphere into account. However, a 
plausible defence of the proposal needs to be qualified. The language of 
operationalisation must neither lead to a neglect of salient issues left out by the 
proposal (as is the case for the social and cultural dimensions of sustainable 
development) -, nor to a scientistic understanding of the approach that fails to 
specify the democratic place of the delineation of eco-space in political society. 
The value of this concept as a political instrument can only benefit from a 
recognition of its limitations and dependence. 
In trus spirit, l would like to conclude with two limitations of the present 
essays toward a political philosophy of statistics. First, in this the sis l chose to 
think through a political philosophy of statistics with the help of the vision of co-
operation; l drew on work of retrieval, normative analysis and a contemporary 
political issue in an attempt to sketch the contours of such a political philosophy 
- and what it has to tell us about this way in wruch we have come to understand 
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ourselves. Retrieval, normative analys1s and engagement proved more than 
enough material for one thesis. Still, it would be interesting to move on and 
compare the focus of this essay with related political visions - l have especially in 
mind Habermas' political philosophy - as weIl as alternative political visions such 
as the communitarian and republican approaches to political philosophy to 
mention but two.1 Second, there is the anthropocentric focus of the idea of 
society as a fair system of co-operation. The last two essays turn to the limitation 
of the idea of co-operation if developed in ignorance of the place of human 
societies in the biosphere, but inevitably they thereby also point beyond human 
concerns. For example, the devastating effect of human societies on biodiversity 
- itself a flourishing field of indicator research - are hardly reducible to 
instrumental questions only, but raise etrucal questions of their own. Showing 
how the vision of co-operation might be congenial to questions of what 1S usually 
referred to as environmental ethics and drawing the implications for a political 
philosophy of statistics is another task. 
t Habermas characterises his exchange with Rawls as a family dispute (see Habermas 1998, essay 
two). For Habermas' political philosophy see especially Habermas 1981 and 1992; for 
communitarian and pluralist approaches see Walzer 1983 and Miller 1999; for the republican 
approach see Petrit 1997. 
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